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A Tear in the Eye of the Law:
Mitigating Factors and the
Progression Toward a Disease
Theory of Criminal Justice
We shall look on crime as a disease, and its physicians shall
displace the judges, its hospitals displace the galleys.  Liberty
and health shall be alike.  We shall pour balm and oil where
we formerly applied iron and fire; evil will be treated in char-
ity, instead of in anger.  This change will be simple and
sublime.
—Victor Hugo1
Throughout history, members of society have committed actsthat violate a social code, and society’s dilemma has been
the question of how to deal with these crimes.  Punishment issues
are of such import to humans that world religions and mythology
often include tales of punishments for transgressions.  For exam-
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sity, 1984.  The Author thanks Lien Chau Benedict, Harry Berberian, Lisa Jacobson,
Carlos Medina, Scott McCollum, Michael Oppenheimer, Daniel Robles, Katerina
Semyonova, Michael Shender, and Joshua Williams for their research assistance.
Also, thanks to Professor Evan Mandery, Professor Russell Miller, and Professor
Deborah Zalesne for comments on earlier drafts.  The title comes from a quote in
Victor Hugo, Les Miserables, when Inspector Javert confronts the humanity of Jean
Valjean, the escaped prisoner he had been pursuing.  Because this Article addresses
issues of morality as well as legal issues, concepts from philosophy and literature are
sometimes used to analyze the legal concepts.
1 VICTOR HUGO, The Last Days of a Condemned , in THE DEATH PENALTY:  A
LITERARY AND HISTORICAL APPROACH 103, 105 (Edward G. McGehee & William
H. Hildebrand eds., 1964).  A more contemporary writer raised a related question:
But there’s just one question/Before they kill me dead/ I’m wondering just
how much/ To you I really said/ Concerning all the boys that come/ Down a
road like me/ Are they enemies or victims/ Of your society?
BOB DYLAN, The Ballad of Donald White , on BROADSIDE BALLADS VOL. 6:
BROADSIDE REUNION (Folkways Records 1971).
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ple, the gods punished Prometheus for stealing fire,2 and Sisy-
phus’ punishment was to eternally roll the stone up the hill.3
God punished Adam and Eve for eating from the Tree of Knowl-
edge.4  Cain later slew Abel, so God banished Cain,5 who re-
sponded, “My punishment is greater than I can bear.”6  Similarly,
the Qur’an, the Hindu Bhagavad Gita, and Buddhist Dham-
mapada address retribution for the wicked.7
Today, the struggle continues as American society debates the
benefits of tough prison sentences, the death penalty, and “three
strikes” laws.  The theories used to justify the use of punishment
usually center on two main justifications: (1) utilitarian justifica-
tions such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; and
(2) retributive justifications.  Under utilitarian theory, punish-
ment is used to prevent offenders from hurting other people and
to serve as a warning to others.8  Under retributive theory, some
people just “deserve” punishment on moral grounds.9  The utili-
tarian and retributive justifications appear throughout the history
of our criminal justice system in both case decisions10 and in
scholarship.11  And while the former justification embraces the
theory that criminal behavior may be controlled by the threat of
2 See AESCHYLUS, PROMETHEUS BOUND 4 (Mark Griffith ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1983).
3 See ALBERT CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 119 (Justin
O’Brien trans., Vintage Books 1991) (1955).
4 Genesis  3:24.
5 Id . 4:12.
6 Id . 4:13 (King James).
7 Jon’a F. Meyer, Retributive Justice , in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT 1393, 1396 (2002).  Additionally, for a recent discussion of punishment theory
and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, see Marguerite A. Driessen, Not
for the Sake of Punishment Alone:  Comments on Viewing the Criminal Sanction
Through Latter-Day Saint Thought , 2003 BYU L. REV. 941; Martin R. Gardner,
Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-Day Saint Thought , 2003 BYU L.
REV. 861; Steven F. Huefner, Reservations About Retribution in Secular Society ,
2003 BYU L. REV. 973.
8 See  discussion infra  Part I.
9 See id .
10 See, e.g. , Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
11 See, e.g. , CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jane Grigson
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (John Bowring ed., 1843), reprinted
in JOSH DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 34 (3d ed. 2003);
MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION:  EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERA-
TURE (1990); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
(1988); Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals:  How Can Something that Feels So Good
Be Wrong? , 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448 (1990).
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punishment, the latter embraces the theory that some people
simply are unquestionably evil.12
There is, however, another view about the relationship be-
tween crime and punishment that has been around for centuries.
Some philosophers, writers, lawyers, and judges have argued that
criminals have no choice in how they act not because they are
inherently “evil” but because they are a product of their genes
and their environment.  Plato wrote, “For no man is voluntarily
bad; but the bad becomes bad by reason of an ill disposition of
the body and bad education, things which are hateful to every
man and happen to him against his will.”13  Victor Hugo pre-
dicted that society eventually would come to see crime as a “dis-
ease” because crime is caused by factors beyond the actor’s
control.14  In 1884, John Peter Altgeld wrote the book Our Penal
Machinery and Its Victims , which argued that society should fo-
cus its resources on addressing the causes of crime instead of
punishing wrongdoers.15  The book would influence Clarence
12 When encountering evil, philosophers have debated whether or not we should
attempt to explain it. See SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT:  AN ALTER-
NATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 238-328 (2002).  The use of the term “evil” has
been part of the modern debate about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the
United States as President George W. Bush and others used the term to describe the
terrorists and certain countries. See, e.g. , Matthew Carolan & Raymond J. Keating,
War Is No Excuse to Expand Size or Role of Government , N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 18,
2001, at A38 (“Some have criticized President George W. Bush’s use of the word
evil when referring to bin Laden, other terrorists and governments supporting terror
. . . .  The war in which we are engaged is a fight against evil.”); David E. Sanger, A
Nation Challenged:  The Rogue List , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (noting Presi-
dent Bush’s use of the term “axis of evil” to describe certain countries).  Ms. Neiman
explained the debate over the use of the term in this context:
To call what happened on September 11 evil appeared to join forces with
those whose simple, demonic conceptions of evil often deliberately obscure
more insidious forms of it.  Not to call the murders evil appeared to relativ-
ize them, to engage in forms of calculation that make them understandable
– and risked a first step toward making them justifiable.
NEIMAN, supra , at 285.
13 THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 568-69 (comp. by George Seldes 1990) (quoting
Plato as was quoted in VICTOR GOLLANCZ, FROM DARKNESS TO LIGHT (1956)).
14 HUGO, supra  note 1, at 105.
15 See JOHN P. ALTGELD, OUR PENAL MACHINERY AND ITS VICTIMS (1886);
GEOFFREY COWAN, THE PEOPLE V. CLARENCE DARROW:  THE BRIBERY TRIAL OF
AMERICA’S GREATEST LAWYER 27 (1993).  Around the same time, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote that if punishment “stood on the moral grounds which are
proposed for it [we would have to consider] those limitations in the capacity for
choosing rightly which arise from abnormal instincts, want of education, lack of in-
telligence, and all the other defects which are most marked in the criminal classes.”
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45 (39th prtg. 1946) (1881).
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Darrow,16 who would later argue that the criminal justice system
should be abolished.17  In the 1970s, Judge David Bazelon of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit raised the argument
that when assigning criminal culpability, courts should consider
the “rotten social background” of defendants.18
Other commentators have made similar arguments, though
such arguments have never been popular.  Today, the public is
often unsympathetic toward possible explanations of crime that
might lessen a criminal’s punishment.19  Recently, the famous de-
fense attorney Professor Alan Dershowitz wrote that the growing
use of “the legal tactic by which criminal defendants claim a his-
tory of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation . . . is a danger-
ous trend, with serious and widespread implications for the safety
and liberty of every American.”20
Yet, in narrow areas, the law implicitly accepts the view of
crime as a disease to be cured rather than punished.  For exam-
ple, insanity is a defense to crimes in most states.21  Many courts
now allow evidence of battered spouse syndrome to help jurors
understand the state of mind of some defendants.22  On a more
experimental level, new problem-solving courts are experi-
menting with different approaches to crime.23
The most subversive acceptance of the “crime as disease” the-
16 COWAN, supra  note 15, at 27.
17 See generally CLARENCE S. DARROW, RESIST NOT EVIL 153-79 (Loompancis
Unltd. 1994) (1902).
18 United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting); see infra  notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
19 For example, after John Hinkley used the insanity defense and was acquitted of
charges regarding his attempted assassination of President Reagan, numerous states
and the federal government responded by making it more difficult to establish the
defense of insanity. See DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS:
THE INSANITY DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 188-89 (1996).
20 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE:  AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994).
21 See  Robert D. Miller, Patient Responsibilities:  The Other Side of the Coin , 17
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 91, 102 (2000) (“In the great majority of jurisdictions in the
United States, mentally-disordered defendants are permitted to raise the affirmative
defense of insanity.”).
22 See, e.g. , Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense , 6
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 321-22 (1992).
23 See  discussion infra  Part VI.B.2; see, e.g. , Aubrey Fox & Greg Berman, Going
to Scale:  A Conversation About the Future of Drug Courts , CT. REV., Fall 2002, at 4,
available at  http://courtinnovation.org/pdf/goingtoscale.pdf; Robin Campbell &
Robert Victor Wolf, Problem-Solving Probation:  A Look at Four Community-Based
Experiments , TEX. J. CORRECTIONS, Aug. 2001, available at  http://courtinnova-
tion.org/ pdf/ prob-sol_prob.pdf.
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ory in recent years has been in the area of capital punishment.
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has required courts and jurors to
give consideration to the causes of capital murder in the form of
mitigating factors.24  As a result, in the following years, attorneys
have created court records about the causes of violent crime and
the moral justifications for punishing certain individuals.25
For example, consider the mitigating evidence in a recent Su-
preme Court decision, Williams v. Taylor .26  The Supreme Court
found Terry Williams’s attorneys constitutionally ineffective for
failure to investigate and discover:
that Williams’[s] parents had been imprisoned for the criminal
neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been
severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been
committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two
years during his parents’ incarceration (including one stint in
an abusive foster home), and then . . . had been returned to his
parents’ custody.27
Juvenile records described the home where Williams grew up
as “a complete wreck . . . .  There were several places on the floor
where someone had had a bowel movement. Urine was standing
in several places in the bedrooms.”28  Additionally, the parents
were too intoxicated to find clothes for the dirty children, several
of whom were also “under the influence of whiskey.”29
In addition to noting the importance of Mr. Williams’s child-
hood conditions in mitigating his sentence, the Court also noted
the relevance of the following evidence: “Williams was ‘border-
line mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond sixth grade
in school”; prison records “recording Williams’[s] commenda-
tions for helping to crack a prison drug ring and for returning a
guard’s missing wallet”; “the testimony of prison officials who
described Williams as among the inmates ‘least likely to act in a
violent, dangerous or provocative way’”; “a certified public ac-
24 See, e.g. , Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that a statute that
limits a jury’s consideration of mitigating factors is unconstitutional).
25 See  discussion infra  Parts IV, V.
26 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
27 Id.  at 395 (footnote omitted).
28 Id.  at 395 n.19.
29 Id.  Another recent case that documents another string of mitigating facts is
Hardwick v. Crosby , 320 F.3d 1127, 1162-82 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting mitigating evi-
dence including a physically and emotionally abusive father who beat the defendant,
routinely exposed himself and urinated on the floor in front of the children, and
gave drugs and alcohol to the defendant when he was a child).
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countant who had offered to testify that he had visited Williams
frequently when Williams was incarcerated as part of a prison
ministry program, that Williams ‘seemed to thrive in a more regi-
mented and structured environment’”; and that “Williams was
proud of the carpentry degree he earned while in prison.”30
The Court stated that this information was relevant to the capi-
tal sentencing of Mr. Williams without any explanation for why
the childhood abuse or other evidence related to his sentencing
for the murder.31  Mr. Williams had killed an intoxicated man
with a mattock because the man refused to loan him a couple of
dollars, and after Mr. Williams’s initial trial he was sentenced to
death.32  Mr. Williams had confessed to the crime, yet the Court
found that his sentencing hearing was unfair and his death sen-
tence was reversed because his attorney did not discover the
above evidence.33  It is important to understand the reasons why
any mitigating evidence should be considered for such a horrible
crime.  This Article addresses the question of why mitigation is
legally and morally relevant to the use of the death penalty in the
United States.
This Article examines how mitigating circumstances reveal
moral problems in the foundation of the capital punishment and
criminal justice systems.  Part I begins by discussing the main
punishment theories that justify consideration of mitigating fac-
tors: utilitarian, retributive, and disease theories.  Part II dis-
cusses Judge Bazelon’s writings on disease theory and the “rotten
social background” defense.  Part III discusses the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on the use of mitigating factors in capital
cases, and Part IV lists a broad range of mitigating factors that
have been used in capital cases, placing them into four categories
and addressing the criminal justice justifications for each
category.34
30 Williams , 529 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
31 See id . at 396-99.
32 Id.  at 367-68.
33 Id.  at 395.
34 This Article collects the broad range of mitigating factors used in the United
States, complementing my previous article, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:  The
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme  which col-
lected and categorized every statutory aggravating factor.  Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:  The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and
Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme , 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 397-431
(1998). Whereas this Article considers mitigation in context of the moral justifica-
tions for the death penalty, in that previous article, I concluded that the current use
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Part V examines one of the categories of mitigation and the
empirical, philosophical, and practical issues raised by the use of
mitigating factors in that category.  The Article explains how the
use of that type of mitigating factor indicates that the criminal
justice system is following science toward embracing disease the-
ory.  Part VI then examines how a legal, philosophical, and scien-
tific understanding of this category of mitigating factors can have
a broad impact on the law.  Thus, the Article concludes, the de-
velopment of the law of mitigating factors is taking the criminal
justice system to new understandings of human responsibility.
I
TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
In recent years, there has been an extraordinary growth in the
number of people in prison in the United States.35  At year-end
2003, there were approximately 482 prison inmates per 100,000
U.S. residents,36 a substantial increase from 292 inmates per
100,000 residents at year-end 1990.37  At the end of 2003, there
were 2,212,475 prisoners in federal and state prisons or in local
jails.38  One in every 109 men in the United States was serving a
prison sentence.39  The number of people on death rows in the
United States as of July 1, 2004 was 3,490.40
Those that are in prison often are there for a long time.  A
2004 report found that almost ten percent of people in state and
federal prisons in the United States were serving life terms.41
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has resulted in systemic problems with
capital punishment in the United States. See id . at 360-434.
35 See, e.g. , VIVIEN STERN, A SIN AGAINST THE FUTURE:  IMPRISONMENT IN THE
WORLD 61 (1998).
36 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2003 , BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL., Nov. 2004, at 1, available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf
[hereinafter Prisoners in 2003].
37 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2001 , BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
BULL., July 2002, at 1, available at  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf.
38 Prisoners in 2003 , supra  note 36, at 1.
39 Id .  One in every 1,163 women was serving a prison sentence. Id .
40 Deborah Fins, A Quarterly Report by the Criminal Justice Project of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. , DEATH ROW USA 3 (Summer 2004),
available at  http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_Summer_
2004.pdf.
41 Fox Butterfield, Almost 10% of All Prisoners Are Now Serving Life Terms ,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at A17.  In California and New York, approximately 20%
of people in state prisons are serving life terms. Id.  “In addition, the report found,
there were 23,523 inmates serving a life sentence who were mentally ill and whose
acts might have been caused by their illness.” Id.
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The growth in harsh sentences in American history is a result of
not an increase in crime, but an increase in more punitive laws.42
The numbers are more disturbing when one considers the ra-
cial disparity in the percentage of people in prison.  At the end of
2003, of all black males aged 25 to 29 in the United States, 9.3%
were in prison or jail, compared to 2.6% of Hispanic males and
1.9% of white males of the same age.43  An African-American
male born in 2004 has a 32.2% likelihood of being incarcerated
sometime during his lifetime.44
With such a substantial portion of our population being impris-
oned and thousands of the condemned waiting for execution, the
policy and moral justifications for these numbers need to be ex-
amined.  As Justice Kennedy recently stated, “‘Tough on crime’
should not be a substitute for thoughtful reflection or lead us into
moral blindness.”45
While the intentional infliction of pain is generally seen as
something wrong, “legal punishment involves deliberate inflic-
tion of suffering . . . beyond the suffering occasioned by stigma
and censure.”46  Thus, an important issue is the question of what
justifies society’s infliction of suffering.  Traditionally, there have
been two main rationales for punishment: utilitarian theory and
retributive theory.47
In 1843, Jeremy Bentham wrote about the utilitarian theory
when he explained that because punishment itself is evil, “if it
ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far
as it promises to exclude some greater evil.”48  Utilitarian theory
reasons that punishment should only be used if it benefits soci-
ety,49 such as by protecting society from the individual by inca-
42 Id.  During 1992-2002 the number of people serving life sentences grew 83%,
but during the same time crime actually fell 35%. Id.
43 Prisoners in 2003, supra  note 36, at 1.
44 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 18 (2004), available at  http://www.abanet.org./yld /an-
nual04/121A.pdf [hereinafter ABA JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT].
45 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Justice Supports Bar Plan to Ease Sentencing ,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A14.
46 HENBERG, supra  note 11, at 191.
47 See, e.g. , id . at 199.  “The retributivist maintains that the dutiful response to
wrong is to liken legal punishment to offense; the utilitarian, by contrast, holds that
the dutiful response to wrong is to choose that response which provides the most
favorable balance of good consequences over bad.” Id.
48 BENTHAM, supra  note 11, at 83-84.
49 See, e.g. , id . at 14.  “Punishments which go beyond the need of preserving the
common store or deposit of public safety are in their nature unjust.  The juster the
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pacitation, by deterring others from committing crimes, or by
rehabilitating the criminal.  In the United States, until around the
last twenty-five years, rehabilitation was the “central professed
goal” of the justice system.50  In the late twentieth century, how-
ever, rehabilitation became one of the least professed goals of
the American criminal justice system, while justifications like in-
capacitation and deterrence became the dominant goals.51
As opposed to utilitarian justifications, retribution theory, such
as that advocated by Immanuel Kant, reasons that punishment is
justified because it is deserved, and it is deserved when a criminal
freely decides to violate the rules of society.52  “A retributivist
believes that the imposition of deserved punishment is an intrin-
sic good.”53  The classic formulation of retribution, and the way it
is used in this Article, differs from vengeance in that it focuses on
what the perpetrator deserves as an individual, not on the vic-
tim’s desire for retaliation.54  Retribution has a proportionality
component in that, as Kant stated, punishment ought to be “pro-
nounced over all criminals proportionate to their internal wick-
edness . . . .”55  Further, as one law professor explained,
“[R]etribution is based on the dual premises that humans possess
free will and that punishment is justified when it is deserved.”56
Although all retributivists might not agree,57 under Kantian
moral philosophy, society not only is justified in punishing
punishments, the more sacred and inviolable the security and the greater the liberty
which the sovereign preserves for his subjects.” Id.
50 Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:  A Ret-
rospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next , 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2003).
51 See id.  at 9, 11; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert , 91
NW. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1997).  One criticism of the incapacitation justification is
that under such a theory, sentences should be based upon a defendant’s future dan-
gerousness, which cannot be predicted reliably, and results in punishment for acts
not yet done. Id . at 464-68.
52 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (3d ed. 2001).
53 Alschuler, supra  note 50, at 15.  Professor Alschuler argues that retribution
“merits recognition as the central purpose of criminal punishment.” Id.
54 Private vengeance as a justification for punishment “is a disguised form of utili-
tarianism, since it defends punishment in order to deter private revenge.”
DRESSLER, supra  note 52, at 17; see  Huefner, supra  note 7, at 975 n.7 (noting that
the classic formulation of retribution holds that punishment is required simply be-
cause it is “just”).
55 IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M.
Kelly Pub. 1974) (1887).
56 DRESSLER, supra  note 52, at 17.
57 See  Alschuler, supra  note 50, at 15.
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criminals, it has a moral obligation to do so.58  Kant explained
this obligation:
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agree-
ment of all its members . . . . the last murderer remaining in
prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly re-
ceive what his actions are worth and so that the blood-guilt
thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to
insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so,
they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of
legal justice.59
In a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court capital case, Morgan v. Illinois ,60
Justice Scalia quoted this passage in a dissenting opinion.61
During the last forty years in the United States, there has been
a “great philosophical revival of retributivism,”62 reintroducing
“ideas of moral agency and moral responsibility into the criminal
law, abandoning the brute therapeutic psychologism of the mid-
twentieth century.”63  Professor James Whitman has noted that
the major role retributivism now plays is at least partly the result
of American democracy, because “[o]rdinary voters are never ca-
pable of the kind of routinized, sober, and merciful approach to
punishment that is the stuff of the daily work of punishment pro-
fessionals.”64  Thus, to gain popular support, American politi-
cians push for retributive punishments, and the result is
dramatically long prison sentences even for nonviolent offenses,
“three-strikes-and-you’re-out” laws, and one of the highest incar-
58 HENBERG, supra  note 11, at 159.  Because Kant holds that the state, whatever
the sentiments of its individual citizens,
has a stern duty to punish legal offenses, it must  punish them.  Legal pun-
ishment of criminals, Kant argues, is a categorical imperative, rationally
universalizable.  As such, it does not share in the merely hypothetical aims
of relieving the distress of victims inflamed by the desire for vengeance.
Still less does it share in the aims of humiliating the offender or of commu-
nicating love via forgiveness once the debt of punishment is paid.  When
understood as comfort for distress of any sort, solace derives from human-
kind’s passional nature and is for Kant as morally irrelevant as the desire
for happiness or success.
Id .
59 Id . at 160 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUS-
TICE 102 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797).
60 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
61 Id.  at 752 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Pub. 1974) (1887)).
62 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:  CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 23-24 (2003).
63 Id.  at 24.
64 Id. at 55.
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ceration rates in the world.65
The theories of utilitarianism and retributivism are inconsis-
tent, but many lawmakers and scholars use a mixture of the two
to justify punishments.66  Thus, “the rules of criminal responsibil-
ity and punishment reflect society’s attraction to both
theories.”67
These theories of punishment also form the bases for the theo-
ries behind allowing certain defenses.  Most substantive defenses
fall into the categories of justification defenses or excuse de-
fenses.  The law provides a justification defense to defendants
who acted out of necessity and acted reasonably, such as in cases
where a defendant acted in self-defense.68  In these cases, utilita-
rian and retributive theories do not require that such defendants
be punished.69  Similarly, utilitarian and retributive theories do
not require the punishment of people who have an excuse de-
fense.  Defendants have an excuse defense where, although soci-
ety does not approve of their action, society understands that the
person was not culpable, such as cases where the defendant was
legally insane.70  Punishment has less deterrent effect on such in-
dividuals, who are also less deserving of punishment.
When the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
the death penalty in the 1970s, it used utilitarian and retributive
theories in its Eighth Amendment analysis.  In Furman v. Geor-
gia ,71 when Justice Marshall considered whether death is an un-
necessary and excessive punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, he discussed these theories of punishment.72  He
argued that “[t]he history of the Eighth Amendment supports
only the conclusion that retribution for its own sake is im-
65 Id.  at 56-58.
Depending on how you reckon it, the American incarceration rate now
stands at somewhere between 450 and 700 per 100,000 of the general popu-
lation—on a rough par with Russia; and in certain parts of the United
States, like Lousiana and the District of Columbia, the rate stands as high
as 760 or 1,700 per 100,000.  The typical European incarceration rate, by
contrast, stands somewhere between 65 and 100 per 100,000.
Id.  at 57-58.
66 DRESSLER, supra  note 52, at 22.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g. , id . at 232-34.
69 See id.  at 214-16.
70 See id.  at 210-14.
71 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
72 Id.  at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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proper,”73 though other justices disagreed.74  Further, in conclud-
ing that the death penalty violates the Constitution, he also
considered various studies and concluded that the death penalty
was not a deterrent.75
When the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia ,76 the plurality also looked at
these theories.  Quoting a 1949 case,77 the plurality noted, “‘Ret-
ribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law.’”78  However, the plurality added, “[N]either is it a forbid-
den objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dig-
nity of men.”79  The plurality concluded that retribution could
justify the use of the death penalty.80  The Gregg  plurality also
reasoned that the death penalty must have some deterrent effect,
though the extent of that effect was best left for legislatures to
consider.81
In dissent, Justice Marshall discussed several studies and con-
cluded that the death penalty is not necessary as a deterrent.82
Additionally, he rejected the plurality’s reliance on retribution
by stating that under the Eighth Amendment, punishments must
comport with human dignity, and “[t]he mere fact that the com-
munity demands the murderer’s life in return for the evil he has
done cannot sustain the death penalty.”83
Beyond retribution theory, which views a criminal as someone
morally deserving of punishment, and utilitarian theory, which
views a criminal as someone who may be punished as an example
to others, there is another possible view.  One may view the crim-
73 Id . at 345.
74 Id . at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.  at 452-54 (Powell, J., dissenting); see
also  Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion).
75 Furman , 408 U.S. at 354 (Marshall, J., concurring).
76 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
77 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
78 Gregg , 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Williams , 337 U.S. at 248).
79 Gregg , 428 U.S at 183.
80 See id.  at 184.  “Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appro-
priate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that cer-
tain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death.” Id.
81 Id.  at 186-87.
82 Id.  at 236 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83 Id.  at 240.  With respect to retribution, Justice Marshall points out that the plu-
rality made a common error at one point when equating retribution with serving
society’s expression of moral outrage and preventing citizens from taking the law
into their own hands.  Such arguments are actually based on utilitarian arguments
that a punishment benefits society, not pure retributive arguments. See id.  at 238-39.
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inal as someone with a disease, which leads one to question our
moral justification for punishing for any purpose beyond “cur-
ing” the individual.
This “disease” theory is not completely inconsistent with retri-
bution and utilitarian theories, both of which may explain why
the “diseased” criminal should not be punished.  Under retribu-
tion theory, one might say that the “diseased” criminal should
not be punished because the person had no control and was not
deserving of punishment.  Under utilitarian theory, the “dis-
eased” criminal should not be punished because such punishment
will not serve any deterrence purposes.  Yet, if all, or at least a
majority of criminals are seen as “diseased,” it seems that such a
view would be inconsistent with current retributive and utilita-
rian thought.  In the 1970s, Judge David Bazelon discussed a ver-
sion of this “disease theory” approach, and his writings on the
subject are discussed in the next section.
II
EARLY DEBATE ABOUT THE CONSIDERATION OF THE
CAUSES OF CRIME IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Judge Bazelon’s Proposed Consideration of “Rotten Social
Background” as a Defense
Because environment plays a significant role in determining an
individual’s behavior,84 legal scholars have discussed whether se-
vere environmental deprivation, or a “rotten social background,”
should be a defense in criminal cases.85  Judge David Bazelon
first wrote about this defense in 1973 in United States v. Alexan-
der ,86 and he explored the issue further in a debate with Profes-
sor Stephen Morse in the Southern California Law Review .87
Judge Bazelon took the phrase “rotten social background”
(“RSB”) from one of the defense attorneys who used the phrase
in closing argument at the trial in Alexander .88  In the case, the
84 See  discussion infra  Part VI.A.
85 See generally  Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”:  Should the Crimi-
nal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation? , 3 LAW AND
INEQ. 9 (1985).
86 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Alexander  was a per curiam decision, but Chief Judge Bazelon
wrote a separate opinion.
87 See infra  notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
88 471 F.2d at 959 n.100 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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defendants were charged with various crimes related to the kill-
ing of a marine after the marine had used a racial slur.89  The
defense argued that the defendant who fired the gun did not
have control of his conduct because the RSB environment in
which he was raised conditioned him to respond to the racial slur
in such a way that he had no meaningful choice of action.90  The
trial judge had instructed the jury to disregard the testimony
about the defendant’s background and instead to focus on the
legal standard of insanity.91  The defendant was convicted, and
the court of appeals in Alexander  affirmed.92
In the appellate decision, Judge Bazelon concurred in part and
dissented in part, discussing some of his ideas about the RSB de-
fense and how it could apply.93  Then, Judge Bazelon considered
four “unattractive” alternatives for its application:94  (1) impose
illogical limitations on the RSB defense so that it will not be suc-
cessful;95 (2) allow the RSB defense, and if successful, it would
result in the acquittal and release of the defendant;96 (3) allow
the RSB defense and if the community will not tolerate the re-
lease of the defendant, find a therapeutic purpose for hospitaliza-
tion;97 or (4) allow the RSB defense and if the defendant cannot
be cured, then confine him based upon his future
dangerousness.98
In Alexander , Judge Bazelon did not offer a solution to the
practical question of how courts should permit the RSB defense,
but he criticized the court for not adequately considering the
choices and fully examining criminal responsibility doctrine.99
He reasoned that further discussion of the defendant’s responsi-
bility defense might lead to further discoveries about the causes
of violent criminal behavior.100
89 Id.  at 928-29 (plurality opinion).
90 See id.  at 960 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 Id . at 928 (plurality opinion).
92 Id.  at 927.
93 Id.  at 961-62 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94 Id.  at 962.
95 Id.
96 Id.  at 963.
97 Id.  at 963-64.
98 Id.  at 964.
99 See id.
100 Id.  at 965.
We might discover, for example, that there is a significant causal relation-
ship between violent criminal behavior and a “rotten social background.”
That realization would require us to consider, for example, whether income
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Judge Bazelon expanded upon his views of the RSB defense in
his 1975 J. Edgar Hoover Foundation lecture,101 and his pub-
lished rejoinder102 to Professor Morse’s response to the publica-
tion of the lecture.103  Judge Bazelon advocated for an expanded
inquiry into culpability of defendants and the fact that “almost all
violent crime is committed by the disadvantaged and de-
prived.”104  He argued that “the law’s aims must be achieved by a
moral process cognizant of the realities of social injustice.”105
Judge Bazelon discussed the debate over the tests for insanity,
including the expansion of the M’Naghten106 test with the test he
earlier had developed in Durham v. United States .107  While
courts ultimately abandoned the Durham , or “Product” test be-
cause most judges believed it went too far in allowing the in-
sanity defense where the act was a product of a mental disease or
defect, Judge Bazelon said that the test did not go far enough.108
Judge Bazelon said that juries should be able to consider the
moral culpability of a defendant even in cases where insanity was
not an issue, through the following instruction: “[A] defendant is
not responsible if at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or
emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired to such an
extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his act .”109
redistribution and social reconstruction are indispensable first steps toward
solving the problem of violent crime.
Id.
101 David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law , 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385
(1976).
102 David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law:  A Rejoinder to Professor
Morse , 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1976).
103 Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:  A Reply to Judge
Bazelon , 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976) [hereinafter Morse, A Reply]; see also
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:  A Final Word , 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1275 (1976) [hereinafter Morse, A Final Word].
104 Bazelon, supra  note 101, at 403.
105 Bazelon, supra  note 101, at 386.
106 M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
107 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
108 Bazelon, supra  note 101, at 390-97. The Durham  test was heavily criticized
because it gave too much importance to the testimony of experts, which took away
from the role of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 474-75 (R.I.
1979).  Judge Bazelon recognized the problems with the test, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia eventually proscribed experts from
testifying concerning productivity in Washington v. United States , 390 F.2d 444
(1967), and ultimately abandoned the Durham  test in United States v. Brawner , 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109 Bazelon, supra  note 101, at 396 (quoting Brawner , 471 F.2d at 1032 (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Later, Judge Bazelon explained,
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Such an instruction would allow “testimony on the nature and
extent of behavioral impairments and of physiological, psycho-
logical, environmental, cultural, educational, economic, and he-
redity factors.”110  Such considerations would not only give more
moral weight to criminal condemnations, but these inquiries
would “give all of us a deeper understanding of the causes of
human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particu-
lar.”111  Ultimately, these inquiries would force society to address
crime in other ways besides incarceration and to directly attack
the causes of crime, such as poverty.112
In response, Professor Morse was more skeptical in his essays:
“Even if great amounts of evidence on social conditions were ad-
mitted at trials, cases leading to conviction would probably not
force society at large  to face its complicity in causing criminal
behavior.  Such cases would be ‘lost’ in the system.”113  Professor
Morse did note that acquittals of dangerous defendants would
compel society to examine systemic problems, but releasing such
defendants would be a great cost.114  Further, he argued, “it is
doubtful that the adversary trial is the best forum for developing
and disseminating the inordinately complex data and philosophi-
cal considerations that would be reasonably necessary to justify
and promote a major change in societal attitudes towards crimi-
nal responsibility.”115
It is precisely because I believe there is no a priori answer to the question,
‘What is a free choice to do wrong?’ that I advocate asking the jury, the
traditional representative of ‘our consensual sense of morality,’ to decide in
each case whether, in light of that morality, the defendant can justly be
held responsible for his act.
Bazelon, supra  note 102, at 1270.
110 Bazelon, supra  note 101, at 396.
111 Id.  Judge Bazelon explained:
The overwhelming majority of violent street crime, which worries us so
deeply, is committed by people at the bottom of the socioeconomic-cultural
ladder—the ignorant, the ill-educated, and the unemployed and often un-
employable.  I cannot believe that this is coincidental.  Rather, I must con-
clude that those people turn to crime for reasons such as economic survival,
a sense of excitement or accomplishment, and an outlet for frustration,
desperation, and rage.  We cannot produce a class of desperate and angry
citizens by closing off, for many years, all means of economic advancement
and personal fulfillment for a sizeable part of the population, and thereaf-
ter expect a crime-free society.
Id.  at 402.
112 Id . at 403-05.
113 Morse, A Final Word , supra  note 103, at 1275.
114 Id.  at 1276.
115 Id.
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Judge Bazelon’s ideas were revolutionary in that he argued for
a deeper inquiry into the minds of the criminal and a higher
moral justification for punishment.116  Due to the perceived im-
practicality and radical nature of his ideas, they never gained
widespread acceptance.
Other commentators, however, have noted that RSB theory
plays a role in several excuse-oriented defenses in the criminal
justice system.  For example, the insanity defense is based on the
assumption that a person’s background may impair her or his
mental and emotional processes.117  As noted above, in Durham
v. United States ,118 Judge Bazelon earlier had advocated for an
insanity defense standard similar to what he later proposed for
the RSB defense: “[a]n accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental de-
fect.”119  Although the tests used today for insanity are much
more restrictive than the Durham  test, they still allow a defen-
dant to be excused for criminal conduct in a narrow range of
cases because “moral blame cannot attach where an act was not
the result of free choice.”120  Similarly, the reasoning that a per-
son’s background gives that person a limited range of free will
may support defenses such as duress and extreme emotional dis-
turbance.121  Yet, although these existing defenses often apply to
defendants who would also have an RSB defense, “none of these
existing defenses was designed to include all RSB cases, and it is
largely a matter of chance that an RSB defendant happens to
meet the requirements of a given defense.”122
In 1985, Professor Richard Delgado argued that a pure RSB
defense should be available to defendants.
116 Considering Judge Bazelon’s concern about the role of mental illness and
criminal law, it is not surprising that he is also the author of two landmark opinions
establishing the right of a mental patient to get appropriate treatment. See  Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (recognizing a right to appropriate treat-
ment under a D.C. statute); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (hold-
ing that the right was the right to treatment in the least restrictive alternative
setting).
117 See  Delgado, supra  note 85, at 38.
118 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
119 Id . at 874-75; see supra  notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
120 DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY:  JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW
24 (1988).
121 See  Delgado, supra  note 85, at 45.  Other defenses, such as intoxication and
battered spouse syndrome, are based upon a similar conclusion that the defendant is
acting on something less than free will.
122 Id . at 54.
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From both individual and societal perspectives, a strong case
can be made for new defenses for the criminal defendant
whose crime stems from poverty, mistreatment, or a legitimate
and frustrated desire for self-respect.  Destitution and neglect
affect individual behavior and choice; they are thus highly rel-
evant to issues of criminal responsibility.123
Professor Delgado argued that an RSB defense is justified under
utilitarian and retributive theories.124  For example, a person
compelled to act a certain way because of that person’s back-
ground is less likely to be deterred by punishment, and such a
person is less deserving of punishment.125
As discussed later, the main purposes of RSB theory is to un-
dermine retributive principles and to question whether certain
individuals are morally deserving of punishment.  If RSB factors,
as well as other environmental and heredity factors, are what
make a person more likely to commit a crime, that person is less
deserving of punishment.  Depending on how we view the
strength of those influences, if we conclude that these factors in
effect “caused” a person to commit a crime, then any retributive
reason for punishing the person disappears.  The person does not
deserve punishment if the crime was caused by factors beyond
the person’s control.  We might still punish the person for deter-
rence reasons, but we cannot say that the person morally “de-
serves” punishment any more than we can say that a river
“deserves” to be dammed to prevent flooding.
B. Other Legal Commentators Have Made Similar Arguments
Although Judge Bazelon is the most famous advocate of the
RSB defense among legal scholars, he was not the first person to
note the close relation between social environment and crime.
Other commentators have questioned the moral justification for
punishing individuals who act as a result of forces beyond their
control such that they do not act with free will.  Clarence Darrow
once explained,
All people are products of two things, and two things only—
their heredity and their environment.  And they act in exact
accord with the heredity which they took from all the past, and
for which they are in no wise responsible, and the environ-
ment, which reaches out to the farthest limit of all life that can
123 Id . at 79.
124 Id . at 55-75.
125 See id.
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influence them.  We all act from the same way.”126
In 1902, in an address to prisoners in the Cook County Jail, he
told the prisoners that they were “in jail simply because they can-
not avoid it on account of circumstances which are entirely be-
yond their control and for which they are in no way
responsible.”127
Lewis Lawes, a former warden of Sing Sing Prison, wrote,
“[e]very murder, whether instigated by passion, criminality or
even gang warfare, reaches back to some form of social disaffec-
tion.”128  Recently, mental health professionals have stressed
similar points in considering the behavior and neurological
causes of violent crime.129  The mental health and medical litera-
ture are discussed in more detail later in this Article.130
These ideas are not new.  In the early sixteenth century, En-
glish martyr John Bradford had a saying for when he saw
criminals going to be executed: “But for the grace of God, there
goes John Bradford.”131  Plato may have been the first advocate
of a disease theory of crime.132  Echoes of a belief in the effects
of the environment can be found throughout history, such as in
the statement of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “Man can be made what
we want him to be.”133  Abraham Lincoln had the fatalistic belief
126 CLARENCE DARROW, Is Capital Punishment a Wise Policy?:  Debate with Judge
Talley , in ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 89, 98 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1989).
127 CLARENCE DARROW, Address to the Prisoners in the Cook County Jail , in AT-
TORNEY FOR THE DAMNED, supra  note 126, at 3-4.
128 LEWIS E. LAWES, TWENTY THOUSAND YEARS IN SING SING 337 (1932).  He
then asked, “[w]hy not reexamine the fundamentals that have to do with shaping
and strengthening the guide posts of good living and right thinking?” Id.
129 See, e.g. , DOROTHY OTNOW LEWIS, M.D., GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY:
A PSYCHIATRIST EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS 187-88, 286-94 (1998).
130 See  discussion infra  Part IV.B.
131 Anecdote by John Bradford, in THE LITTLE, BROWN BOOK OF ANECDOTES 74
(Clifton Fadiman ed., 1985).
132 HENBERG, supra  note 11, at 95.
Applying a medical analogy, Plato thinks of vice—the source of crime—as
an ailment of soul in the way that physical illness is an ailment of body.  He
attributes vice sometimes to ignorance, sometimes to disorder among the
elements of the soul, and sometimes to bodily fractiousness affecting the
soul; but in each case, the object of punishment is the same:  to restore
order in the soul.
Id . (citations omitted).  Plato saw that punishment was necessary when training and
education did not cure the “disease,” but the purpose of the infliction of suffering as
punishment was to cure the criminal. See id.  However, Plato’s writings also in-
cluded some retributive views of punishment. See id.  at 96-108.
133 MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE:  GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND WHAT
MAKES US HUMAN 185 (2003).
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of another famous Illinois lawyer Clarence Darrow that there is
no free will.134  Based on his belief in “necessity,” Lincoln also
was a critic of punishment for retributive purposes.135
Of course, these ideas are not generally accepted in criminal
law.  Judge Evelle J. Younger once commented,
Too many persons indulge themselves in gushing sentimental-
ism over criminals.  They overemphasize the fact that life, edu-
cation and environment are the forces that victimize and
penalize every criminal.  If society is wholly responsible, why
not apologize to the cutthroat and pension him for life?  If you
don’t hang him, why imprison him?  He surely needs neither
gallows nor cell if the blame is all on the universe at large.136
Further, in 1988, Professor Deborah W. Denno wrote “that so-
cial science research has not successfully demonstrated suffi-
ciently strong links between biological factors and criminal
behavior to warrant major consideration in determining criminal
responsibility.”137  Professor Denno argued that the only defense
to mitigate criminal responsibility should be in rare insanity de-
fense cases and that mitigating factors should only be considered
to determine where a defendant will be incarcerated but not to
determine the length of a sentence.138  Still, she concluded that
“[u]ltimately, the criminal justice system must confront the signif-
icance of the mounting evidence concerning the biological bases
of behavior, weigh its importance, evaluate its strengths and
weaknesses, and recommend a policy for its use.”139
134 ALLEN C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  REDEEMER PRESIDENT 118, 120
(2003); see supra  notes 126-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Clarence
Darrow’s views.
135 GUELZO, supra  note 134, at 118, 120.  Lincoln’s friend Orville Hickman
Browning noted:
Since Lincoln was a ‘thorough fatalist’ and ‘believed that what was to be
would be, and no prayers of ours could arrest or reverse the decree,’ then
‘men were but simple tools of fate, of conditions, and of laws,’ and no one
‘was responsible for what he was, thought, or did, because he was a child of
conditions.’  This, [Lincoln’s law partner and friend William] Herndon be-
lieved, was the real spring of Lincoln’s ‘patience’ and ‘his charity for men
and his want of malice for them everywhere.’
Id.  at 120.
136 Evelle J. Younger, Capital Punishment:  A Sharp Medicine Reconsidered ,
A.B.A. J. (1956), republished in THE DEATH PENALTY:  A LITERARY AND HISTORI-
CAL APPROACH 129, 130 (Edward G. McGehee & William H. Hildebrand eds.,
1964).
137 Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility:  Free Will or
Free Ride?,  137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 617 (1988).
138 Id.
139 Id.  at 618.
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The debate about heredity, environment, free will, determin-
ism, and moral culpability is discussed in Part V.  Part III dis-
cusses how, beginning in 1976, those issues were brought to the
forefront of the criminal justice system through the jurisprudence
of mitigating circumstances in capital cases.
III
THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON
MITIGATING FACTORS
One of the best ways to examine the role of RSB, personal
responsibility, and punishment theory is in the area of capital
sentencing.  Because of a lack of clear proof that the death pen-
alty effectively deters more than imprisonment,140 the death pen-
alty is in many ways the punishment most based upon moral
condemnation and retributive theory.141  Additionally, because
of the extreme nature of the punishment, the U.S. Constitution
requires courts to do more of a moral balancing than in other
cases.142  Consequently, sentencing in capital cases is much more
structured than in non-capital cases.143  Generally, there is a list
of factors that are considered by the sentencer, and these factors
range across a broad spectrum.  To understand how the process
works, one must understand the development of the current capi-
tal punishment scheme.
In the early years of the United States, all states followed the
common-law practice of requiring the death penalty automati-
cally for people found guilty of certain offenses.144  Eventually,
the number of eligible defenses decreased, but under such a sys-
tem, all premeditated murderers were deserving of the death
penalty and were equally morally culpable in the sense that they
140 See, e.g. , William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Punishment,
and Deterrence:  A Review of the Literature , in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 135 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
141 See, e.g. , Robert Blecker, The Death Penalty:  Where Are We Now? , 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 665, 674 (2002-03) (“Increasingly [retributivists] agree that if the death
penalty is used at all, it ought to be reserved for the worst of the worst who, beyond
factual and moral doubt, deserve to die.”).
142 See, e.g. , Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (noting the
importance of individualized sentencing in capital cases because the death penalty
differs from other punishments).
143 See, e.g. , id.
144 Id . at 289 (citing Bailey & Peterson, supra  note 140, at 5-6, 15, 27-28 (rev. ed.,
1967)) (holding that a mandatory death penalty system violates the Constitution).
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received the same punishment.145
Soon, however, legislatures realized there were problems with
having an unforgiving mandatory death penalty system, espe-
cially when juries began making moral distinctions that the law
did not permit, such as finding sympathetic guilty defendants
“not guilty” to avoid giving the death penalty.146  In response to
this type of jury nullification, states began changing their death
penalty laws, and by 1963, every state with the death penalty and
the federal government had moved to discretionary systems that
permitted juries the complete discretion to grant mercy to guilty
defendants.147  Under this discretionary system, jurors were per-
mitted to make their own moral judgments whether a guilty de-
fendant should be executed.
The modern era of the death penalty in the United States be-
gan in 1972 with Furman v. Georgia ,148 which addressed the con-
stitutionality of those discretionary statutes as well as the
constitutionality of the death penalty.149  In Furman , the Court
voted five to four that the imposition of the death penalty in the
three cases before it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, with many of the justices focusing on concerns about the
arbitrary imposition of the punishment.150  The cases before the
Court were from states where juries were given complete discre-
tion as to whether or not to impose the death penalty.151  In
Furman , each of the nine justices wrote a separate opinion, and
there was no clear consensus on the reasoning behind the re-
sult,152 but the decision prevented the execution of everyone on
death row in the United States at the time.153
145 See Woodson , 428 U.S. at 289-90; McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198
(1971).
146 Woodson , 428 U.S. at 293.
147 Id. ; see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 217 (1994).
148 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
149 Id . at 239-40.  A year earlier, the Court held in McGautha  that discretionary
statutes did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court did not address
whether such statutes violated the Eighth Amendment.  402 U.S. at 196.
150 Furman , 408 U.S. at 239-40. Cf. McGautha , 402 U.S. at 196 (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by the absence of standards to guide the
jury’s discretion in determining whether to impose the death penalty).
151 Furman , 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
152 The nine opinions in Furman  “totaled 50,000 words, 243 pages—the longest
decision in the Court’s history.” BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 220 (1979).
153 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDAN HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986).
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A number of state legislatures responded to Furman  by draft-
ing new death penalty statutes.  To avoid the constitutional prob-
lem of arbitrary jury discretion addressed by Furman , states
drafted statutes that either (1) made the death penalty
mandatory upon the conviction of a specific capital crime; or (2)
provided “guided discretion” to capital juries.154  The latter type
of statute generally permitted capital sentencers to consider spe-
cific aggravating factors that supported a death sentence and mit-
igating factors that supported a lesser sentence.155
In 1976, the Court addressed the constitutionality of these two
types of death penalty statutes, striking down the mandatory
death penalty statutes156 and upholding the guided discretion
statutes.157  In Gregg v. Georgia ,158 a guided discretion statute
case, the Court considered a state statute with a bifurcated sys-
tem that contained specific aggravating and mitigating factors for
a jury to consider.159  The plurality, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Stewart, held that such a statute provided “clear and objec-
tive standards” and gave adequate guidance to the sentencer.160
On the same day, the Court upheld other states’ guided sentenc-
ing statutes in Jurek v. Texas161 and Proffitt v. Florida .162
At the same time, the Court struck down mandatory death
penalty statutes as violating the Eighth Amendment in Woodson
v. North Carolina163 and Roberts v. Louisiana .164  In these cases,
one first sees the beginning of an emphasis on the importance of
mitigating factors in capital cases.  In Woodson , the plurality
noted that “the Eighth Amendment draws much of its meaning
from ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.’”165  The plurality considered the historical
154 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE:  DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1864-1982, at 174 (1984).
155 Id . at 174-75.
156 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
157 See  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  The Court also held that the death penalty
per se does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Gregg , 428 U.S. at 169.
158 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
159 Id . at 161.
160 Id.  at 196-98.
161 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
162 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
163 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
164 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
165 Woodson , 428 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
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failures of mandatory death penalty statutes and concluded that
in death penalty cases the Eighth Amendment “requires consid-
eration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.”166  Individualized sentencing in capital cases is required
because there is an increased need for reliability, since “the pen-
alty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of impris-
onment, however long.”167  This balancing of individual aspects
of the crime and the defendant is achieved by consideration of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Thus, because of concerns about arbitrariness, under Furman
and Gregg  a jury cannot have complete discretion in determining
the moral culpability of a capital defendant.168  However, in
Woodson  and Roberts  the Court required that the sentencer
have some discretion, in the form of considering mitigating fac-
tors, in determining the moral culpability of the defendant.169
Later cases further explained the role served by mitigating fac-
tors in the legal and moral condemnation of capital defendants.
In Lockett v. Ohio , Ohio’s death penalty statute was struck down
because it limited the mitigating factors a capital jury could con-
sider during a sentencing hearing.170  The plurality stated that a
sentencer must “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigat-
ing factor , any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”171
Other cases strengthened the Lockett  rule.  In Skipper v. South
Carolina , the Court held that the trial court’s exclusion of evi-
86, 101 (1958)).  Like Gregg , Woodson  was a plurality opinion written by Justice
Stewart and joined by Justices Powell and Stevens. See generally Woodson , 428 U.S.
at 280.  Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty is unconsti-
tutional per se and provided the other two votes to strike down North Carolina’s
statute. See id.  at 305-06.
166 Woodson , 428 U.S. at 304.
167 Id.  at 305.
168 A jury’s discretion must be guided by statutory factors. See  Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98 (1976).
169 Woodson , 428 U.S. at 304.  In Roberts , the plurality explained that the crime
of intentional murder of a police officer could not result in a mandatory death sen-
tence. Roberts , 428 U.S. at 335-36.  More than ten years later, as in Woodson and
Roberts , the Court struck down a mandatory death penalty statute in Sumner v.
Shuman , 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
170 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (plurality opinion).
171 Id.  at 604.
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dence that the defendant had adjusted to incarceration violated
the Eighth Amendment.172  In Eddings v. Oklahoma , the Court
held that a sentencer must be able to consider a capital defen-
dant’s troubled youth during sentencing.173  Thus, not only must
death penalty statutes provide for the consideration of mitigating
circumstances about the offense and the defendant’s character,
but the statutes cannot limit the factors that may be consid-
ered.174  Any information about “the circumstances of the of-
fense together with the character and propensities of the
offender”175 that is relevant must be considered.176
Therefore, mitigating circumstances play an essential role in
capital sentencing.  Most states list some of the factors that are
mitigating in their capital sentencing statutes.  Because a defen-
172 476 U.S. 1, 114-15 (1986).
173 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982).
174 See  Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding that trial
judge’s instruction to advisory jury to only consider statutory mitigating circum-
stances and refusal to consider non-statutory mitigating factors violated the Consti-
tution).  The plurality in Lockett  noted that there may be a rare case, such as the
situation of where a prisoner commits murder while serving a life sentence, where
mitigating factors would not have to be considered. Lockett , 438 U.S. at 604 n.11.
However, the Court later held that even in such a situation mitigating circumstances
must be considered. See  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 76 (1987).
175 Eddings , 455 U.S. at 112 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937)).
176 The Court has implied that there might be some limits on what mitigation a
sentencer is required to consider under the Constitution.  In Franklin v. Lynaugh ,
487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988), the Court implied that a capital defendant may not have
a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury to consider any lingering doubt
about the defendant’s guilt as mitigating.  The Court reasoned that such doubts are
not part of a defendant’s “‘character,’ ‘record,’ or a ‘circumstance of the offense.’”
Id.  at 174.  In the alternative, however, the Court concluded that even if there were
such a right to have a jury consider “residual doubt,” the right was not violated by
the jury instructions in that case. Id.  at 175.  Also, the Court has suggested a limit
on the broad holding of the Lockett  line of cases.  In Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S. 350
(1993), the Court considered a capital sentencing statute that presented special ques-
tions to jurors instead of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors. Compare TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
CODE art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (Texas’s current death penalty statute does
specifically provide for mitigating factors to be considered).  In Johnson’s case, the
jury was told to sentence him to death (1) if he deliberately killed the victim; and (2)
if he were a future danger to society. Johnson , 509 U.S. at 354.  Johnson, who was
nineteen at the time of the murder, argued that the questions did not permit consid-
eration of his youth as a mitigating factor.  The Court, however, held that Lockett
only requires that a jury be able to consider mitigating evidence and that it does not
have to “be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable manner in
which the evidence might be relevant.” Id.  at 372.  Thus, the Court upheld the death
sentence because the mitigating factor of youth could be considered in at least one
way—how it affected the defendant’s future dangerousness. Id.  at 371-72.
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dant is not limited to the factors in a statute,177 court decisions
have contributed to the list of factors.  The Supreme Court has
not provided definitive guidance as to what specific factors
should be mitigating or why some factors are mitigating.  Thus,
on a case-by-case basis, lower courts have developed mitigating
circumstances.  While there are a large number of mitigating cir-
cumstances and not all of them are disease theory factors, a sub-
stantial number of them paint a picture of the causes and effects
of human failings.  The next section lists and discusses the range
of factors that have been found to be mitigating by the legisla-
tures and the courts, and it addresses some of the reasons that
the factors are mitigating.
IV
CATEGORIES OF MITIGATING FACTORS IN
CAPITAL CASES
In making the legal and moral determination that a defendant
177 Many state statutes explicitly incorporate the command of Lockett  that all mit-
igating evidence must be considered by including a catch-all provision among the list
of specific statutory mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3(k) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“Any other circumstance which extenuates
the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime”); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18.1.3-1201(4)(l) (2003) (“Any other evidence which in the courts
opinion bears on the question of mitigation”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(h)
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (“The existence of any other factors in the defendant’s
background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(8) (Burns Supp. 2002) (“Any other circumstances appro-
priate for consideration”) (amended 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9)
(2001) (“Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to
have mitigating value”).
The Connecticut statute, by contrast, only contains a catch-all provision and does
not list specific mitigating factors. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(d) (West 2001
& Supp. 2002).  Instead, it states,
the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the
defendant’s character, background or history, or the nature and circum-
stances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall deter-
mine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case.
Id.  Interestingly, Connecticut used to list five statutory mitigating circumstances,
but the statute was rewritten so that one of those factors was eliminated (duress)
and the remaining four became per se bars to the death penalty.  An Act Concern-
ing the Death Penalty, 1995 Conn Legis. Serv. 95-19 (West).  The four former miti-
gating circumstances that are now bars to the death penalty are whether at the time
of the crime:  (1) the defendant was under eighteen; (2) significant mental impair-
ment; (3) minor participation; or (4) the defendant could not have reasonably fore-
seen that the conduct would create a risk of death. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
46a(h).
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should be executed, jurors consider certain mitigating factors
presented by the defendant and approved by the trial court.  As
discussed above, the Supreme Court has stated that a sentencer
must “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor ,
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a ba-
sis for a sentence less than death.”178  The threshold for deter-
mining what evidence is relevant mitigating evidence is a low
one: “Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logi-
cally to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-
finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.”179  How-
ever, the category of relevant factors about the offense or the
defendant’s character and record is not unlimited.  For example,
the fact that a defendant has a certain hair color or was born on a
Tuesday would generally not be mitigating.180  The mitigating
factor must somehow relate to the crime, and sometimes courts
will find that certain evidence does not constitute a mitigating
circumstance.181  Still, courts and legislatures have found a signif-
178 Lockett , 438 U.S. at 604.
179 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (quoting State v. McKoy,
372 S.E.2d 12, 55 (N.C. 1988) (Exum, C.J., dissenting)).  In Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S.
Ct. 2562, 2570 (2004), the Supreme Court emphasized that there is a “low threshold
for relevance” and rejected the higher threshold applied by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
180 The Supreme Court has noted as another example, “we have no quarrel with
the statement . . . that ‘how often [the defendant] will take a shower’ is irrelevant to
the sentencing determination.” Tennard , 124 S. Ct. at 2571 (quoting State v. Plath,
313 S.E.2d 619, 627 (S.C. 1984)).
181 Below are some examples of cases where courts found certain evidence did not
constitute a mitigating factor. See, e.g ., State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144, 172 (N.J.
2001) (holding that capital sentencing jury may not consider a co-defendant’s sen-
tence as a catch-all mitigating factor); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 115-16
(N.J. 1999) (holding that capital defendant’s alleged offer to plead guilty in exchange
for a life sentence was not a mitigating factor); State v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 806-07
(N.M. 1999) (holding that fact that the former governor had commuted prior death
sentences to life imprisonment was not a mitigating factor; also holding that opinions
of friends or relatives of the defendant that defendant should not be sentenced to
death is not a mitigating circumstance and that testimony of religious leaders and
lawyers as to the propriety of a death sentence was not relevant mitigating evi-
dence); State v. Torres, 713 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J.A.D. 1998) (rejecting as a mitigating
factor the defendant’s age of sixteen because the crime was not of a nature consis-
tent with youth); State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 270 (N.J. 1998) (holding that parole
ineligibility is not a mitigating factor); Madison v. State, 718 So. 2d 90, 96-97 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997) (holding that evidence from defense expert that the defendant
suffered from delusional and thought disorders was insufficient to support the miti-
gating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance); State v. Brown,
651 A.2d 19, 56 (N.J. 1994) (holding that sentencing of co-defendant may not be
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icant number of factors that should be considered in capital cases
as mitigating.
The law of mitigating factors in capital cases is a relatively re-
cent development, but these mitigating factors are not new con-
cepts.  As noted earlier, Judge Bazelon and others have noted
the relationship between crime and many factors that courts now
consider mitigating circumstances in capital cases.182
For organization and discussion purposes, the mitigating fac-
tors are grouped together here into four categories: (1) mitigat-
ing circumstances unrelated to the crime that show that the
defendant has some good qualities (“Good Character Factors”);
(2) mitigating circumstances that show the defendant had a lesser
involvement with the murder (“Crime Involvement Factors”); (3)
mitigating circumstances related to the legal proceedings (“Legal
Proceeding Factors”); and (4) mitigating circumstances that show
less culpability and/or that help explain why a defendant commit-
ted the crime (“Disease Theory Factors”).  The Disease Theory
Factors reflect the disease considerations that Judge Bazelon
raised in his discussions of the RSB defense.
A. Good Character Factors: Mitigating Factors Unrelated to
the Crime That Show Defendant Has Some
Good Qualities.
Assisted in the prosecution of another183
considered as a mitigating factor), overruled on other grounds , State v. Cooper, 700
A.2d 306, 331 (N.J. 1997).
182 For example, Judge Bazelon explained:
The circumstances that lead some of these people to crime are no mystery.
They are born into families struggling to survive—if they have families at
all.  They are raised in deteriorating, overcrowded housing.  They lack ade-
quate nutrition and health care.  They are subjected to prejudice and edu-
cated in unresponsive schools.  They are denied the sense of order,
purpose, and self-esteem that makes law-abiding citizens.  With nothing to
preserve and nothing to lose, they turn to crime for economic survival, a
sense of excitement and accomplishment, and an outlet for frustration,
desperation, and rage.
BAZELON, supra  note 120, at 17.
183 E.g. , N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(5)(g) (West Supp. 2004) (“The defendant ren-
dered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the
crime of murder.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(8) (2001) (“The defendant aided
in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the
prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.”).  Many states do not list this miti-
gating factor in their statute. E.g. , OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Anderson
1996 & Supp. 2001).
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Capacity to love184
Character in general185
Cooperated with police or prosecutor / Did not resist arrest186
184 E.g. , State v. Canez, 74 P.3d 932, 937 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that trial court found
“love of family” as a mitigating circumstance); Powell v. State, 796 So. 2d 404, 433
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that trial court found that it was a mitigating factor
that the capital defendant had demonstrated the capacity to love and to care for
another human being); State v. Smith, 974 P.2d 431, 442 (Ariz. 1999) (in upholding
death sentence, holding that defendant’s love for his son was a mitigating circum-
stance); People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 540 (Cal. 1990) (affirming death sentence and
noting that defendant’s love for and from his family, friends, and persons who have
known him was mitigating).
185 Many of the mitigating circumstances listed fall into the category of “charac-
ter.”  However, the category is listed as a separate mitigating circumstance to stress
the Supreme Court’s emphasis that anything about a defendant’s character should
be considered. E.g ., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988) (noting that the
sentencer must be able to consider all mitigating factors regarding the defendant and
the offense); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (holding that “the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor , any aspect of a defendant’s character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death”) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978)); State v. Wagner 786 P.2d 93, 96 (Or. 1990) (noting that general mitigation
question to be submitted to sentencing jury must allow the jury to consider all as-
pects of the defendant’s character and background); see also  21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(10)
(2000) (“That other factors in the defendant’s background or character mitigate
against imposition of the death sentence.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-
303(h)(2)(viii) (2004) (“Any other facts which the court or the jury specifically sets
forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (2004) (“The court may consider any other fact that exists in
mitigation of the penalty.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(7) (Michie 2001 &
Supp. 2003) (“Any other mitigating circumstance”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(VI)(i) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“Other factors in the defendant’s back-
ground or character mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 11-3(5)(h) (“Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant’s char-
acter or record or to the circumstances of the offense”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 400.27(9)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (“Any other circumstance concerning the
crime, the defendant’s state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the
defendant’s character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or
punishment for the crime”).
186 E.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(h) (2003) (“The extent of the defen-
dant’s cooperation with law enforcement officers or agencies and with the office of
the prosecuting district attorney”); N.M. STAT. ANN.  § 31-20A-6(H) (Michie Supp.
2001) (“The defendant cooperated with authorities.”).  Many state courts have
found cooperation with authorities to be a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.
E.g. , State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 895 (Tenn. 1998) (affirming death sentence but
finding defendant’s cooperation with the police after his apprehension was a mitigat-
ing factor); Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461, 472 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that
the fact that the appellant cooperated with police was a nonstatutory mitigating cir-
cumstance but affirming the death sentence); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 485
(Tenn. 1993) (reversing the death sentence and considering among other things as
mitigating that the defendant cooperated with the FBI to find others); Ex parte  Har-
ris, 825 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that the circumstances sur-
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Creative (art/poetry)187
Criminal history (lack of)188 / Defendant previously has not
rounding the shooting and applicant’s remorse and cooperation with the police
suggest that applicant is not a violent person); State v. Joubert, 399 N.W.2d 237, 248
(Neb. 1986) (approving trial judge’s decision that defendant’s guilty plea was a miti-
gating circumstance); State v. Compton, 726 P.2d 837, 846 (N.M. 1986) (affirming
death sentence and holding that it does not violate the Constitution to consider co-
operating with authorities as a mitigating factor because the factor does not uncon-
stitutionally allow for imposition of the death penalty based upon the exercise of the
right to remain silent).
187 E.g. , Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1990); State v. Jeffries, 717 P.2d
722, 739-40 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the defendant’s artwork introduced as mitiga-
tion was insufficient to merit leniency).
188 Many statutes in the United States list “no significant history of prior criminal
activity” as a statutory mitigating factor. E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848 (m)(6) (“The defen-
dant did not have a significant prior criminal record.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(1)
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001) (“The defendant has no significant history of prior crim-
inal activity.”); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-605(6) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002) (same);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“The presence or absence
of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of
force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3(c) (“The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.”);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(g) (“The absence of any significant prior convic-
tion”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (“The defendant
has no significant history of prior criminal activity.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
9-1(c)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1) (Burns Supp.
2002) (same) (amended 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(1) (Supp. 2001) (same);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(1) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003) (same); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §2-303 (h)(2)(i)(1)-(3) (2004) (“The defendant previously
has not:  (1) been found guilty of a crime of violence; (2) entered a plea of guilt or a
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (3) received probation
before judgment for a crime of violence.”); MISS. CODE ANN. §99-19-101(6)(a)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“The defendant has no significant history of prior crimi-
nal activity.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (“The defen-
dant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-304(1)(a) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(a) (Supp. 2000) (same); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(1) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(e) (“The
defendant did not have a significant prior criminal record.”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(5)(f) (“The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activ-
ity.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(A) (“The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(a) (“The defendant has
no significant history of prior criminal convictions involving the use of violence
against another person.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(1) (2001) (“The defen-
dant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(5) (“The offender’s lack of a significant history of prior criminal con-
victions and delinquency adjudication.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) (2003)
(“[T]he extent and severity of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct.”); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(1) (2002) (“The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal convictions.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001)
(“The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the
use of violence against another person.”) (amended 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-204(j)(1) (Supp. 2001) (“The defendant has no significant history of prior crimi-
nal activity.”) (amended 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(a) (2003 & Supp.
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entered a guilty or nolo contendere plea to a crime of vio-
lence189 / Defendant previously has not received probation for
a crime of violence190
Defendant’s family will suffer from execution191
Education obtained in prison192
Good behavior in prison or a structured environment193
2004) (“[T]he defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(i) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002) (“The defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(1)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether the defendant has or does not have a signifi-
cant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity.”); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(i) (Michie 2003) (“The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity.”).
Not all states, however, list lack of prior criminal history as a statutory mitigating
factor. E.g. , ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2004).  Case law in many
states addresses this mitigating factor. E.g. , Apicella v. State, 809 So. 2d 841, 864-65
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that the trial court may consider a defendant’s ar-
rest record in determining the weight to be given the statutory mitigating circum-
stance, but its existence or nonexistence must be based only on whether the
defendant has prior convictions); Riggs v. State, 3 S.W.3d 305, 319 (Ark. 1999) (con-
cluding that jury found the mitigating circumstance of no significant history of crimi-
nal activity); State v. Moore, 316 N.W.2d 33, 45 (Neb. 1982) (holding that “the
commission of two felonies cannot support a finding that there is no significant prior
criminal history”), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds , Moore v. Kinney, 278 F.3d 774
(8th Cir. 2002); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 892 (Neb. 1977) (noting that alle-
gations of statutory rape and several misdemeanor convictions for intoxication and
reckless driving were not a significant history of prior convictions), overruled on
other grounds , State v. Reeves, 453 N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1990); Bowers v. State, 468
A.2d 101, 104 (Md. 1983) (vacating death sentence and remanding to the trial court
for a new sentencing procedure because the court found that the jury erred in failing
to find the mitigating factor of no prior conviction of a crime of violence).
189 See, e.g. , MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(i) (“[T]he defendant pre-
viously has not . . . entered a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendre to a charge of a
crime of violence.”).
190 See, e.g. , id . § 2-303(h)(i), (1) (“The defendant previously has not . . . been
found guilty of a crime of violence.”).
191 E.g. , State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 168 (Or. 1994) (holding that circumstantial
evidence that defendant’s execution might have some harmful effect on defendant’s
daughter is relevant during the penalty phase to defendant’s character or back-
ground); Romine v. State, 305 S.E.2d 93, 101 (Ga. 1983) (noting that it should be
considered as mitigating the effects that a death penalty will have on the defendant’s
loved ones); cf.  People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 506 (Cal. 1998) (stating “that sympa-
thy for a defendant’s family is not a matter that a capital jury can consider in mitiga-
tion, but that family members may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on
them if by so doing they illuminate some positive quality of the defendant’s back-
ground or character”).
192 E.g. , State v. Schurz, 859 P.2d 156, 165 (Ariz. 1993) (noting that the trial court
found the mitigating circumstance that the defendant completed the requirements
for a GED certificate and a course on substance abuse).
193 E.g. , Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 364 (1993) (holding that a good prison
record is a mitigating factor); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1986)
(holding that Eighth Amendment requires sentencer to consider evidence of defen-
dant’s good behavior in jail between arrest and trial as mitigating); Jackson v. State,
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Good citizen / Good character194
Good employment history195
791 So. 2d 979, 1035-36 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that the trial court not only
considered the defendant’s ability to adapt to prison life, but found that it consti-
tuted a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, albeit a “weak” one); State v. Car-
riger, 692 P.2d 991, 1010-11 (Ariz. 1984) (indicating that the defendant’s action in
saving the life of another inmate was evidence in mitigation); State v. Matthews, 353
S.E.2d 444, 449-50 (S.C. 1986) (reversing sentence of death because of the exclusion
of testimony of a clinical psychologist as to the defendant’s future adaptability to
prison life, since such testimony was evidence of a mitigating circumstance); State v.
Patterson, 351 S.E.2d 853, 856-58 (S.C. 1986) (reversing a death sentence based on
the trial judge’s refusal to permit a clinical psychologist to testify at sentencing be-
cause the expert’s testimony as to future adaptability to prison life was required to
be admitted as a relevant mitigating evidence of the defendant’s character).
However, a defendant who argues that he is entitled to a new hearing to consider
his behavior on death row as mitigating will be unsuccessful.  In Evans v. Muncy ,
498 U.S. 927 (1990), the Supreme Court denied a stay of execution where Wilbert
Evans sought consideration of his actions in saving the lives of guards and prevent-
ing the rape of a nurse while he was on death row when other prisoners tried to
escape. Id . at 928-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kirchmeier, supra  note 34, at 372-74.
194 E.g. , Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995) (affirming Alabama Su-
preme Court and death sentence where the trial judge found as non-statutory miti-
gating circumstances that Harris was a hardworking, respected member of her
church and community, although the non-statutory mitigating factors were out-
weighed by one statutory aggravating factor); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915,
928-32 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that defense counsel was ineffective for,
among other reasons, failing to present witness testimony that the defendant was a
good person and was non-violent and his family loved him); Collier v. Turpin, 177
F.3d 1184, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence that included, among other
things, the defendant’s gentle disposition and instances of compassion and heroism);
Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 616-18 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that defense
counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to present postive testimony
from defendant’s family that would have humanized the defendant); Wilson v. State,
777 So. 2d 856, 892-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (upholding death sentence but noting
that it was a non-statutory mitigating circumstance that two witnesses from the de-
fendant’s church testified that he was a person of good character and participated in
church activities); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 452-53 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that
trial court correctly found non-statutory mitigating circumstance that the defendant
displayed good character prior to murdering the victim because he was law abiding
and had previously saved lives of others); In re  Marquez, 822 P.2d 435, 448-49 (Cal.
1992) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evi-
dence that included fact that his family members would have testified that he was a
good son and brother, he worked hard, and he had good character traits); Dawson v.
State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1108 (Del. 1990) (noting that it was mitigating that the defen-
dant offered to donate his kidney to his cousin), vacated , 503 U.S. 159 (1992); People
v. Thompkins, 732 N.E.2d 553, 569-70 (Ill. 2000) (holding that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to present mitigation that included that the defendant was a
good family person, was kind, and may have saved the life of a youth officer who
later became a police chief); State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 208 (N.J. 1991) (noting
that the defendant’s character was shown by his civil, business, and philanthropic
acts but affirming death penalty), supplemented by  613 A.2d 1059.
195 E.g., State v. Soto-Fong, 928 P.2d 610, 634 (Ariz. 1996) (affirming death sen-
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Military service196
Not a future danger197
Potential for rehabilitation198
Religious199
tence and holding that it was mitigating that the defendant was employed for at least
some of the time that he was not in school); Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d 720, 723
(Fla. 1989) (holding that the defendant’s work habits, among other mitigating cir-
cumstances, were sufficient to reduce the death penalty); People v. Johnson, 538
N.E.2d 1118, 1130-31 (Ill. 1989) (holding that the defendant’s work record along
with other mitigating factors were sufficient to warrant leniency).
196 E.g. , State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 777 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that the defen-
dant’s service in Vietnam and his honorable discharge were relevant mitigating cir-
cumstances but upholding death sentence); People v. Lucero, 3 P.3d 248, 272 (Cal.
2000) (noting that it was mitigating evidence the defendant had served three tours of
duty in Vietnam and had been awarded Purple Heart and combat infantry badge);
People v. Babbitt, 755 P.2d 253, 265-66 (Cal. 1988) (holding that it was non-prejudi-
cial error for trial court to find that post-Vietnam stress syndrome did not rise to the
level of a mitigating circumstance).
197 See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(k)(2003) (“The defendant is not a
continuing threat to society.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(9) (Supp. 2001) (“A
term of imprisonment is sufficient to defend and protect the people’s safety from the
defendant.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(vii)(2004) (“[I]t is unlikely
that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would be a continuing
threat to society.”).
One way of showing that the defendant is not a future threat is to show that the
defendant is seriously ill. See, e.g ., White v. State, 446 So. 2d 1031, 1036 (Fla. 1984)
(noting that the defendant suffered from a heart condition that required medica-
tion); Jones v. State, 767 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. 1989) (noting that defendant suffered
from a heart condition).
198 E.g. , Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398 (1986) (implying that “capacity
for rehabilitation” should have been considered as a mitigating factor at trial); Skip-
per v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (holding that Eighth Amendment re-
quires that evidence that defendant in capital case would not pose danger if spared,
but incarcerated, must be considered potentially mitigating); State v. Schad, 788 P.2d
1162, 1172 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation but
affirming death sentence); State v. Davis, 477 A.2d 308, 311-12 (N.J. 1984) (noting
that “character” may include the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation); State v.
Smith, 863 P.2d 1000, 1009 (N.M. 1993) (holding that the sentencing court erred by
failing to order a presentence investigation and report that included consideration of
defendant’s admission of guilt, contrition, commitment to rehabilitation, and con-
duct while incarcerated, which were all relevant as mitigating evidence); State v.
Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 786 (Tenn. 2001) (changing death sentence to life imprison-
ment and noting as mitigating that the fact that the defendant appeared genuinely
remorseful and offered evidence that he was a dependable worker of above-average
intelligence, suggested his amenability to rehabilitation); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20A-6(G) (Michie Supp. 2000) (“[T]he defendant is likely to be
rehabilitated.”).
199 E.g. , Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that fact that
a petitioner had a religious conversion or “rededicated his life to God” is a mitigat-
ing circumstance); State v. Richmond, 495 S.E.2d 677, 692 (N.C. 1998) (noting miti-
gating value of fact that defendant has sought forgiveness from God); State v. Boyd,
319 S.E.2d 189, 203 (N.C. 1984) (discussing quality of evidence submitted to support
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Remorse200
The Supreme Court has indicated the constitutional signifi-
cance of some of these good character mitigating circumstances.
For example, in Hitchcock v. Dugger , Justice Scalia wrote for a
majority and vacated the death sentence because the jury was
limited from considering mitigating factors.201  Mitigating cir-
cumstances in that case included “innocence of significant prior
criminal activity or violent behavior,” “potential for rehabilita-
tion” and “voluntary surrender to authorities.”202  However,
there was little discussion by the Court about why these factors
are mitigating.
These factors are mitigating not because they mitigate the
crime, but because they show that a defendant is not completely
evil and therefore should not be executed.  Thus, these factors
are relevant to the moral determination of whether a defendant
should be executed.  A court’s consideration of these factors rec-
ognizes, for retributive purposes, that a defendant consists of
something more than the murder that took place on one day of
the defendant’s life.
Good Character Factors not only go to the moral value of the
defendant, but for utilitarian reasons are relevant to the defen-
dant’s future dangerousness.  For example, if a defendant has
done good things and has not committed crimes in the past, it
shows that the murder was not consistent with the defendant’s
mitigating factors that the defendant had been baptized and had expressed a devo-
tion to God).
200 E.g. , State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 887 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that remorse was
a non-statutory mitigating circumstance where in letters written to both the victim’s
family and the judge, the defendant expressed remorse for the damage his “rash and
unthoughtful” actions had caused); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1238 (Miss.
1996) (holding that “catch-all“ mitigating circumstance instruction adequately af-
forded jury opportunity to consider remorse as mitigating factor during sentencing
phase of capital murder case); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 764 (N.M. 2000) (holding
that remorse was a non-statutory mitigating factor but affirming death sentence);
Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 790 (Va. 1979) (noting that had the defen-
dant manifested remorse, sorrow, or grief for the murder that he had committed,
this would have been a mitigating circumstance); Ex parte  Harris, 825 S.W.2d 120,
121 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the circumstances surrounding the shooting and appli-
cant’s remorse and cooperation with the police suggest that applicant is not a violent
person); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry?  The Role of Re-
morse in Capital Sentencing , 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998); Scott E. Sundby, The
Capital Jury and Absolution:  The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the
Death Penalty , 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998).
201 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
202 Id.  at 397.
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usual behavior.  In such a case, the person is less of a risk to
society or other prisoners than are murderers with a consistent
dangerous history.  Therefore, these factors are mitigating for
utilitarian reasons as well as retributive reasons.
As a practical matter, these factors usually are not given great
weight in sentencing capital defendants.  For example, despite
the fact that a defendant has not committed crimes in the past,
juries seem to consider that the defendant has now committed
capital murder argues strongly for the defendant’s moral culpa-
bility and future dangerousness.203  Still, these factors should
carry more weight than courts often give to them.  When a per-
son is executed, society is destroying not only the murderer but
the entire person, who may have been a parent, sibling, and child
who was not entirely evil.
These “redeeming” mitigating factors are important to supple-
ment other mitigating factors.  “The thinking goes in mitigation
circles that it’s not enough to present someone as psychically bat-
tered and frayed, since if a jury feels he is too far gone, what’s
left to save?”204  So, in addition to factors that might help explain
why a defendant committed the crime, redeeming factors give ju-
rors a reason to spare the life of the defendant.
B. Crime Involvement Factors: Mitigating Factors That Show
the Defendant Had Less Involvement in the Murder
Belief that the killing was morally justified205
203 See, e.g.,  Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 507 (1995) (affirming Alabama Su-
preme Court and death sentence where the trial judge found as non-statutory miti-
gating circumstances that Harris was a hardworking, respected member of her
church and community, although the non-statutory mitigating factors were out-
weighed by one statutory aggravating factor); Jackson v. State, 791 So. 2d 979, 1035-
36 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that the trial court not only considered the de-
fendant’s ability to adapt to prison life, but found that it constituted a non-statutory
mitigating circumstance, albeit a “weak” one); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 764
(N.M. 2000) (holding that remorse was a non-statutory mitigating factor but af-
firming death sentence).
204 Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death , N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 32.  Simi-
larly, one state supreme court considered the mitigating circumstance of a capital
defendant’s troubled early family life as showing he was violent and therefore “it
weighs as much in favor of the death sentence as against it.”  State v. Schurz, 859
P.2d 156, 167 (Ariz. 1993) (affirming death sentence).  Therefore, the “redeeming”
mitigating factors are an important addition to mitigating factors that help explain
the causes of the murder.
205 E.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(f) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether or not
the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably be-
lieved to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct”); COLO. REV. STAT.
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Causation/Defendant’s act was not the sole proximate cause of
the victim’s death206
Circumstances that justify or reduce the crime207
Consent208
§ 18-1.3-1201(4)(j) (2003) (“The good faith, although mistaken, belief by the defen-
dant that circumstances existed which constituted a moral justification for the defen-
dant’s conduct”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(4) (Michie 1999 & Supp.
2003) (“The capital offense was committed under circumstances which the defen-
dant believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct even
though the circumstances which the defendant believed to provide a moral justifica-
tion or extenuation for his conduct are not sufficient to constitute a defense to the
crime.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(d) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (“The
offense was committed under circumstances which the offender reasonably believed
to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-204(j)(4) (Supp. 2001) (“The murder was committed under circumstances
which the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the
defendant’s conduct.”); see also  Simmons v. Lockhart, 814 F.2d 504, 514 (8th Cir.
1987) (noting that the Arkansas trial court stated that the jury could have viewed the
murderer’s fear of detection as a mitigating circumstance in killing three victims
because it at least provided an understandable, though twisted, motive for killing);
People v. White, 870 P.2d 424, 437 (Colo. 1994) (reversing death sentence and not-
ing that trial court found the mitigating factor that the defendant believed that his
acts were morally justified).
206 See, e.g.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(vi) (2004) (“[T]he act of
the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death.”).
207 E.g. , N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(F) (Michie Supp. 2001) (“The defendant
acted under circumstances which tended to justify, excuse, or reduce the crime.”).
208 E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9) (2000) (“The victim consented to the criminal con-
duct that resulted in the victim’s death.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(3) (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 2001) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented
to it.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(e) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether or not
the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to
the homicidal act.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)
(“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(3) (West Supp. 2002) (“[T]he murdered individ-
ual was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homi-
cidal act”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(3) (Burns Supp. 2002) (“The victim was
a participant in or consented to the defendant’s conduct.”) (amended 2003); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(3) (Supp. 2001) (“The victim was a participant in or consented
to the defendant’s conduct.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 532.025(2)(b)(3) (“The victim
was a participant in the defendant’s criminal conduct or consented to the criminal
act.”); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(2) (2003) (“The victim was a participant in
the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act  which caused the victim’s death.”);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(c) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“The victim was a
participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032(3) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (“The victim was a participant in the defen-
dant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(e)
(2004) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the
act.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(f) (Supp. 2000) (“The victim was a participant
in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
200.035(3) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003) (“The victim was a participant in the defen-
dant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(h)
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“The victim consented to the criminal conduct that
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Duress or coercion209
resulted in the victim’s death.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(5)(b) (West Supp. 2004)
(“The victim solicited, participated in, or consented to the conduct which resulted in
his death.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(E) (“The victim was a willing participant
in the defendant’s conduct.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(6) (West Supp. 2002)
(“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to
the homicidal acts.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(3) (“The victim was a par-
ticipant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-20(C)(b)(3) (West Supp. 2001) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s
conduct or consented to the act.”) (amended 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4
(B)(iii) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2002) (“[T]he victim was a participant in the defen-
dant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(3) (West
2002 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether the victim consented to the act of murder”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(iii) (Michie 2003) (“The victim was a participant in the de-
fendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); see also  Gospodareck v. State, 666 So.
2d 835, 841-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the fact that the victim may
have participated in his death or consented to it was appropriately considered by the
jury as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of the trial).
209 E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(2) (2000) (“The defendant was under unusual and
substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of such a degree as to con-
stitute a defense to the charge.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(5) (“The defendant acted
under extreme duress or under the substantial dominion of another person.”); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(2) (West Supp. 2004) (“The defendant was under unusual
and substantial duress, although not so much as to constitute a defense to prosecu-
tion.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(2) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002) (“The capital
murder was committed while the defendant was acting under unusual pressures or
influences or under the domination of another person.”); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3(g) (“Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(c)
(2003) (“The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such
duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”).; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(e)
(“The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(4) (“[T]he defendant acted
under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or
great bodily harm.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(5) (“The defendant acted
under the substantial domination of another person.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4626(5) (“The defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial dom-
ination of another person”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(6) (“The defen-
dant acted under duress or under the domination of another person even though the
duress or the domination of another person is not sufficient to constitute a defense
to the crime.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004)
(“The offense was committed while the offender was under the influence or under
the domination of another person.”); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(3) (2003)
(“The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or provocation of an-
other person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prose-
cution.”); MISS. CODE ANN. §99-19-101(6)(e) (“The defendant acted under extreme
duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032(5) (“The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(c) (“The defen-
dant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(b) (“The offender acted under unusual
pressure or influences or under the domination of another person.”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 200.035(5) (“The defendant acted under duress or under the domination
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Felony-murder210
Lack of presence at the homicide211
Minor participation: defendant was an accomplice and her or
his participation was relatively minor212
of another person.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(b) (“The defendant was
under unusual and substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of such a
degree as to constitute a defense to the charge.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(5)(e)
(“The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute
a defense to prosecution.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(B) (“The defendant acted
under duress or under the domination of another person.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 400.27(9)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (“The defendant was under duress or under
the domination of another person, although not such duress or domination as to
constitute a defense to prosecution.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(5) (2001)
(“The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(2) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“Whether
it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 9711(e)(5) (“The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress
as to constitute a defense to prosecution under § 309 (relating to duress), or acted
under the substantial domination of another person.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(j)(6) (“The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial dom-
ination of another person.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(5) (West Supp. 2001)
(“The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.”);
see also  Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that in the case
“coercion” could be considered a mitigating circumstance); State v. Spain, 4 P.3d
621, 622 (Kan. 2000) (noting that trial court had found as a mitigating circumstance
that the defendant was dominated by his co-defendant); State v. Howard, 369 S.E.2d
132, 138 (S.C. 1988) (holding that the defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of
his confession because the confession contained mitigating evidence that the co-de-
fendant dominated the defendant).
210 E.g. , State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468, 492 (Ariz. 1996) (finding that felony-mur-
der verdict was a relevant mitigating factor but not one that was sufficiently substan-
tial to call for leniency in a case where defendant was a major participant); State v.
McDaniel, 665 P.2d 70, 83 (Ariz. 1983) (reducing the defendant’s death sentence to
life imprisonment, finding that his lack of intent to kill was a mitigating circumstance
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency).
In felony-murder cases the Supreme Court has held that the category of murder-
ers who did not have the intent to kill or act with reckless disregard to human life
may not be sentenced to death. See  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987)
(holding that prior to sentencing felony-murder defendants to death, there must be a
determination that they were major participants in the felony and that they acted
with reckless indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-802
(1982) (holding that person in a getaway car during a robbery-murder could not be
sentenced to death without a showing that he intended or anticipated that lethal
force be used).
211 E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c)(5) (“[T]he defendant was not per-
sonally present during commission of the act or acts causing death.”).
212 E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(4) (“The defendant was an accomplice in the
capital offense committed by another person and his participation was relatively mi-
nor.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (West Supp. 2004) (“The defendant
was legally accountable for the conduct of another . . . , but his participation was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(5) (“The capital murder was committed by another per-
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son and the defendant was an accomplice and his participation relatively minor.”);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(j) (“Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to
the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively
minor.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(d) (“The defendant was a principal in
the offense which was committed by another, but the defendant’s participation was
relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(d) (“The defendant was an accomplice in the capital
felony committed by another person and his or her participation was relatively mi-
nor.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(4) (“The defendant was an accomplice in a
murder committed by another person, and the defendant’s participation was rela-
tively minor.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(4) (“The defendant was an accomplice
in a murder committed by another person, and the defendant’s participation was
relatively minor.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(5) (“The defendant was
an accomplice in a capital offense committed by another person and his participa-
tion in the capital offense was relatively minor.”); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413(g)(6) (“The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the vic-
tim’s death.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(d) (“The defendant was an accom-
plice in the capital offense committed by another person and his participation was
relatively minor.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3) (“The defendant was an accom-
plice in the murder in the first degree committed by another person and his partici-
pation was relatively minor.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(f) (“The
defendant was an accomplice in an offense committed by another person, and the
defendant’s participation was relatively minor.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e)
(“The offender was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person and his
or her participation was relatively minor.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(4) (“The
defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his
participation in the murder was relatively minor.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(VI)(e) (“The defendant is punishable as an accomplice . . .  in the offense,
which was committed by another, but the defendant’s participation was relatively
minor, regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a de-
fense to the charge.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(d) (“The defendant was
criminally liable for the present offense of murder committed by another, but his
participation in the offense was relatively minor although not so minor as to consti-
tute a defense to prosecution.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(6) (“If the
offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree
of the offender’s participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s partici-
pation in the acts that led to the death of the victim”); N.C. GEN.  STAT. § 15A-
2000(f)(4) (“The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony
committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(3) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s con-
duct or consented to the act.”); see also  State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 704-05 (Tenn.
2001) (holding that the trial court should have considered as a possible mitigating
factor evidence that defendant played a minor role in the offenses).
213 E.g ., United States v. Davis, 132 F. Supp. 2d 455, 463-67 (E.D. La. 2001) (hold-
ing that “residual doubt” argument is permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3592 and must
be considered by jury if offered by defense); Height v. State, 604 S.E.2d 796, 797-98
(Ga. 2004) (holding that trial court should admit the defendant’s polygraph evidence
to support his mitigation argument of residual doubt); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d
44, 57 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that impeachment of state’s eyewitness is “clearly rele-
vant and admissible to establish residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance”); State
v. Rockwell, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that the “unique circum-
stances” of the defendant’s conviction, where there was questionable evidence of his
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Unforeseen risk of causing death214
Victim’s actions make the defendant less culpable (victim’s
provocation).215
guilt, was a mitigating circumstance); People v. Earp, 978 P.2d 15, 65 (Cal. 1999)
(holding that the defendant may urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in
mitigation at penalty phase of capital trial); Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 95 (Miss.
1988) (implying it is permissible for a jury to consider whimsical doubt as a mitigat-
ing factor), rev’d on other grounds , Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); State
v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 422 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that the defendant was permitted
to present evidence of “residual doubt” as a non-statutory mitigating factor in a re-
sentencing proceeding). But see, e.g.,  Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1457
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that once guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, a
doubt about guilt does not need to be evaluated as a mitigating circumstance), va-
cated on other grounds , 486 U.S. 1051 (1988); Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600, 609
(Nev. 1992) (affirming death sentence and holding that trial court did not err in
refusing defendant’s requested jury instruction listing residual doubt as mitigating
circumstance because there is no constitutional mandate). Cf . Franklin v. Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 166 (1988) (leaving open possibility of residual doubt as a mitigating
circumstance, but stating that the Court’s previous holding about mitigation “in no
way mandates reconsideration by capital juries, in the sentencing phase, of their
‘residual doubts’ over a defendant’s guilt”).
214 E.g.  21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9) (2000) (“The victim consented to the criminal con-
duct that resulted in the victim’s death.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(4)
(“The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course
of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would
cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.”). COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(e) (“The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen
that the defendant’s conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of
causing, death to another person.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(6) (“The victim
was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homici-
dal acts.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (C)(b)(3) (“[T]he victim was a participant in
the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(j)(3) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to
the act.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (B)(iii) (Michie 2000) (amended 2003)
(“[T]he victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the
act.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(3) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether
the victim consented to the act of murder”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(iii)
(Michie 2003) (“The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or con-
sented to the act.”).
215 See , e.g. , N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(3) (2001) (“The victim was a volun-
tary participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal
act.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1) (Whether the victim of the offense
induced or facilitated it”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(8) (“The defendant was
provoked by the victim into committing the murder.”); see also  State v. Fierro, 804
P.2d 72, 87 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that it was a mitigating factor that defendant rea-
sonably believed his life was in danger from the victim); State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d
441, 444 (S.C. 1986) (holding that photos of the interiors of the defendant’s dilapi-
dated house should have been admitted as mitigating evidence because the morning
of the murder the defendant had conferred with his landlord, the victim, about the
conditions), overruled on other grounds , State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 329 (S.C.
1991).
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Crime Involvement Mitigating Factors, which indicate the de-
fendant had lesser involvement in the murder, are the mitigating
circumstances most directly related to the crime.  Thus, it is easy
for jurors to see the relevance of these factors to the defendant’s
culpability.  Although at the sentencing stage, the jurors will have
already found the defendant guilty of capital murder, these fac-
tors require additional findings about the type of murder com-
mitted by the defendant.  If the defendant were not present at
the killing or if the victim had provoked the defendant, the de-
fendant is less culpable and less dangerous than someone who
killed without provocation.
The extreme situation here is the “residual doubt” mitigating
circumstance, where jurors may decide not to impose a death
sentence because they are not completely sure that the defendant
is guilty of the murder.  The Supreme Court defined “residual
doubt” as “a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind
that exists somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and
‘absolute certainty.’”216  Advocates of this mitigating circum-
stance argue that while a jury may convict someone of murder
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” society should not execute a de-
fendant unless a higher degree of guilt is established.217  How-
ever, the Supreme Court has implied that there may be no
constitutional requirement to consider residual doubt as a miti-
gating circumstance.218  Also, although some courts allow consid-
eration of residual doubt, some courts have held that once guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt, there cannot be a miti-
gating circumstance of residual doubt.219  In light of the recent
For a more general discussion of how capital juries consider a victim’s behavior
and characteristics in making their sentencing decision, see Scott E. Sunby, The Cap-
ital Jury and Empathy:  The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims , 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 343 (2003).
216 Franklin , 487 U.S. at 188.
217 One study of capital jurors concluded that “‘residual doubt’ over the defen-
dant’s guilt is the most powerful ‘mitigating’ fact.”  Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases:  What Do Jurors Think? , 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538,
1563 (1998); see  Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 715 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
“creating lingering doubt has been recognized as an effective strategy for avoiding
the death penalty”).
218 Franklin , 487 U.S. at 174 (plurality) (leaving open possibility of residual doubt
as a mitigating circumstance, but stating that the Court’s previous holding about
mitigation “in no way mandates reconsideration by capital juries, in the sentencing
phase, of their ‘residual doubts’ over a defendant’s guilt”).
219 E.g. , State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1117 (N.J. 2002) (holding that residual
doubt evidence is inadmissible at the sentencing phase); McKenna v. State, 968 P.2d
739, 749 (Nev. 1998) (affirming death sentence and holding that trial court did not
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number of exonerations of death row inmates, however, courts
should permit residual doubt as a mitigating factor more often.220
Unlike the “redeeming” circumstances of the Good Character
Factors, the Crime Involvement Factors are directly related to
the murder.  These factors are relevant to the culpability of the
defendant and they go, to some extent, toward determining both
the nature of the crime committed by the defendant and the de-
fendant’s guilt.




Length of legal proceedings223
Prosecutor (or victim’s family) recommended leniency224
Sentencing disparity with co-defendant225
err in refusing defendant’s requested jury instruction listing residual doubt as a miti-
gating circumstance because there is no constitutional mandate); Homick v. State,
825 P.2d 600, 609-10 (Nev. 1992) (same).
220 See  Jeffery L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here:  The Death Penalty
Movement in the United States , 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 39-43 (2002) (discussing large
number of innocent defendants released from death row and an increasing concern
about executing innocent defendants).
221 At least in cases where the prosecution has placed the defendant’s “future
dangerousness” at issue, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives the defendant the right to inform the jury that she or he is ineligible for parole
if sentenced to life in prison. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-70
(1994).  The factor is listed here, though arguably parole ineligibility is not a mitigat-
ing factor but more like rebuttal to the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.
222 E.g. , Ferguson v. State, 814 So. 2d 925, 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that
the trial court found as a non-statutory mitigating factor that the jury recommended
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
223 E.g. , State v. Adamson, 665 P.2d 972, 989 (Ariz. 1983) (upholding the death
sentence but noting that the length of the legal proceedings from inception was a
mitigating factor).
224 E.g. , Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F. Supp. 1334, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1986) (noting that
the prosecutor offered a plea bargain that did not involve a death sentence), rev’d on
other grounds  832 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d sub nom.  Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.
764 (1990); State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 825 (Ariz. 1999) (affirming death sentence
but holding that trial judge erred by not finding a mitigating circumstance that the
two prosecutors did not believe that death was the appropriate sentence).
225 E.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (2000) (requiring the jury to consider as a mitigat-
ing factor that another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime,
would not be punished by death); 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) (2000) (“Another defen-
dant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(g) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“Another defen-
dant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.”).
Courts have interpreted the “equally culpable co-defendant” mitigating factor as not
limited to indicted defendants, thus also requiring sentencers to compare a defen-
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These Legal Proceeding Mitigating Factors relate to specific
aspects of the defendant’s legal case, such as that the victim’s
family does not want the death penalty.  These factors tend to be
permitted to make the system more fair, such as by considering
how other co-defendants were sentenced.  They also consider
specific aspects of the defendant’s case, such as the recommenda-
tions of juries, prosecutors, or victims’ families.  Unlike the Good
Character, Crime Involvement, and Disease Theory Factors,
these Legal Proceeding Factors do not have a direct relation to
the moral culpability or moral value of the defendant.
D. Disease Theory Factors: Mitigating Factors That Show Less
Culpability and/or That Help Explain Why a
Defendant Committed the Crime
Age226
dant’s sentence with the punishment for uncharged accomplices. E.g. , United States
v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804, 812 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that federal statutory
“equally culpable” mitigating factor applies to uncharged co-conspirators); McLain
v. Calderon, No. CV 89-3061 JGD, 1995 WL 769176 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1995) (ap-
plying a non-statutory disparate treatment mitigating factor and noting no distinc-
tion between charged and uncharged accomplices); see also  Arthur v. State, 711 So.
2d 1031, 1095 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that the disparity of treatment be-
tween the appellant and his accomplices was a non-statutory mitigating circum-
stance); Craig v. State, 685 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. 1996) (noting that in sentencing
the defendant, the jury must consider the co-defendant’s punishment); State v. Mar-
low, 786 P.2d 395, 402-03 (Ariz. 1989) (reducing the defendant’s sentence to life and
finding that the “dramatic disparity” between the defendant’s death sentence and his
co-defendant’s four-year sentence was a mitigating factor that the trial court had not
considered). But see  State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792, 824-26 (N.J. 1988) (finding that
a co-defendant’s sentence was not a mitigating factor); State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d
908, 918 (Tenn. 1989) (holding that a rational basis for different sentences existed
when a co-defendant received a lesser penalty than the defendant because the co-
defendant did not initiate the crimes and participated out of fear for his life).
226 Statutes do not usually list a specific age limit for youth as a mitigating factor,
although some do.  Additionally, statutory mitigating factors sometimes focus on
“youth” as mitigating, while others focus on the “age” of the defendant, leaving
open the possibility that old age might be mitigating. E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(5)
(2000) (“The defendant was youthful, although not under the age of 18.”); ALA.
CODE § 13-5-51(7) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001) (“The age of the defendant at the
time of the crime”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5) (West Supp. 2004)
(“The defendant’s age”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(4)(Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002)
(“The youth of the defendant at the time of the commission of the capital murder”);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime”); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-1201(4)(a) (2003) (“The age of
the defendant at the time of the crime”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West
2001 & Supp. 2004) (“The age of the defendant at the time of the crime”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(7) (Michie Supp. 2002) (“The defendant was less than
eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder was committed.”) (amended 2003);
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(7) (2001) (“The age of the defendant at the time of the
crime”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518-1.3-1201(4)(a) (2003) 32.025(2)(b)(8) (Michie
1999 & Supp. 2003) (“The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime”); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(f) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (“The youth of the
offender at the time of the offense”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(v)
(2004) (“[T]he defendant was of a youthful age at the time of the murder.”); MISS.
CODE ANN. §99-19-101(6)(g) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3) (“The age of the defendant
at the time of the crime”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(g) (2004) (“The defen-
dant, at the time of the commission of the crime, was less than 18 years of age.”);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(d) (Supp. 2000) (“The age of the defendant at the
time of the crime”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(6) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003)
(“The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime”); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 630:5(VI)(d) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“The defendant was youthful, although
not under the age of 18.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(5)(c) (West Supp. 2004) (“The
age of the defendant at the time of the murder”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(I)
(Michie Supp. 2000) (“[T]he defendant’s age”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7)
(2001) (“The age of the defendant at the time of the crime”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“The youth of the offender”);
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(4)(2002)(“The age of the defendant at the time of the
crime”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(7) (Supp. 2001) (“The youth or advanced
age of the defendant at the time of the crime”) (amended 2002); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(7),(9) (West Supp. 2001) (“The age or mentality of the defendant at
the time of the crime”) (“The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of
the crime.”) (amended 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(e) (2003 & Supp.
2004) (“[T]he youth of the defendant at the time of the crime”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (Michie 2000) (“[T]he age of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the capital offense”) (amended 2002); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.070(7) (2003) (“Whether the age of the defendant at the time of the crime
calls for leniency”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(vii) (Michie 2003) (“The age of
the defendant at the time of the crime”).  A number of cases have emphasized that
there is no specific age limit for “youth” as a mitigating factor, and other factors
besides chronological age should be considered. See also  Hill v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d
340, 342 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that statutory mitigating circumstance of “youth” is
not defined by chronological age but must be considered in light of the circum-
stances); State v. Holtan, 250 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Neb. 1977) (holding that age is rela-
tive and must be considered in light of surrounding conditions), overruled on other
grounds , State v. Palmer, 339 N.W.2d 706, 728 (Neb. 1986); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d
814, 842-43 (N.J. 1992) (affirming death sentence and holding that in determining
whether age as a mitigating factor applies, juries must consider chronological age
and maturity but give more weight to chronological age); Johnson v. State, 703 A.2d
1267, 1275-76 (Md. 1998) (holding that trial court erred in equating mitigating factor
of youthful age with chronological age).  In Bryant v. State , 824 A.2d 60, 75 (Md.
2003), the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that chronological age was not the only
consideration in weighing “youthful age.”  However, the court held that as a matter
of law the sentencer must consider the youthful age mitigator when the defendant
was under the age of nineteen at the date of the homicide, although the weight of
the factor may vary depending on other factors. Id.  at 64.  The court’s analysis con-
sidered that the Maryland legislature had prohibited the execution of defendants
under eighteen years of age at the time of the crime, so it seemed that those barely
above that marker should have their age considered as mitigating. Id.  at 65.  States
have also disagreed on whether old age, in addition to young age, may be a mitigat-
ing factor. E.g. , State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 275 (N.J. 1987) (holding that age
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Agoraphobia227
Brain damage / Head injury228
Childhood abuse / Deprived childhood229
Circumstances that excuse the crime230
should be considered as a mitigating circumstance only when the defendant is rela-
tively young or relatively old), rev’d on other grounds , 524 A.2d 188 (1987); State v.
Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that young age, but not old
age, may be a mitigating factor).  Because the “age” of the defendant means more
than just the chronological age, courts have not been consistent in finding that
chronological age is mitigating, but it is still a fairly common mitigating factor. See
State v. Rockwell, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that life sentence should
be imposed because of defendant’s youth of twenty-one years of age as well as other
mitigating factors); State v. Velencia, 645 P.2d 239, 241 (Ariz. 1982) (holding that the
fact that the defendant was sixteen at the time of the murder was mitigating); Hawk
v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 163 (Fla. 1998) (vacating death sentence and holding that
fact that defendant was nineteen years of age at the time of the crimes was a mitigat-
ing factor); Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 1001 (Fla. 1993) (reversing death sentence
and holding that when a murder is committed by a minor, the mitigating factor of
age must be found and weighed); Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137, 1143 (Fla. 1988)
(vacating death sentence and holding that the emotional age of a twenty-four-year-
old defendant was low enough to find mitigating circumstance of youth); State v.
Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 488, 494 (Mo. 1983) (affirming death sentence and holding
that age of eighteen years and four months was not a mitigating factor); Mooney v.
State, 990 P.2d 875, 885 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that age and maturity are
relevant mitigating factors); Ex parte  Kelly, 832 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (listing mitigating factors as including fact that the defendant was twenty-one
at the time of the offense).
227 E.g. , Musgrove v. State, 519 So. 2d 565, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (holding
that symptoms or manifestations of agoraphobia should be given careful considera-
tion in mitigation of sentence), aff’d , 519 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1986).
228 E.g. , State v. Lapointe, 678 A.2d 942, 944 (Conn. 1996) (holding that a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate and
finding as one of several mitigating factors that the defendant had a congenital cra-
nial deformity, resulting in hydrocephalus that left him with permanent brain dam-
age); State v. Rockwell, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (Ariz. 1989) (reducing death
sentence to life in prison because of mitigating factors, including that the defendant
lost his leg and hit his head in an accident, which caused personality changes).
229 Courts have found that childhood abuse is a mitigating factor, as is evidence
that the defendant was neglected and had a deprived childhood. Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (noting that when the defendant is still young,
“there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a
harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly relevant”); Camp-
bell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1463 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant has a
right to present evidence that he was abused as a child); Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d
1276, 1346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (finding nonstatutory mitigating circumstance
that the appellant had suffered from a “deprived” childhood, including “abandon-
ment by his natural mother and the representation to him that his aunt was his
mother”); Coulter v. State, 31 S.W.3d 826, 830 (Ark. 2000) (noting that the jury
found the mitigating circumstance that the defendant “did not have the opportuni-
ties of a normal childhood because of the divorce of his parents, the alcoholism of
his father, and his placement in foster homes“).
230 E.g. , N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(F) (“[T]he defendant acted under circum-
stances which tended to justify, excuse or reduce the crime.”).
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Drug addiction231
Emotional problems from death of a family member232
Extreme mental or emotional disturbance233
231 E.g. , State v. Stevens, 764 P.2d 724, 728 (Ariz. 1988) (vacating death sentence
and holding that the defendant’s long-term alcohol and drug dependency and the
fact that the defendant was under the influence at the time of the shooting was
sufficient mitigating evidence); People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442, 482 (Cal. 1998) (find-
ing that it was a mitigating factor that the defendant was addicted to cocaine); State
v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Mo. 1997) (noting that in some situations drug abuse
may be considered as a mitigating factor); Swartz v. State, 225 N.W. 766, 769-70
(Neb. 1929) (reducing defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment because the defen-
dant was under the influence of drug addiction at the time of the robbery that re-
sulted in the murder).
232 E.g. , Davis v. State, 740 So. 2d 1115, 1134 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that
it was a mitigating circumstance that there was evidence of possible emotional
problems brought on from the death of the defendant’s brother and the defendant’s
subsequent feelings of guilt and remorse); McNair v. State, 653 So. 2d 351, 352 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1994) (upholding death sentence but holding that it was a non-statutory
mitigating circumstance that the appellant’s father died when he was very young and
he was the oldest of seven children born to his mother).
233 E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(7) (2000) (“The defendant committed the offense
under severe mental or emotional disturbance.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2) (Michie
1994 & Supp. 2001) (“The capital offense was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-703(G)(2) (West Supp. 2004) (“The defendant was under unusual and
substantial duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002) (“The capital murder
was committed while the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether or not
the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(f) (2003)
(“The emotional state of the defendant at the time the crime was committed”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (“The capital felony was com-
mitted while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1(c)(2) (West Supp. 2002) (“[T]he
murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to
prosecution.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (Michie Supp. 2002) (“The defen-
dant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the
murder was committed.”) (amended 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(2) (Supp.
2001) (“The crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbances.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(b)(2) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003) (“The capital offense was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance even though the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not
sufficient to constitute a defense to the crime.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.5(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (“The offense was committed while the offender
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“The offense was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032(3)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (“The murder
in the first degree was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(b)
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(2004) (“The offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c)
(Supp. 2000) (“The crime was committed while the offender was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(2)
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003) (“The murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(f) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“The defendant committed
the offense under severe mental or emotional disturbance.”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(c)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2004) (“The defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to pros-
ecution.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(D) (Michie Supp. 2000) (“The defendant
was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (“The murder was committed while the
defendant was mentally or emotionally disturbed or under the influence of alcohol
or any drug, although not to such an extent as to constitute a defense to prosecu-
tion.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (2001) (“The capital felony was commit-
ted while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance.”); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(2) (2002)(“The defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20
(C)(b)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (“The murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.”) (amended 2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(2) (Supp. 2001) (“The murder was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”)
(amended 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(b) (2003 & Supp. 2004) (“[T]he
homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B)(ii) (Michie 2000) (“[T]he
capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance.”) (amended 2002); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.070(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (“Whether the murder was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(ii) (Michie 2003) (“The murder was committed while
the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance.”); see also  Castor v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1281, 1288-89 (Ind. 1992) (vacating
death sentence and holding that defendant should have been provided with a psy-
chologist to assist during the penalty phase because the possibility that the defen-
dant was subject to extreme mental or emotional disturbance is an appropriate
mitigating factor to be considered); Wells v. State, 698 So. 2d 497, 515 (Miss. 1997)
(affirming death sentence and holding that mental retardation alone would not
cause extreme emotional disturbance); State v. Sandles, 740 S.W.2d 169, 179-80 (Mo.
1987) (holding that the fact that defendant was emotionally disturbed at the time of
the killing was a mitigating circumstance); State v. Rust, 250 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Neb.
1977) (noting mitigating factor of emotional instability).
234 E.g. , Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-16 (1982) (stating that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated where the trial judge considers
youth as a mitigating circumstance but refuses to consider family history of emo-
tional and physical abuse); McGriff v. State, CR-97-0179, 2000 WL 1455196 (Ala.
Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2001) (holding that fact that the defendant’s natural father
abandoned him and that his mother had little contact with him was not a mitigating
factor because a stepfather was present in his life), rev’d , Ex parte  McGriff, 1010469,
2004 WL 2914951 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 2004); Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 444
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (affirming death sentence but holding that it was a nonstatu-
tory mitigating circumstance that the appellant came from a dysfunctional family
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with an alcoholic, abusive father); State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 985-986 (Ariz.
1989) (holding that doctor’s testimony that the defendant had a difficult childhood
and was in a disassociative state at the time of murder did not establish the statutory
mitigating circumstance of significant impairment); Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d
767, 772 (Ark. 1995) (affirming death sentence and holding that there was no error
for jury to find no mitigating factors even though the defendant offered evidence of
his deprived socioeconomic background and dysfunctional family); People v. Rodri-
gues, 885 P.2d 1, 66 (Cal. 1994) (affirming death sentence but noting that there was
some evidence of mitigating factors such as defendant’s childhood and family rela-
tionships); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d  7, 10-11 (Fla. 1997) (holding that trial court
did not err in giving little mitigating weight to circumstance of defendant’s impover-
ished childhood because other family members had the same background and did
not follow lives of crime); Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990) (vacat-
ing death sentence and holding that the trial court improperly rejected the defen-
dant’s deprived and abusive childhood as a mitigating factor); Livingston v. State,
565 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1988) (vacating death sentence and holding that the de-
fendant’s childhood of abuse and neglect was a mitigating factor); People v. Hender-
son, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1271-73 (Ill. 1990) (affirming death sentence and holding that
defendant’s troubled childhood does not have to be considered a mitigating circum-
stance and that it can be considered as evidence of the aggravating circumstance of
future danger to society); State v. Williams, 490 N.E.2d 906, 914 (Ohio 1986) (af-
firming death sentence but noting evidence that the defendant pursued a life of
crime in response to a lack of love in his childhood);  State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18,
31 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that background evidence is relevant because defendants
who come from a disadvantaged background or who have emotional or mental
problems may be less culpable than other defendants); Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d
572, 582 (Tenn. 1997) (same); Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, 165-66 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (holding that Texas statutory scheme allows jury to consider and give mitigat-
ing effect to evidence of troubled or abusive childhood); Richardson v. State, 901
S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that society has a long-held belief
that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background may be less culpable than defendants without that excuse).
235 E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(10) (2002) (“[T]hat other factors in the defendant’s
background or character mitigate against imposition of the death sentence”); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(d) (West 2001 & Supp. 2002) (“[T]he court shall first
determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant’s character, back-
ground or history, or the nature of the circumstances of the crime, has been estab-
lished by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating
in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case.”); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(viii) (2004) (“[A]ny other facts that the court or the
jury specifically sets forth in writing as mitigating circumstances in the case”); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (2004) (“The court may consider any other fact that ex-
ists in mitigation of the penalty.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.035(7) (“[A]ny other
mitigating circumstance”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(i) (“Other factors in
the defendant’s background or character mitigate against imposition of the death
sentence.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(5)(h) (“[A]ny other factor which is relevant
to the defendant’s character or record or to the circumstances of the offense”); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(f) (“[A]ny other circumstance concerning the crime,
the defendant’s state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the defen-
dant’s character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or pun-
ishment for the crime”); see also  State v. Mejia, 662 A.2d 308, 320-21 (N.J. 1995)
(reversing death sentence and holding that a claim of right instruction should have
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Insanity236
Intoxication / Substantially impaired capacity237
been given in the penalty phase because it would have given weight to the “catch-
all” mitigating factor that at the time of the homicide the defendant was attempting
to reclaim money that he had entrusted to the victim), overruled on other grounds ,
State v. Cooper, 700 A.2d 306 (N.J. 1997); State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991)
(noting that the defendant’s character was shown by his civil, business, and philan-
thropic acts but affirming death penalty), aff’d , 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); Edwards
v. State, 737 So. 2d 275, 297 (Miss. 1999) (holding that trial court erred in not admit-
ting relevant mitigating evidence that defendant was in mental health facility as a
youngster, which failed to address the problems he suffered as a result of abuse and
neglect at home); State v. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Mo. 1999) (affirming death
sentence but finding mitigating factors that the defendant was raised in a dysfunc-
tional family, and was neglected and abused as a child and that the defendant is a
long-term drug abuser).
236 E.g. , Ullery v. State, 988 P.2d 332, 352-53 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (holding
that the defendant’s mental state, which included indications he was insane, was a
mitigating circumstance that outweighed the single aggravating circumstance).
237 E.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(i) (2003) (“The influence of drugs or
alcohol”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (“The defendant’s capacity to appreci-
ate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or de-
fect or of intoxication.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2004) (“At the time of the offense the capacity of the offender to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.”); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(iv) (“[T]he murder was committed while the capac-
ity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to
conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired due to
emotional disturbance, mental disorder, or mental incapacity.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 279, § 69(b)(4) (2002) (“[T]he offense was committed while the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect,
organic brain damage, emotional illness brought on by stress or prescribed medica-
tion, intoxication, or legal or illegal drug use by the defendant which was insufficient
to establish a defense to the murder but which substantially affected his judgment.”);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(g) (“At the time of the crime, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or
her conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental illness,
mental defect, or intoxication.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(e) (“The mur-
der was committed while the defendant was mentally or emotionally disturbed or
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, although not to such an extent as to
constitute a defense to prosecution.”) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j)(8)
(“[I]ntoxication which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which
substantially affected the defendant’s judgment”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(4)(d) (“[A]t the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of
law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, intoxication, or influence of
drugs.”).
Some state statutes do not specifically list alcohol as a separate factor but intoxica-
tion might be included as part of a statutory lack of “capacity” factor.  Colorado has
separate mitigating factors for capacity and for being under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(b) (“The defendant’s capacity to
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appreciate wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform the defendant’s
conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired
as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(i)
(“The influence of drugs or alcohol”); see also  Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 641-42
(1978) (holding that Ohio’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did
not allow consideration of defendant’s drug problems and emotional and mental
instability); State v. Canez, 74 P.3d 932, 937 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that trial court
found drug and alcohol abuse as a mitigating circumstance); State v. Stevens, 764
P.2d 724, 728-29 (Ariz. 1988) (vacating death sentence and holding that the defen-
dant’s long-term alcohol and drug dependency and fact that was under influence at
the time of the shooting was sufficient mitigating evidence); Smalley v. State, 546 So.
2d 720, 722-23 (Fla. 1989) (vacating death sentence and considering, among other
factors, that defendant’s minor marijuana use on the day of the killing contributed to
impairing his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct); Smith v. Common-
wealth, 845 S.W.2d 534, 539-40 (Ky. 1993) (holding that the jury was entitled to
instruction of intoxication as a mitigating circumstance); State v. Reeves, 476
N.W.2d 829, 841 (Neb. 1991) (holding that evidence supported finding of impair-
ment mitigating circumstance due to intoxication but upholding death sentence after
re-weighing), rev’d on other grounds , Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998); State v.
Coyle, 574 A.2d 961, 970 (N.J. 1990) (holding that prosecutor improperly suggested
that jurors must hold the defendant accountable for the effect of the intoxication
when the legislature had provided that intoxication is a mitigating circumstance);
State v. Pierce, 346 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (S.C. 1986) (holding that evidence of volun-
tary intoxication should be considered by jury in mitigation), overruled on other
grounds , State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71,
78 (Utah 1982) (noting that trial court found intoxication as one of three mitigating
circumstances).
238 In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002), that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute mentally retarded inmates.
So, now, mental retardation should bar the execution of some inmates. Of course,
prior to Atkins , when the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional to execute
mentally retarded defendants in 1989, mental retardation was still treated as a miti-
gating circumstance. See  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (“In sum,
mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant’s culpability for a
capital offense.”). Impaired mental ability that does not rise to a constitutional statu-
tory definition of mental retardation, however, should still continue to act as a miti-
gating circumstance in much the same way as mental retardation did in the past. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(b) (“The defendant was mentally retarded at the
time of the crime, or the defendant’s mental capacity was impaired or his ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired but not so im-
paired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (West Supp. 2001) (“The defendant had mental retardation at
the time of the crime. ‘Mental retardation’ means significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period.”) (amended 2002); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(vi) (“[M]ental retardation of the defendant”).  Prior to Atkins , sev-
eral states prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded. See, e.g. , WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.070(6) (“[A] person found to be mentally retarded under RCW
10.95.030(2) may in no case be sentenced to death.”); see also Hall v. State, 614 So.
2d 473, 478 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s mental retardation did not pro-
vide a justification that would preclude a finding at sentencing that the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner); Blue v. State, 674 So. 2d
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Personality disorder239
Pesticide exposure / Chemical brain poisoning240
Post-traumatic stress241
Substantially impaired capacity242
1184, 1235 (Miss. 1996) (affirming death sentence and holding that jury was able to
consider the defendant’s sixty-seven IQ as a mitigating circumstance); Jones v. State,
602 So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Miss. 1992) (holding that jury was correctly allowed to con-
sider defendant’s mental retardation as a mitigating factor); State v. Rogers, 478
N.E.2d 984, 996-97 (Ohio 1985) (holding that mitigating factor of mental retarda-
tion, among others, did not outweigh aggravating circumstances surrounding the
murder and affirming the death sentence), vacated by  Rogers v. Ohio, 474 U.S. 1002
(1985); State v. Hughey, 529 S.E.2d 721, 730 (S.C. 2000) (holding that trial judge
adequately instructed jury to consider the non-statutory mitigating factor of the de-
fendant’s “level of intellectual function whether as a natural consequence of his
birth or as a result of physical and/or emotional trauma suffered as a child or as an
adult“); Rios v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 310, 315-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that
penalty phase instruction did not adequately allow the jury to consider mental retar-
dation as a mitigating circumstance).
239 E.g. , Perkins v. State, 808 So. 2d 1041, 1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (finding
nonstatutory mitigating factors that the defendant suffered from borderline person-
ality disorder, is of borderline intelligence, and possibly has organic brain dysfunc-
tion), vacated by  Perkins v. Alabama, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); Freeman v. State, 776 So.
2d 160, 200 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (finding nonstatutory mitigating factor that the
defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder); Corcoran v. State, 774
N.E.2d 495, 501 (Ind. 2002) (noting testimony of doctors that the defendant suffered
from schizotypal or paranoid personality disorder was a mitigating factor).  Not all
courts have found that antisocial personality disorder qualifies as a mitigating cir-
cumstance. See  Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1988).
240 E.g. , Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that to
resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the case should be remanded to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing about whether the defendant suffered brain
damage as a result of his exposure to pesticides as a migrant farm worker).
241 E.g. , KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626(8) (Supp. 2001) (“At the time of the crime,
the defendant was suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome caused by violence
or abuse by the victim.”); see also  State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 777-78 (Ariz. 1993)
(noting that post-traumatic stress disorder can be a mitigating factor); People v.
Lucero, 750 P.2d 1342, 1356-57 (Cal. 1988) (holding that it was error to prevent the
defense from presenting expert testimony regarding the mitigating factor of defen-
dant’s post-traumatic stress disorder).
242 E.g. , 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(1) (2000) (“The defendant’s capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform conduct to the require-
ments of law was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so
impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge.”); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6)
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was sub-
stantially impaired.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (West Supp. 2004)
(“The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so
impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(3)
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002) (“The capital murder was committed while the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or
defect, intoxication or drug abuse.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West 1999 &
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Supp. 2004) (“Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defen-
dant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the
affects of intoxication”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(b) (2003) (“The defen-
dant’s capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform
the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but
not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(6)(f) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004) (“The capacity of the defendant to appre-
ciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-
9(c)(6) (“The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s
conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication.”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4626(6) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
the defendant’s conduct or to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(7)
(Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003) (“At the time of the capital offense, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct to the requirements of law
was impaired as a result of mental illness or retardation or intoxication even though
the impairment of the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law is insufficient to con-
stitute a defense to the crime.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h)(2)(iv)
(“[T]he murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder or emotional
disturbance.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(f) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“The
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032(3)(6) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002) (“The capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was substantially impaired.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(1)(d)
(2004) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defen-
dant’s conduct or to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of the law
was substantially impaired.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(g) (“At the time of the
crime, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as
a result of mental illness, mental defect, or intoxication.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(VI)(a) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“The defendant’s capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as
to constitute a defense to the charge.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(d) (West
Supp. 2004) (“The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired
as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient
to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(C) (Michie
Supp. 2001) (“[T]he defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.”); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(b) (“The defendant was mentally retarded at the time
of the crime, or the defendant’s mental capacity was impaired or his ability to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired but not so impaired in
either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”); N.C. GEN.  STAT. § 15A-
2000(f)(6) (2001) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.”); OHIO
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Stress (unusual / substantial)243
The Disease Theory Factors, which are consistent with a dis-
ease theory of criminal law, are common in capital cases.  One
informal review of court records in one state found that approxi-
mately 50% of the state’s death row inmates had evidence they
had been victims of childhood abuse or neglect, and the actual
number was certainly higher.244
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2001) (“Whether, at the
time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender’s conduct or
to conform the offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2001) (“Whether, at the time
of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender’s conduct or
to conform the offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law”); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711(e)(3) (West Supp. 2002) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (“The capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204(j)(8) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the de-
fendant’s conduct or to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of the
law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication
which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially
affected the defendant’s judgment.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4)(d) (“[A]t the
time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a
result of a mental condition, intoxication, or influence of drugs.”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (“[A]t the time of the commission of the capital felony, the ca-
pacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired.”); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.070(6) (“Whether, at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or
defect”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j)(vi) (Michie 2003) (“The capacity of the de-
fendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”); see also  State v. Simants, 250
N.W.2d 881, 891 (Neb. 1977) (affirming death sentence and holding that trial court
properly found that as a result of the combination of alcohol, low intelligence, and
mental deficiency, the defendant met the requirements of the capacity statutory mit-
igating circumstance).
243 E.g. , State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 603 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that defen-
dant’s unusual stress—resulting from lack of sleeping and eating, being depressed,
and having a history of mental illness—was a non-statutory mitigating circum-
stance); see also supra  note 231.
244 See  Clint Williams, Paths Paved in Violence: Consequences of Abuse Evident
on Death Row , ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 21, 1993, at A25.  “For many death-row in-
mates, there simply isn’t enough available information . . . .  Probation officers rarely
dig deeply into a killer’s family history.  The killers themselves are seldom candid.”
Id.
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One may wonder why we should give a less severe punishment
to someone merely because the person had a difficult childhood
or because the person had a drug addiction.  Most of the factors
in this category are mitigating because: (1) they show that the
defendant is less able to control herself or himself; and (2) they
are among the causes that led the defendant to commit the
crime.245  Under the first rationale, these culpability factors work
like partial excuses rather than justifications for the defendant’s
conduct.246  Many of these factors relate to the development of
the defendant’s brain and the idea that neurological or psycho-
logical problems show that the defendant is not as responsible as
someone acting under “normal” conditions.247
In the second rationale, these factors help explain why the de-
fendant committed the crime, and several of them fit into Judge
Bazelon’s RSB category.  For example, the fact that someone is
young and emotionally disturbed may be among the causes of the
crime.  The justification for allowing these factors to be mitigat-
ing is important because the factors raise questions about punish-
ment, evil, and morality.  The presence of these factors
undermine the retributive theories for punishing certain individ-
uals because the individuals are less deserving of punishment,
even though there still may be deterrence principles that support
a severe punishment.  Thus, disease theory and Judge Bazelon’s
RSB defense have been adopted in the capital sentencing
context.248
Courts have attempted to explain why some Disease Theory
Factors are mitigating.  In Eddings v. Oklahoma , the Supreme
245 Another possible reason that many of these factors are mitigating might be
because they show that the defendant has already suffered in life and that a jury
should take pity on the defendant.  Although viewing these factors as “pity factors”
might be part of what goes on in jurors’ minds, as discussed below, the analysis from
court decisions is more consistent with the view that these are causal factors relating
to the crime.
246 See , e.g. , Richardson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994) (noting that
society has a long-held belief that defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background may be less culpable than defendants
without that excuse).  Unlike excuse defenses, however, mitigating factors only af-
fect punishment and do not act as defenses to the crime.
247 For more information about the scientific literature on this issue, see infra  Part
VI.A.
248 One may distinguish the use of RSB factors in sentencing versus the use of
RSB factors for determining criminal culpability.  However, in capital cases, the dif-
ference between a sentence of life in prison and death is so substantial that the
capital sentencing stage is more like the culpability stage of other criminal trials than
the sentencing stage for non-capital cases.
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Court explained that a young age is a mitigating factor because
minors are “less mature and responsible than adults.”249  In hold-
ing that Eddings’s age of sixteen years should have been consid-
ered a mitigating circumstance, the Court stated that age is “a
time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible
to influence and to psychological damage.”250  Noting that ado-
lescents are less able to control themselves and contemplate
repercussions, the Court concluded that on moral grounds such
offenders are not completely to blame because the murder had
other causes: “[O]ffenses by the young also represent a failure of
family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility
for the development of America’s youth.”251
Although the Supreme Court has noted that a defendant’s
family background may be a mitigating factor, it has not pro-
vided a clear explanation for the reasons.  In Eddings , the Court
seemed to equate such evidence with chronological age, when it
noted that Eddings had been raised “in a neglectful, sometimes
even violent, family background,”252 which could show that a de-
fendant’s “mental and emotional development were at a level
several years below his chronological age.”253  The Court ex-
plained that “just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a
relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the back-
ground and mental and emotional development of a youthful de-
fendant be duly considered in sentencing.”254
Further, the Eddings  Court noted that evidence of a “difficult
family history and of emotional disturbance” might be given little
weight in some cases where a defendant is older.255  However, it
added, “But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of
the offense there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent
249 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982).
250 Id.  at 115.
251 Id.  at 115 n.11 (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, CON-
FRONTING YOUTH CRIME:  SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS 7
(1978)).  Also, in recognizing that “minors, especially in their earlier years, generally
are less mature and responsible than adults,” the Court implied that one of the rea-
sons that age should be mitigating is that youths have potential to grow up and be
rehabilitated. Eddings , 455 U.S. at 115-16.
252 Eddings , 455 U.S. at 116.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id . at 115; see also  Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987) (holding that
it was mitigating that “petitioner had been one of seven children in a poor family
that earned its living by picking cotton; that his father had died of cancer; and that
petitioner had been a fond and affectionate uncle”).
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family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emo-
tional disturbance is particularly relevant.”256  The Court cited no
psychological support and did not explain its rationale for imply-
ing that such evidence may carry less weight with an older defen-
dant, though the implication is that it would be for experts to sort
out during individual sentencing hearings.  However, it is some-
what odd that the Court made psychological conclusions without
cited support, both about the effects and non-effects of family
abuse.
Some factors from this mitigation category are of such concern
that the Court has held that they may make a defendant com-
pletely ineligible for the death penalty.  The Court has held that
defendants who committed a murder while under a certain age
may not be executed.257  In Ford v. Wainwright , the Court held
that the insane may not be executed,258 and more recently, in
Atkins v. Virginia , the Court held that a state may not execute a
person who is mentally retarded.259
Besides considering the treatment of these excluded categories
in law and in legislatures, the Court looked at the rationales for
excluding these categories of defendants from executions.  In
considering the insane, the Court noted that there was not a con-
sensus for the rationale to exclude them, but that possible ratio-
nales included: the execution of the insane offends humanity;
such executions provide no example to others; insanity is its own
punishment; and a community’s quest for retribution is not
served by executing the insane.260
In Atkins , the Court noted that mentally retarded capital de-
fendants are less culpable than other capital defendants because
of significant limitations in adaptive skills and evidence that they
are more likely than others to act on impulse.261  Thus, the goals
of retribution are not served by their execution.262  Also, the
Court reasoned that exempting the mentally retarded from the
death penalty would not undermine the deterrent effect of capi-
256 Eddings , 455 U.S. at 115.
257 The Supreme Court recently granted a petition for writ of certiorari to recon-
sider how old a defendant must be at the time of the crime in order to be eligible for
the death penalty. See  Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
258 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
259 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
260 Ford , 477 U.S. at 407-08.
261 536 U.S. at 306, 318.
262 Id . at 319.
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tal punishment because the mentally retarded are less likely to be
deterred from committing murder because of their diminished
ability to process information, learn from experience, or control
impulses.263
Thus, the Court’s rationale behind many of these Disease The-
ory Factors stresses that these factors show that defendants have
less control over their actions and for retributive purposes are
less deserving of punishment.264  These mitigating circumstances
are inconsistent with the other categories of mitigating factors,
especially the Good Character and Crime Involvement Factors
that focus on the “good” qualities of the defendant.  Those cate-
gories are reasonable because they show that the defendant has
good qualities and is deserving of life.  The Disease Theory Fac-
tors, by contrast, may show that the defendant is a bad person
who is irrational and will commit more crimes in the future.
Therefore, Disease Theory Factors do not make the defendant a
better person.  For utilitarian purposes, although their punish-
ment may deter others, such defendants may not be deterred
themselves by the threat of punishment.  These factors do not
make a defendant any less dangerous or less worthy of punish-
ment for incapacitation purposes.  Yet, these factors make a per-
son less deserving of the severest punishment because they show
the person has less control and that there were outside causes of
the murder.  In a sense, the courts are accepting that these de-
fendants acted with something less than free will, as discussed in
the next section.  The next section considers Disease Theory Fac-
tors from empirical and philosophical viewpoints to understand
their legal and moral significance.
V
EMPIRICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS RAISED BY DISEASE
THEORY FACTORS
In considering the legal and moral justifications behind punish-
263 Id . at 320.  Some commentators have criticized the Atkins  decision because
many of the same conclusions may also be reached about the mentally ill, who are
still eligible for execution.  Margaret Talbot, The Executioner’s I.Q. Test , N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2003, at 30.  “You can be skeptical . . . about the classes of people
[Atkins] leaves out.  Why the mentally retarded and not the schizophrenic, whose
particular demons and deficiencies make them, if anything, less able to conform to
the law than people with low I.Q.’s?” Id.
264 536 U.S. at 318-19.
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ment and mitigating circumstances, one should consider the em-
pirical world where the theories apply and the philosophical
theories behind the justifications.265  These areas are discussed
below.  The first subsection discusses the scientific theories un-
derlying Disease Theory Factors and how we continue to learn
more about the causes of human behavior.
Philosophical implications of the Disease Theory Factors are
discussed in the second subsection below.  Because mitigating
factors, RSB, and disease theory in capital cases involve the con-
sideration of the causes of crime, they raise issues of determinism
and free will.  Therefore, the second subsection considers
whether there is any philosophical justification for the death pen-
alty and the courts’ consideration of mitigating circumstances.
A. Empirical View: Developments in Science and Psychology
Provide Theories About the Causes of Crime
The modern form of the debate about the effects of nature and
nurture on human beings began in the late 1800s with geographer
Francis Galton, who may have borrowed the “nature-nurture”
terminology from William Shakespeare.266  Sigmund Freud be-
lieved “that childhood events were key in determining adult be-
havior, but he also felt that many of the most important
childhood events were innately predetermined.”267  Since
Galton’s and Freud’s times, scientists continue to make new dis-
coveries about the effects of genes and environment on human
behavior,268 as well as the effects of brain damage and brain
functioning.269
These discoveries are relevant to the criminal justice system.
As one author noted, “Clearly, very violent and recidivistic indi-
265 See  Jeffrey G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution , in PUNISHMENT AND REHA-
BILITATION 84-85 (2d ed. 1985).  Professor Murphy notes that before this relatively
simple point—about the importance of the nature of the empirical world—was
made by Karl Marx, it was ignored by Enlightenment political theory, including that
of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. Id.  at 85 n.24.
266 RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 69-71.  In The Tempest , Prospero insulted Caliban
with the comment, “A devil, a born devil, on whose nature [n]urture can never
stick.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 4, sc. 1, ll. 188-89 (Richard Grant
White ed., 1911).
267 ELIZABETH KANDEL ENGLANDER, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE 60 (1997).
268 See, e.g., RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 1-6.
269 For a summary of recent neuroscientific research on brain functioning and
brain damage, see Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness:  Science and In-
voluntary Acts , 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 320-37 (2002).
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viduals frequently have a multitude of handicaps, including neu-
rological and medical disorders, profound psychological
disorders, and intellectual and familial dysfunction.”270  The au-
thors of one study concluded that a large number of condemned
individuals likely have unrecognized severe psychiatric, neuro-
logical, and cognitive disorders.271  A forensic psychologist re-
cently wrote, “Research indicates that antisocial behavior is
caused by a combination of biological, psychological, and social
phenomenon such as negative parenting practices, peer influ-
ence, genetics and heredity, neurobiological factors, and socio-
economic/environmental influences.”272  Numerous scientific
studies confirm that genetic, biological, cognitive, and social fac-
tors may predispose an individual to crime.273
Several studies show biological links to crimes, and scientists
have examined links between crime and such factors as minimal
brain damage, physical anomalies, head injuries, neurotransmit-
ters, hormones, and genetics.274  For example, scientists know
that criminality is highly heritable.275  One familiar indication of
270 ENGLANDER, supra  note 267, at 95.
271 Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational
Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States , 143 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 838, 841-42 (1986).
272 John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychol-
ogist , 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 94 (2003).
273 See generally ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER 243-44 (1993) (discussing several studies about
violence and its causes); Fabian, supra  note 272, at 94-103 (discussing several studies
about the causes of antisocial personality disorder); David P. Farrington, The Expla-
nation and Prevention of Youthful Offending , in DELINQUENCY AND CRIME:  CUR-
RENT THEORIES 68-148 (J. David Hawkins, ed., 1996); Craig Haney, The Social
Context of Capital Murder:  Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation , 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 547, 570-80 (1995) (concluding that “[t]he nexus between poverty,
childhood abuse and neglect, social and emotional dysfunction, alcohol and drug
abuse, and crime is so tight in the lives of many capital defendants as to form a kind
of social historical ‘profile’”); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Biopsychosocial Charac-
teristics of Children Who Later Murder:  A Prospective Study , 142 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1161 (1985) (finding a strong relationship between experiencing abuse as
children and later committing murder).
274 See, e.g. , ENGLANDER, supra  note 267, at 50-60 (discussing several studies
about biological links to crime).  There is, of course, a danger that studies of biologi-
cal or genetic links to crimes could be misused by ignorant people.  However, these
issues still need to be discussed, and the importance of environment in most studies
would undermine the misuse of the biological studies.
275 RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 87.  For example,
[A]dopted children end up with a criminal record which looks a lot more
like that of their biological parents than like that of their foster parents.
Why?  Not because there are specific genes for criminality, but because
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 60 18-FEB-05 10:03
690 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
the fact that biology plays a role in violence is that men are much
more likely than women to commit crimes of violence.276  At
least one capital defendant attempted to make a defense based
upon his genes.277
Mental illness has a strong relation to crime.  As the incarcera-
tion rate in the United States has dramatically increased since the
early 1970s and the number of residents in state mental hospitals
has dropped, “state prisons and county jails have become the
21st-century equivalent of insane asylums.”278  One estimate is
that 15% of inmates have a serious mental illness, and about
20% of adolescents in juvenile detention facilities have a major
mental illness.279  A recent report concluded that the two largest
psychiatric inpatient institutions in the United States are the Los
Angeles County Jail and New York’s Rikers Island.280  The over-
lap between the criminal justice system and the mental health
system is consistent with a disease theory of criminal law.
Studies also show an environmental link to crime.  Although
most abused children do not become criminals, neglect and abuse
of a child increases that individual’s risk for criminal and violent
there are specific personalities that get into trouble with the law and those
personalities are heritable.”
Id .
276 See ENGLANDER, supra  note 267, 86-90.  “[M]en perpetrate street violence in
numbers overwhelmingly larger than women.  In contrast, women seem to perpe-
trate family violence as often as men do, although their aggression is generally sig-
nificantly less severe, is much less often fatal, and is more likely to result from self-
defense.” Id.  at 88.  This difference between men and women, however, may not be
entirely biological and may be affected, in part, by the different social settings boys
and girls face as children. Id.  at 89-90.
On a similar point, several defendants have unsuccessfully tried to use a defense
that they have an XYY chromosomal abnormality (as compared to the pair of sex
chromosomes for the normal male of XY – or the normal female of XX). See, e.g. ,
People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d
313 (Sup. Ct. 1975); State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 (Wash. 1976).
277 The argument, which was unsuccessful, was made in the Georgia case of Ste-
phen Mobley. RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 272.
278 Prisoners of Mental Illness , HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, (Harv. Med.
Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), July 1, 2003, available at  2003 WL 2050931.  “[T]he number
of residents in state mental hospitals has declined from nearly 600,000 in the 1950s to
about 60,000 today.” Id.
279 Id.
280 Sally Satel, Out of the Asylum, Into the Cell , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at A15.
The report by Human Rights Watch found that there were 3,400 mentally ill prison-
ers at the Los Angeles County Jail and 3,000 mentally ill inmates at Rikers Island.
Id.  A Justice Department report found that approximately sixteen percent of in-
mates in the United States have serious psychiatric illnesses. Id.
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behavior.281  Some analysis has found that “[c]riminal behaviors
are acquired by a process of socialization and learning.”282  A
number of researchers have concluded that a child’s attachment
to a parent or parents, which may be the most important event in
a child’s life, “is probably strongly related to the child’s tendency
to be either prosocial or aggressive.”283
The nature and nurture factors do not work in isolation from
each other.  Physical components of human beings work together
with the environment in ways we still are discovering.  Some sci-
entific studies have indicated a connection between a person’s
genes and a person’s environment and whether the person grows
into a criminal.284  One study found that people with a certain
type of gene who are exposed to abuse as a child are much more
likely to commit crimes, while people who were not victims of
abuse or did not have the certain type of gene were much less
likely to commit crimes.285  One author explained, “[Some ex-
perts] recognize the role of sexual selection in making young
adult males the prime perpetrators of murder, for example, but
recognize just as strongly the role of the environment in produc-
ing the situations that actually elicit murder.”286
There are a range of studies regarding crime’s relation to ge-
netic evidence, hormonal research, intellectual ability, attention
deficit disorder, minimal brain dysfunction, socioeconomic fac-
281 RAINE, supra  note 273, at 246.
282 David C. Rowe, An Adaptive Strategy Theory of Crime and Delinquency , in
DELINQUENCY AND CRIME:  CURRENT THEORIES 268-314 (J. David Hawkins ed.,
1996).  Although Professor Rowe notes the importance of environmental factors, he
also notes the role that biological factors play. Id.
283 ENGLANDER, supra  note 267, at 68.  “The findings that violence interferes with
attachment, and that a poor attachment may help predict antisocial behavior, might
help explain the relationship between parental violence and an increased risk of
aggression in the family children.” Id.
284 See, e.g. , RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 267-68. Professor Ridley cites a large
study from Denmark that looked at the percent probability of a person getting in
trouble with the law where the person was adopted from an honest family into an
honest family (13.5%); where the person was adopted from an honest family into a
family that included criminals (14.7%); where the person was adopted from criminal
parents into an honest family (20%); and where both biological parents and the
adopting parents were criminals (24.5%). Id.  at 253.  Interestingly, Professor Ridley
still concludes that, despite the importance of heredity and environment, there is
free will. Id.  at 272-75.
285 See id.  at 267-69.  The study was done by Terrie Moffitt and Avshalom Caspi
on 400 young men in a city in New Zealand, checking the subjects at regular inter-
vals. Id.  at 267.  Studies of animals have shown a similar interaction between genes
and environment in creating aggressive behavior. See, e.g., id . at 50.
286 Id . at 246 (citing MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988)).
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tors, familial factors, sociological influences, and other factors.287
These factors are reflected in the list of capital case mitigating
circumstances.  Examining Disease Theory Factors, one sees that
the law acknowledges, at least to some extent, that violence is a
result of nature and nurture.  The mitigating factors that courts
and legislators have created reveal how society views the reasons
for violent crime.
One might argue that the criminal nature in a defendant devel-
ops not by choice but by other factors, much like the way dis-
eases develop by hereditary and outside factors.  Just as we do
not blame individuals for getting diseases, one might argue that a
criminal is similarly not blameworthy.  A disease theory of crime
would focus on finding a cure rather than on punishing.
Not everyone embraces the disease theory.  Some scholars ar-
gue that current understandings of biology and cognitive neuros-
cience are consistent with the claim that human beings still act
with free will.288  One scientist has questioned the effects of the
adoption of disease theory on the criminal justice system: “[I]t is
much bruited about that the discovery of genes influencing be-
havior will lead to an epidemic of lawyers to try to excuse their
clients on the ground that it was their genetic fate to commit
crimes, not their choice.”289  He concluded, however, that be-
cause of deterrence concerns, it would be unlikely that juries and
judges would release people predisposed to commit crimes.290
The deterrence concern, however, does not address the impor-
tant moral implications.  Society has a right to protect itself, but
the issue is whether it can morally condemn individuals.  If a per-
son’s predisposition to commit crime comes from that person’s
287 See, e.g. , ENGLANDER, supra  note 267; RAINE, supra  note 273; Denno, supra
note 137, at 619-60.  Some studies have indicated that important predictors for
whether males will commit crimes include “poor parental child management tech-
niques, childhood antisocial behavior, offending by parents and siblings, low intelli-
gence and educational attainment, and separation from parents.”  Farrington, supra
note 273, at 83.
288 See, e.g. , DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003). Professor Den-
nett, who is a university professor and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies
at Tufts University, concedes that genes and environment play a major role in creat-
ing who a person is, but still concludes that all human actions are not inevitable. See
id.  at 156-66.
289 RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 271.
290 Id.  at 271-72.  Professor Ridley did note that a gene defense would be useful
for sentencing purposes in death penalty cases, presumably as a mitigating circum-
stance. Id.  at 272.  He notes that the gene “defense” was used in the Georgia capital
case of Stephen Mobley. Id.
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genes and environment, arguably there is no moral justification
to place individual blame upon the person.  Society may be justi-
fied only in acting to prevent the person from committing future
crimes but not justified in any aspects of the punishment that are
retributive.  In other words, under the disease theory, once the
person is no longer a threat or “cured,” then society is not mor-
ally entitled to keep the person in prison.  In considering the
moral implications from the lessons of science, it is helpful to
consider philosophical theories underlying the use of mitigating
circumstances.291
B. Philosophical View: Which Views of Disease Theory and
Free Will Form the Basis of Our Criminal
Justice System?
Ultimately, disease theory, scientific evidence about the causes
of crimes, and Disease Theory Factors raise the issue of whether
or not human beings have free will and whether there is any phil-
osophical and moral basis for our capital punishment system.292
Philosophers have used different definitions of “free will,” but
for criminal culpability purposes, this Article uses the term in the
sense of how much freedom one has at the point she commits a
crime, i.e., whether the individual has the ability to make the
choice and originates the idea and behavior on her own accord
not completely dictated by other causes.
The debate of free will versus determinism has been around
for centuries, but the developments of scientific knowledge about
human behavior in the late eighteenth century led to optimism
about understanding criminal behavior.293  During the Progres-
291 Of course, the scientific studies help to inform our understanding of the free
will versus determinism debate.  For example, scientific studies about brain activity
by Benjamin Libet have indicated that philosophers should revisit the concept of
free will. See DENNETT, supra  note 288, at 228-42; Benjamin Libet, The Timing of a
Subjective Experience , 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 183, 183 (1989).  Though one might
argue that the development of science may make the free will debate irrelevant, as
Tom Wolfe wrote, “Why wrestle with Kant’s God, Freedom, and immortality when it
is only a matter of time before neuroscience, probably through brain imaging,
reveals the actual physical mechanism that fabricates these mental constructs, these
illusions?” RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 249 (quoting TOM WOLFE, HOOKING UP
(2000)).
292 The resolution of the free will debate is beyond the scope of this Article, which
instead focuses on the issue as it relates to the narrow context of mitigating factors in
capital cases.
293 See Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of
Pound:  An Essay on Criminal Justice , 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1921-22 (1995).
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sive Era in the United States, a deterministic view of human be-
havior began to increasingly play a role in the understanding of
criminal behavior.294
Much of the recent scientific studies about causality discussed
above tend to undermine a free will theory, though some argue
that science still does support some level of free will.295  While
ultimately much of American criminal law takes a free will
view,296 the consideration of the philosophical consequences of
free will and determinism in criminal law continues to be an es-
sential discussion when talking about criminal responsibility.
This Article does not solve the age-old debate of free will ver-
sus determinism.  Instead, the following sub-sections consider the
role of mitigating circumstances, the death penalty, and disease
theory: (1) if there is no free will; (2) if there is absolute free will;
and (3) if there is partial free will.  Ultimately, the current system
is not justified under any of the possible philosophical models.
1. A Determinism Model Does Not Morally Justify the
Criminal Justice System’s Use of Death Penalty or
Consideration of Mitigating Factors
One philosophical view is that there is no free will because all
human actions have a cause, a view sometimes called hard deter-
minism or incompatibilism.297  If we decide that individuals do
not have free will, then we have no moral right to punish them
for determined actions.298  If every act of the defendant was de-
termined and completely beyond the defendant’s control be-
cause, as Baruch Spinoza asserted, “[t]here is no such thing as
free will,”299 then we cannot say that the defendant is morally
blameworthy.300  Thus, the legal system’s uses of punishment, the
294 See id . at 1922.
295 For example, California neuroscientist Walter Freeman and German philoso-
pher Henrik Walter argue that causation of behavior is circular and not linear and
permits some level of free will. RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 272-74.
296 Green, supra  note 293, at 1942-43.
297 See, e.g. , Steven Goldberg, Evolutionary Biology Meets Determinism:  Learn-
ing from Philosophy, Freud, and Spinoza , 53 FLA. L. REV. 893, 898 (2001).
298 One may argue, however, that if there is no free will, our decision to punish is
predetermined.  Then, one may wonder whether we may say that our decision to
punish is immoral if we had no free will in making that decision.
299 THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 651 (comp. by George Seldes 1990) (quoting BA-
RUCH SPINOZA, ETHICS (1677)).  “The mind is induced to wish this or that by some
cause, and that cause is determined by another cause, and so on back to infinity.”
Id.
300 On the other hand, compatibilists believe that it is not illogical to believe in
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death penalty, and retributive theory do not seem consistent with
a belief in determinism.301
A utilitarian might argue that society is still justified in punish-
ing people who act without free will for deterrence purposes,
even though the individual being punished is not deserving of
punishment under retributive theory.  Still, there is a question
whether society would be morally justified to inflict suffering on
an individual who could not have acted otherwise.
Disease Theory Factors are used in capital cases to show that
circumstances beyond an individual’s control caused the murder.
The use of mitigating circumstances in capital cases to establish
the causes of crime, then, seems to be consistent with a theory of
determinism.  As one professor of philosophy has noted, “[T]he
more thoroughly and in detail we know the causal factors leading
a person to behave as he does, the more we tend to exempt him
from responsibility.”302  Further, the more one learns that com-
determinism and in human responsibility for actions.  Goldberg, supra  note 297, at
899.
301 The same might be true even if any freedom of will that might exist does not
affect individual earthly actions, as Arthur Schopenhauer concluded in his Prize Es-
say on the Freedom of the Will , which was awarded a gold medal in 1839 by the
Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences:
In a word, a human being always does only what he wills, and yet he neces-
sarily does it.  This is owing to the fact that he already is  what he wills; for
from what he is all that he ever does follows of necessity.  If we consider his
actions objectively , i.e., from without, we recognize apodictically that, like
the actions of every [human] being in nature, they must be subject to the
law of causality in all its strictness. Subjectively , on the other hand, every-
one feels that he always does only what he wills .  But this means merely
that his actions are the pure manifestation of his very own essence.  There-
fore if it could feel, every being in nature, even the lowest, would feel the
same thing.
Freedom , then, is not suspended by my treatment of the matter, but merely
moved up from the domain of individual actions, where it obviously is not
to be found, into a higher region, which, however, is not so easily accessible
to our cognition; in other words, freedom is transcendental.
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PRIZE ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL  98 (1999).
302 John Hospers, Psychoanalysis and Moral Responsibility , in THE PROBLEMS OF
PHILOSOPHY 452 (William P. Alston & Richard B. Brandt eds., 2d ed. 1978) (empha-
sis omitted).
Let us suppose it were established that a man commits murder only if,
sometime during the previous week, he has eaten a certain combination of
foods—say, tuna fish salad at a meal also including peas, mushroom soup,
and blueberry pie.  What if we were to track down the factors common to
all murders committed in this country during the last twenty years and
found this factor present in all of them, and only in them?  The example is
of course empirically absurd; but may it not be that there is some  combina-
tion of factors that regularly leads to homicide . . . ?
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mon causation factors are present for some murderers, the more
one may believe that causation factors exist for all murderers,
even though not all factors have been discovered.
However, an advocate of free will might argue that the use of
the death penalty and mitigating circumstances is consistent with
a belief in free will because mitigating factors would be unneces-
sary for a legal system that believed in determinism.  If every-
thing is predetermined, then: (1) every murder is predetermined,
not just some murders; (2) no individuals are blameworthy; and
(3) therefore there is no moral justification for the death penalty
and no need for mitigating circumstances to distinguish individ-
ual cases.  Thus, the legal system’s adoption of the death penalty
and the use of mitigating circumstances for differentiating indi-
vidual cases illustrates that the legal system embraces ideas of
free will to some extent.
2. A Free Will Model Does Not Justify the Death Penalty and
Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances
Many world religions and philosophies are based upon the as-
sumption that people act under free will.303  Although early
thinkers believed that outside forces dictated the actions of
human beings, many, beginning with Socrates, have argued for
the free will of human beings.304  Aristotle wrote, “Virtue, as well
as evil, lies in our power.”305  Although much of Indian culture
focuses on the deterministic law of karma,306 Ghandhi claimed
that “no man loses his freedom except through his own weak-
Id.  at 451.
303 One commentator has noted that an anthropological study might show that
“all cultures, religions, and philosophic disciplines tend to view humans as free, con-
scious beings, capable of exercising self-control.”  Rachel J. Littman, Adequate Prov-
ocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free Will , 60 ALB. L.
REV. 1127, 1146 (1997).  “The historical tendency of religion (though replete with
anomalies like the Calvinist theory of predestination) has been to fix both the blame
and the punishment for sin on the individual and to repudiate the tribal concept that
the sins of the fathers are inevitably visited upon the children.” SUSAN JACOBY,
WILD JUSTICE:  THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 69 (1983).
304 See S.E. FROST, JR., BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS, 129-30
(rev. ed., Anchor Books 1989) (1942).
305 Id.  at 131.
306 See  Littman, supra  note 303, at 1146.  However, “[i]n Upanishadic psychology,
the inner demand all human beings feel for freedom is ultimately a drive to free
ourselves from the inherited and acquired compulsions in our own psychic makeup.”
Michael N. Nagler, Reading the Upanishads , in THE UPANISHADS 291 (Eknath Eas-
waran trans., 1987).
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ness.”307  One of existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre’s most famous
statements was that “man is condemned to be free.”308
Further, the legal system generally assumes that human beings
act with free will.  As Justice Cardozo wrote in Steward Machine
Company v. Davis , “till now the law has been guided by a robust
common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a work-
ing hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”309  Other cases
have made similar assertions,310 and William Blackstone wrote,
“[P]unishments are . . . only inflicted for abuse of that free will,
which God has given to man.”311  Professor Sanford Kadish
noted that it is to society’s benefit to presume free will exists,
even if those who argue for determinism are actually correct:
“Whether the concept of man as responsible agent is fact or
fancy is a very different question from whether we ought to insist
that the government in its coercive dealings with individuals must
act on that premise.”312
Therefore, traditional views of punishment, based upon the be-
lief that defendants acted with free will, form the bases for the
belief that we are morally justified in executing defendants.  For
example, utilitarianism accepts the belief that conduct of individ-
307 Nagler, supra  note 306, at 291.
308 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Ethics of Existentialism , in THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSO-
PHY, supra  note 302, at 260.
Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is
free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything
he does.  The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion.  He
will never agree that a sweeping passion is a ravaging torrent which fatally
leads a man to certain acts and is therefore an excuse.
Id.
309 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
310 See, e.g. , United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (noting that a deter-
ministic view would be “inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal
justice system”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (stating that a
universal element of the law is the “belief in [the] freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil”).
311 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27 (William S. Hein & Co. 1992)
(1769).
312 Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence , 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 287
(1968), reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT:  ESSAYS IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW 65, 77 (1987).  Professor Kadish stated, “Much of our commit-
ment to democratic values, to human dignity and self-determination, to the value of
the individual, turns on the pivot of a view of man as a responsible agent entitled to
be praised or blamed depending upon his free choice of conduct.” Id.  One may
question, however, whether our commitment to human dignity is upheld if our
moral justification for executions is based upon a convenient presumption that has
no basis in reality.
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uals, such as potential criminals, can be affected by outside fac-
tors, such as the threat of punishment or execution.  Thus, the
utilitarian would argue, individuals have free choice.313  How-
ever, it is possible for a utilitarian to concede that there is not
complete free will.  According to Graham McFee, “The utilita-
rian position concedes the determinist’s first premise, that every
event has a cause, while maintaining notions of moral responsi-
bility, and indeed responsibility more generally.”314
The belief in absolute free will is consistent with the retribu-
tivist theory of punishment: criminals deserve punishment be-
cause they acted out of free will.  For example, Immanuel Kant
believed that the actions of human beings were not dictated by
rigid causation principles,315 and he believed in the retributive
purposes of punishment and in the death penalty for certain
crimes.316
The use of Disease Theory Factors, however, seems inconsis-
tent with a belief in complete free will.  If there is complete free
will in a society that uses a death penalty, then murderers could
be condemned without consideration of mitigating circumstances
because the decision to murder was made with complete free
will.317  At the least, if there is free will, many of the Disease
313 One author explained utilitarianism’s embrace of free will concepts:
The ‘utilitarian’ position, then, turns the determinist argument on its head,
urging that those events where praise or blame would be efficacious in al-
tering the behaviour are free, rather than, as the determinist does, asking
whether any behaviour can be affected by, for example, praise or blame.
There seems something right in this.  For we might well think that, across a
range of human activity, praising activities will tend to make humans more
likely to continue with them and censuring will have the opposite tendency.
GRAHAM MCFEE, FREE WILL 72 (2000).
314 Id .
315 “Reason is present in all the actions of men at all times and under all circum-
stances, and is always the same.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
476 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., St. Martin’s Press 1968) (1781); see EDGAR
BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 18 (1980).
It is impossible, Kant held, ever to prove that the will is free.  Nevertheless,
because such a belief is necessary, we can act and live as if the will was free.
When we so act and live, we discover that certain moral insights are possi-
ble . . . .   We are not drowned in complete moral despair . . . .  Life be-
comes meaningful . . . .  The moral consciousness of man implies that the
will is free.
FROST, JR., supra  note 304, at 147.
316 HENBERG, supra  note 11, at 158-59, 164-66.
317 One view that rejects the claim that human will is determined is sometimes
called libertarianism. See, e.g. , Goldberg, supra  note 297.  “Libertarians accept that
humans may be predisposed to take certain actions by evolution, the environment,
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Theory Factors should not be mitigating.  If at the moment a
murderer decides to kill, that person has complete free will in
that decision and is not affected by prior events, then arguably
we are morally justified in executing that defendant based upon
the free choice to kill in spite of whatever happened in the defen-
dant’s past.318  In other words, under a complete free will model,
a defendant’s experience as a child would be irrelevant.  Thus,
the fact that courts accept Disease Theory Factors shows that the
legal system does not follow a complete free will model.
More recently, the complete free will model has become less
popular among philosophers because of advances by social scien-
tists, behavioral scientists, medical experts, and psychology ex-
perts.319  Similarly, the criminal justice system, by allowing
consideration of certain defenses and mitigating factors that indi-
cate that the defendant was not in complete control of events,
accepts that individuals are not acting with complete free will.
For example, in Atkins , the Court excluded mentally retarded
defendants from death row because they were more likely to be
acting on “impulse,” i.e., without free will.320  The courts’ moral
rejection of determinism by considering mitigating factors at all,
and the rejection of absolute free will by allowing Disease The-
ory Factors, indicate that the criminal justice system must be
grounded in an alternative belief, as discussed in the next sub-
section.
C. Does a Partial Free Will Model Justify the Death Penalty
and the Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances?
1. An Alternative View to Absolute Free Will or Determinism
Is Limited Free Will
A third view in the free will debate is the belief that humans
have some free will but it is limited by various means beyond our
and other causes outside of their control, but they insist that, in the end, individuals
can choose to follow or not follow these tendencies.” Id.  (citing Littman, supra  note
303, at 1138-39).
318 The free will debate is the essence of the disagreement between some death
penalty abolitionists and some death penalty retentionists.  The retentionists believe
in free will and the resulting moral culpability, while some death penalty abolition-
ists believe that defendants may not be acting with complete free will. See infra
notes 352-56 and accompanying text (discussing death penalty supporter Justice
Scalia’s views on free will); see supra  notes 126-127 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing death penalty abolitionist Clarence Darrow’s views on free will).
319 Littman, supra  note 303, at 1132.
320 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2001).
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control.321  A baby born with a disease may not have free will to
be an Olympic athlete.  A child born in poverty who starves to
death does not have the free will to make choices that would lead
her to be president of the United States.  A child born with brain
damage who is severely abused has limited options too.  Even if
that child has free will in small day-to-day choices, those are a
limited range of choices compared to those made by a child
growing up healthy in a loving environment.  We may have free
will to make small individual choices throughout the day, but
given a certain biological make-up and a fixed set of environmen-
tal factors, our decisions on some issues are determined, at least
to some extent.  One view of limited free will has been called
“degree determinism.”322
The debate about free will has been argued by philosophers
and may never be resolved.  “[John] Locke said that it was as
nonsensical to ask ‘whether a man’s will be free as to ask whether
his sleep be swift or his virtue square.’”323  Yet, even if humans
do have free will, their choices are limited by circumstances be-
yond their control.324  As you read this Article, if the electricity
321 Psychology Professor Adrian Raine explained the concept of variable free will
and how it relates to the criminal justice system:
Perhaps one erroneous assumption in these considerations is that free will
is a categorical variable, that one either has free will or does not have free
will at a specific point of time.  Instead, it seems much more likely that free
will lies on a continuum and that there are differing degrees to which each
of us as individuals have a free choice in most of our daily actions as well as
those more extreme acts such as killing another individual.  While it is true
that in most cases a criminal has a choice regarding whether or not to com-
mit a criminal act, the decision is likely to be heavily weighted by a large
number of preceding events, including the individual’s social history and
presence/absence of both social and biological predispositional influences.
Indeed, the whole notion of absolute free will as applied to criminal offend-
ing may be unrealistic, with consequent implications for issues such as re-
sponsibility for one’s actions, consequent punishment, and justice.
RAINE, supra  note 273, at 310.
322 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW  61 (1982) (defining de-
gree determinism as the “degree of freedom of choice on a continuum from the
hypothetically entirely rational to the hypothetically pathologically determined—in
states of consciousness neither polar condition exists”); Denno, supra  note 137, at
661-662; Michael Moore, Causation and the Excuses , 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1114-18
(1985) (criticizing degree determinism).  Degree determinism has been defined as “a
denial that all human actions are fully caused.  The degree determinist believes in a
continuum of freedom from causation:  different actions can be more or less deter-
mined and thus more or less free.” Id . at 1114.
323 RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 270.
324 The question of where this free will comes from is beyond the scope of this
Article.  One explanation comes from a Californian neuroscientist named Walter
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in your building goes out, your decision as to whether to continue
reading or to go do something else is affected by surrounding
circumstances. You might have the option to go outside to con-
tinue reading if the weather is nice, but if it is raining outside—as
it is as the author writes this section—your options are limited.325
Some philosophers, faced with the scientific studies supporting
determinism and a causal view of human actions, argue that de-
terminism and free will are compatible.326  Although an in-depth
discussion of compatibilism, or soft determinism, is beyond the
scope of this Article, compatibilists concede that at least on one
level, we live in a world with causes.327  However, they argue that
we may still hold people morally responsible because even if
human actions are caused, such actions are “the product of po-
tentially rational practical reason.”328
Freeman who notes that the belief in predetermination comes from the belief that
the brain is embedded in a simple linear causal chain, when complex nonlinear cau-
sality may be a source of free will. See id . at 272.  Similarly,
[t]he German philosopher Henrik Walter believes that the full ideal of free
will is genuinely an illusion, but that people do possess a lesser form of it,
which he calls natural autonomy and which derives from the feedback
loops within the brain, where the results of one process become the next
starting conditions.  Neurons in the brain are hearing back from the recipi-
ent even before they have finished sending messages.  The response alters
the message they send, which in turn alters the response, and so on.  This
idea is fundamental to many theories of consciousness.
Id . at 274.
325 The concept of degree determinism has its critics.  “It makes sense to say that
we are determined or that we are free, but to speak of being partly determined or
partly free makes as much sense as to speak of being partly pregnant.” See  Moore,
supra  note 322, at 1115-16.
326 The compatibilist view is popular among moral philosophers today. See  Ste-




A compatibilist holds an agent responsible if the agent acts intentionally,
complies with or breaches a moral or legal obligation we accept, and the
agent is generally capable of grasping and of being guided by reason in the
context . . . .  For the compatibilist, moral responsibility is dependent pri-
marily on the agent’s general capacity to grasp and be guided by reason,
because it is reasonable and fair to hold an agent responsible only if the
agent possesses this capacity.  According to this account, human action is
different from the rest of the causal universe not because it is uncaused, but
rather because it is the product of potentially rational practical reason.
Only people act for reasons, and moral and legal rules are thus action-
guiding primarily because they provide an agent with good reasons for for-
bearance or action.
Id.  (footnote omitted).
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Yet, if our choices are influenced by fate, then it makes moral
sense that those factors that limit one’s free will be considered in
the capital sentencing determination.329  Thomas Nagel wrote
about this topic in an essay about “Moral Luck,” explaining that
who we are and what we do is subject to luck, thus questioning
moral culpability because we cannot blame people for acts over
which they have no or only partial control.330  When circum-
stances and characters are shaped at least to some extent by
“moral luck,” we do not have the moral right to condemn those
individuals.  Mitigating circumstances help juries to weigh the
moral luck factors in determining whether to impose the death
sentence or life imprisonment.
2. Ultimately, Even a Limited Free Will Model Does Not
Justify the Current Death Penalty System
The theory of moral luck, even in a limited sense, is not that
some  people are shaped by surrounding hereditary and environ-
mental factors, but that everyone  is.331  So, defendants whose de-
329 Of course, limits on free will do not always result in crimes or misfortunes.  To
acknowledge that unlucky events may lead to poor results in one’s life is also to
acknowledge that good fortune may have played a significant role in one’s successes.
330 Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck , in FREE WILL 174, 177 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
Nagel explained:
There are roughly four ways in which the natural objects of moral assess-
ment are disturbingly subject to luck.  One is the phenomenon of constitu-
tive luck—the kind of person you are, where this is not just a question of
what you deliberately do, but of your inclinations, capacities, and tempera-
ment.  Another category is luck in one’s circumstances—the kind of
problems and situations one faces.  The other two have to do with the
causes and effects of action:  luck in how one is determined by antecedent
circumstances, and luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out.  All
of them present a common problem.  They are all opposed by the idea that
one cannot be more culpable or estimable for anything than one is for that
fraction of it which is under one’s control.  It seems irrational to take or
dispense credit or blame for matters over which a person has no control, or
for their influence on results over which he has partial control.  Such things
may create the conditions for action, but action can be judged only to the
extent that it goes beyond these conditions and does not just result from
them.
Id.
331 Professor Michael Moore made an interesting argument that while legal schol-
ars make excuse arguments for defendants with an abusive or poor background,
rarely do they make arguments that criminals should be excused because of “their
happy childhood, their parents’ wealth, or the advantages they may have enjoyed—
even though such factors may well cause someone . . . to become a criminal.”
Moore, supra  note 322, at 1146.  He suggests that the reason we allow the unhappy
background to be an excuse is not so much based on causal explanations but because
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fense attorneys failed to present mitigating evidence for juries to
consider were not defendants without mitigating factors.  In
those cases, those mitigating circumstances, or moral luck factors,
were not discovered or presented.  Another problem is that even
when mitigating evidence is presented, its weight is dictated by
the beliefs of the decision-makers in the individual cases.  There-
fore, as discussed below, even the partial free will model does not
provide a moral foundation for a system that executes capital
defendants.332
a. Is the Death Penalty Morally Justified If Judge, Jury, and
Executioner Never Have a Complete Moral Picture
of the Defendant?
The limited free will view, like the free will and determinism
models, ultimately fails to provide a moral justification for the
current capital punishment system.  One problem that arises
from the attempt to provide a moral justification for executing
human beings through consideration of mitigating factors is that
not all mitigating evidence is found in individual cases.  This
problem occurs because of our incomplete understanding of the
causes of crime and because of attorneys’ failures or inability to
we feel guilty for not helping the unhappy child or we feel that the defendant has
already suffered enough. See id.
Legislatures and courts generally do not list a mitigating circumstances of “happy
childhood” as an excuse, but that might be (1) because there is no, or only a few,
capital defendants with that background and (2) because there have been no studies
that such a background creates murderers.  Still, if we live in a determinist world,
then any factors in an individual’s background, even positive ones, contribute to
creating the person who commits murder.
Professor Moore references an argument of privileged background that was made
by Clarence Darrow in representing Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, Jr. . See
id .; Clarence Darrow, The Crime of Compulsion , in ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED:
CLARENCE DARROW IN THE COURTROOM 16, 16-88 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1989).
Darrow argued to the court, “It is just as often a great misfortune to be the child of
the rich as it is to be the child of the poor.” Id . at 59.  In fact, though, much of
Darrow’s argument centered on the defendants being “emotionally defective.” Id.
at 57.
332 See  Moore, supra  note 322, at 1119.  Moore states:
If we truly believe that all behavior is fully determined and that fully deter-
mined behavior is not the actor’s responsibility, it would be immoral to
hold people responsible because we were ignorant of what caused them to
act.  To say otherwise would be tantamount to excusing those who have
some particular excuse about which we have knowledge, but holding all
others responsible because we are ignorant of what excuse they have—
even though we believe that all of those others have some valid excuse.
Id.
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discover evidence.  Under the limited free will model, if we con-
sider current scientific beliefs that crimes have causes, the de-
fense lawyer’s failure to discover the cause, or mitigating factors,
in an individual case does not mean that a cause does not exist.
Similarly, when doctors discover a disease, if they do not know
the causes of the disease, they do not assume that there is no
cause.
Disease Theory Factors are the building blocks of our under-
standing of the causes of violent crimes, yet the picture in an in-
dividual case is often incomplete.  The list of possible causes of
crime is still being developed and studied, and we may never
know all of the causes because a person’s “heart is an abyss”
whose depths we cannot fathom.333  The incomplete list raises the
question of whether we can ever determine the “moral desert”334
of capital defendants accurately.  Professor Stephen Nathanson
has argued that there are three possibilities regarding our ability
to determine moral desert: (1) we cannot develop a precise scale
to assess moral desert among individuals; (2) we can never accu-
rately determine the blameworthiness of a person because we
will never have complete information; or (3) although we can ac-
curately determine a person’s moral blameworthiness, the legal
system is incapable of making that determination in an accurate
and unbiased way.335
Although mitigating circumstances are an attempt to deter-
mine moral desert, they still give an incomplete picture of the
defendant.  Not only are there other possible causes of crime yet
to be discovered, known causes may not be adequately
researched in individual cases.  For example, because the mitigat-
ing circumstance of child abuse is relevant to moral desert, a de-
333 Baron P.H.D. d’Holbach, Determinism Rules Out Free Will , in THE PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY, supra  note 302, at 412.
334 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 193 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
It is a belief fundamental to morality that people ought to get what they
deserve.  What they deserve are benefits and harms made appropriate by
some past fact[s] about the recipients . . . .
Underlying the ought  involved in desert is the notion of a moral equilib-
rium:  the state in which the benefits and harms an individual receives are
proportional to what is warranted by the significant fact in the individual’s
past.  One central aim of morality is to maintain this equilibrium by distrib-
uting benefits and harms according to desert and by correcting the dise-
quilibrium that occurs when benefits and harms are received undeservedly.
Id .
335 See STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE:  THE IMMORALITY OF PUN-
ISHING BY DEATH 90-94 (2d ed. 2001).
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fense attorney’s failure to discover such an existing mitigating
circumstance results in a morally inaccurate result.
There are two main reasons for incomplete research of mitigat-
ing evidence in individual cases.  First, it is not uncommon for
capital defense attorneys to fail to adequately investigate the
background of their clients.336  Often because of a lack of re-
sources or for other reasons, attorneys fail to complete the com-
plex task of doing a complete mitigation investigation or
supervising such an investigation, and often the courts find that
an incomplete investigation is constitutionally adequate.337
The second reason that an incomplete mitigation picture is
often presented at sentencing is because of the inherent impossi-
bility of presenting a complete picture of all of the influences in a
person’s life.338  Mitigating evidence in a capital case goes back
across the defendant’s entire lifetime and even before the defen-
dant’s birth.  As one scholar has noted,
A proper mitigation investigation involves a complex process
of researching records, interviewing family members and asso-
ciates of capital defendants, following leads, multiple follow-
up interviews, as well as the organization and compilation of
potentially large quantities of evidence into a comprehensible
summarized chronology that illustrates the cumulative effect
of the influences on a capital defendant’s life.339
336 See, e.g ., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer , 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Ivan K. Fong,
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing , 39 STAN. L. REV. 461
(1987).
337 See  Bright, supra  note 336; Fong, supra  note 336.
338 One philosopher who believed in Determinism explained:
[I]t must be acknowledged that the multiplicity and diversity of the causes
which continually act upon man, frequently without even his knowledge,
render it impossible, or at least extremely difficult for him to recur to the
true principles of his own peculiar actions, much less the actions of others:
they frequently depend upon causes so fugitive, so remote from their ef-
fects, and which, superficially examined, appear to have so little analogy, so
slender a relation with them, that it requires singular sagacity to bring them
into light.  This is what renders the study of the moral man a task of such
difficulty; this is the reason why his heart is an abyss, of which it is fre-
quently impossible for him to fathom the depth.
d’Holbach, supra  note 333, at 412.
339 Daniel L. Payne, Note, Building the Case for Life:  A Mitigation Specialist as a
Necessity and a Matter of Right , 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 48 (2003); see  Jonathan P.
Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t:  The Use of Mitigation Experts in
Death Penalty Litigation , 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359, 365 (1997); Major David D. Vel-
loney, Balancing the Scales of Justice:  Expanding Access to Mitigation Specialists in
Military Death Penalty Cases , 170 MIL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2001).
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Such evidence is often difficult to find.  Because relevant mitigat-
ing evidence may be traced back to decades before the trial,
there are situations where even with a complete investigation,
substantial mitigating evidence might not be discovered because
witnesses have died or records have been destroyed.340  Further,
evidence of some of the Disease Theory Factors, such as child
abuse, are not matters family members may be willing to dis-
cuss.341  Therefore, in many cases it is impossible to present a
complete picture of mitigating circumstances and especially of
Disease Theory Factors.  So, at best, as Professor Nathanson sug-
gests, the legal system in this area gives an incomplete picture of
moral desert.342
Under a limited free will model, the legal system, by adopting
the jurisprudence of mitigating factors, accepts that there are
causes of crime that are relevant to determining whether a per-
son is executed.  Of course, the legal system is not perfect, but
there needs to be a higher standard of moral justification in situa-
tions where the system takes an individual’s life.  Because miti-
gating evidence is relevant to whether the system is morally
justified in executing a defendant, an execution is not morally
validated in cases with undiscovered mitigating evidence.  Thus,
the law of mitigating circumstances, an attempt to give a moral
force to the execution of individuals, itself undermines the moral
justifications for the death penalty.
b. Is the Death Penalty Morally Justified If Personal Beliefs of
Judges, Legislators, and Juries About Free Will Affect the
Application of Mitigating Circumstances?
Another practical problem in determining moral desert under
a limited free will model is a disparity of moral beliefs held by
the decision-makers about the extent of free will that an individ-
ual has.  One of the benefits of a jury system is that it incorpo-
rates beliefs of the community.  However, in the area of the
death penalty where a higher degree of moral certainty is re-
340 See  Williams, supra  note 244, at A25.  “For many death-row inmates, there
simply isn’t enough available information . . . .  Probation officers rarely dig deeply
into a killer’s family history.  The killers themselves are seldom candid.” Id.
341 See  Elizabeth Beck et al., Seeking Sanctuary:  Interviews with Family Members
of Capital Defendants , 88 CORNELL L. REV. 382, 413 (2003) (discussing how mitigat-
ing evidence can make a capital defendant’s family feel ashamed within their
community).
342 See NATHANSON, supra  note 335, at 90-94.
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quired, the diversity of beliefs and the failure to accurately and
consistently consider mitigating factors undermine the moral ba-
sis of the capital punishment system.
Despite the important role of mitigating factors in trying to
discover the causes of violent crime, the people who consider the
evidence impose their own beliefs about personal responsibility
and good and evil, even if those beliefs are inconsistent with sci-
ence and law.343  Although courts and legislators mandate that
various factors should be considered as mitigating in capital
cases, the weight given to each factor varies depending on the
individual decision-maker.344
One study by the Capital Juror Project found that jurors gener-
ally give different weight to different mitigating factors.345  For
example, as a whole, jurors give the most mitigating weight to the
circumstances of residual doubt, mental retardation, and youth-
fulness, even though a significant number of jurors still would not
give much weight to those factors.346  Only a small percentage of
jurors give weight to some other mitigating circumstances, such
as lack of a criminal record, that a co-defendant received a life
sentence, and that the crime was committed under the influence
343 Similarly, one writer recently explained in an editorial that considering that
the real rationale for the death penalty is vengeance, jurors are incapable of making
a reasonable determination because:
Human pain is not quantifiable.  And understanding the pain of another
turns largely on your own experience, your own sensitivities, and the vic-
tim’s eloquence—not on any accepted extrinsic yardstick.  By the same to-
ken, whether a defendant deserves to live or die turns largely on what lies
deep in his heart and whether there is such thing as redemption; questions
that jurors may not be suited to decide with any degree of certainty.
Dahlia Lithwick, The Crying Game:  Should We Decide Capital Punishment With
Our Hearts or Our Heads? , SLATE, Dec. 2, 2004, at  http://www.slate.com/ id/
2110567.
344 In some cases, judges and juries may view certain mitigating circumstances as
aggravating.  “Specifically, mental illness, substance abuse, and having a deprived
and abusive childhood, factors that would appear to be mitigating and arising sym-
pathy, may be viewed as aggravating and suggestive of future dangerousness.”  John
M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist , 27
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 90 (2003).
345 See  Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases:  What Do
Jurors Think? , 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998).
346 Id.  at 1563-64. Even for the mitigating factor of residual doubt, which was the
most powerful mitigating factor, a significant number of jurors did not give it much
weight.  “[A]mong those twenty-eight jurors who said they actually held lingering
doubt over the defendant’s guilt, only 46.4% said it made them much less likely to
vote for death, and only 57.1% said it made them at least slightly less likely.  Fully
35.7% said it made no difference to them.” Id.  at 1563.
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of alcohol or drugs.347  The study found that “a third of jurors
would assign some mitigating weight to the fact that the defen-
dant had been seriously abused as a child, although nearly two-
thirds would assign it no weight.”348
The study concluded, “[N]otions of collective or societal re-
sponsibility for shaping the defendant’s character played some
role in jurors’ capital sentencing decision, especially if it ap-
peared that the defendant tried to get help for his problems but
society somehow failed him.  Notions of individual responsibility,
however, played a larger role.”349
Beliefs about personal responsibility and free will affect not
only jurors, but affect legislators and judges.  Justices Scalia and
Thomas have written opinions advocating that the Court allow
states to limit the consideration of mitigating circumstances.350
Chief Justice Rehnquist also has indicated that he would approve
some limitation on mitigating circumstances,351 though Justice
Scalia takes the most extreme position by arguing “that the
Eighth Amendment does not require any consideration of miti-
gating evidence.”352
Justice Scalia would abandon the mitigating factor require-
ment because of the arbitrariness it adds to the death penalty,
but his proposed scheme is consistent with his belief in free will
and that the punishment should be mainly or completely based
upon the crime.  For example, in a recent dissenting opinion in a
capital case, he implied that a defendant’s lack of mental capacity
may be irrelevant when he wrote, “Surely culpability, and de-
servedness of the most severe retribution depends not merely (if
at all) upon the mental capacity of the criminal (above the level
where he is able to distinguish right from wrong) but also upon
347 Id.  at 1562-63, 1565.  For each of the factors of lack of criminal record, a co-
defendant received a life sentence, and that the crime was committed under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, only about a fifth of the jurors surveyed said they
would give them mitigating significance. Id.
348 Id.  at 1565.
349 Id.
350 See, e.g. , Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 493-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 374 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Sochor v.
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 554 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
351 Chief Justice Rehnquist joined a dissenting opinion that argued that it would
be constitutional to sentence a defendant to death without consideration of mitigat-
ing circumstances where that defendant committed murder while serving a life sen-
tence.  Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 86 (1987).
352 Sochor , 504 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the depravity of the crime.”353
Justice Scalia explained more about free will in an essay on
capital punishment and his own Christian beliefs: “The doctrine
of free will—the ability of man to resist temptations to evil,
which God will not permit beyond man’s capacity to resist—is
central to the Christian doctrine of salvation and damnation,
heaven and hell.”354  Thus, he argued, “[T]he more Christian a
country is the less  likely it is to regard the death penalty as im-
moral.”355  Arguably, his proposed judicial solution to dealing
with systemic arbitrariness by eliminating the mitigating factor
requirement, as opposed to other possible solutions, might be
guided by perceptions of how mitigating factors relate to free will
and personal responsibility.356
353 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
354 Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours , FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17-21.
355 Id.  In the essay, Justice Scalia quotes St. Paul:  “[I]f thou do that which is evil,
be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain:  for he is the minister of God, a
revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.  Wherefore ye must needs be
subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.” Id.  (quoting Romans
13:1-5).
356 For a further discussion of Justice Scalia’s position regarding mitigating factors,
see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:  The Paradox of To-
day’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme , 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 345, 447-51 (1998); Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal
Punishment:  The Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas , 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 593, 613 (1995); Stephen G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty , 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 67, 96 (1992).  Professor Gey has noted that Justice Scalia’s justification for
the death penalty does not center only on individual responsibility but also on soci-
ety’s obligations to execute murderers:  “In Scalia’s universe, the individualized
moral guilt of the defendant is only one part of the equation.  Society’s outrage at
crimes analogous to the defendant’s is the other, equally important part of the equa-
tion.” Id. at 124.
Further, Professor Gey argues that Justice Scalia’s view of the death penalty is
that it is an instrument of revenge rather than retribution. Id.  at 125-30.  Justice
Scalia has cited Kant because they both agree about the responsibility of society to
execute murderers.  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 752 n.6 (1992) (Scalia J., dis-
senting) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 (W. Hastie trans.,
Augustus M. Kelley Pub. 1974) (1887) (“Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve
itself with the consent of all its members . . . the last Murderer lying in the prison
ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”).  However, Kant re-
jected punishment as revenge.  Kant believed that “[t]he state alone possesses both a
right and, more important, a duty of retribution; and as the state is impersonal, de-
void of passion, its acts cannot be described as the ‘channeling’ of vengeance.” MAR-
VIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION:  EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE
159 (1990).  It should be noted that “[c]lassical retributivism . . . is a late develop-
ment [in history], attributable in its purest form to Kant and Hegel.” Id.  at 96.
Interestingly, Hegel believed that not only was there a duty to punish, the offender
had a moral right to be punished. Id.  at 206.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 80 18-FEB-05 10:03
710 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
Therefore, Supreme Court Justices may be swayed by their un-
derstandings about free will in evaluating mitigation.  In the same
way, other judges, like jurors, may give different weight to simi-
lar mitigating factors.357  This disparity in the consideration of
mitigating factors, resulting from a disparity in philosophical be-
liefs and scientific understandings, undermines the moral justifi-
cation of capital punishment.
D. Scientific Evidence and Alternative Views of Free Will Fail
to Provide Moral Justification for the Current Capital
Punishment System
In conclusion, in light of scientific evidence of causation princi-
ples, none of the possible models of the role of free will provide a
moral justification for the death penalty that is consistent with
our current justice system.  A pure free will model is inconsistent
with the consideration of Disease Theory Factors.  A determin-
ism model is inconsistent both with the need for mitigating fac-
tors and with the use of the death penalty.
A limited free will view is most consistent with our current
death penalty system.  The attempt to embrace both free will and
determinism, however, creates other problems and ultimately
does not morally justify the capital punishment system.  Despite
the fact that courts and legislators have developed a long list of
mitigating circumstances, the circumstances are not applied con-
sistently.  In some cases, they may be ignored or given less weight
by jurors or judges with strong views about individual responsi-
bility and free will.  Existing mitigating factors might not be dis-
covered at all.  Thus, our current system is not morally justified
even under a limited free will model.
357 For example, courts may give a range of weight to a defendant’s background.
Compare  Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d  7, 10-11 (Fla. 1997) (holding that trial court did
not err in giving little mitigating weight to circumstance of defendant’s impoverished
childhood because other family members had the same background and did not fol-
low lives of crime), and  Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Ark. 1995) (af-
firming death sentence and holding that there was no error for jury to find no
mitigating factors even though the defendant offered evidence of his deprived socio-
economic background and dysfunctional family), with  State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18,
31 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that background evidence is relevant because defendants
who come from a disadvantaged background or who have emotional or mental
problems may be less culpable than other defendants), and  Henley v. State, 960
S.W.2d 572, 581 (Tenn. 1997) (same), and  Richardson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 941, 942
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that society has a long-held belief that defendants
who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background may
be less culpable than defendants without that excuse).
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In specific cases, however, jurors may ultimately gain a new
perspective of murderers from learning more about a defendant’s
mitigating circumstances, as shown by a study of twelve Indiana
jurors who favored capital punishment but ultimately voted for a
life sentence.358  In that case, several of the jurors said that it was
only by going through the experience of witnessing the mitigating
evidence that they could vote for life, whereas their explanations
to friends about why they rejected the death penalty seemed
insufficient.359
The development of mitigating circumstances is an ongoing ed-
ucation process about the causes of crimes and one may wonder
what the future holds if society learns the lessons that these indi-
vidual jurors learned, and we gradually begin to give more con-
sideration to such factors.  Yet, we are still left with a system that
lacks a consistent moral justification for retributive notions of
punishment.
VI
THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
FROM MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, SCIENCE,
AND PHILOSOPHY
A. Disease Theory Will Have Broad Effects for Society and
the Criminal Justice System
Philosophical and scientific evidence supports disease theory
and at least a partially deterministic view of human behavior.360
Yet, the system does not sufficiently take into account these sci-
entific and moral principles.361  Roscoe Pound wrote that crimi-
358 See  Kotlowitz, supra  note 204.  In this examination of the sentencing phase of
the murder trial of Jeremy Gross, all twelve jurors began the trial favoring the death
penalty in theory, but they were moved by mitigating evidence of the abusive cir-
cumstances of Mr. Gross’s childhood, as well as evidence that he could do well in
better environments. Id .
359 Id.
360 See supra  Part V.A and V.B.
361 Except for punishment purposes, the legal system’s goals generally do not in-
clude an attempt to understand the causes of a crime.  For example, in a civil suit
surrounding the April 20, 1999 Columbine school shooting, all four of the parents of
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were deposed. Peter Wilkinson, Columbine, Five
Years Later , SALON, April 20, 2004, at  http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2004/04/
20/columbine_anniversary/ index.html.  Despite the fact that the information from
those depositions would be useful for society to understand what caused the young
men to do such a horrible crime, “in a highly unusual decision, a Colorado magis-
trate ordered the deposition transcripts to be destroyed, and a federal judge barred
any of the plaintiffs who witnessed the depositions from talking about them.” Id.
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nal law “is so rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral
responsibility and juridical ideas of retribution . . . that we by no
means make what we should of our discoveries.”362  More re-
cently, another scholar noted that available scientific evidence
about insanity is ignored by a legal system that embraces “medie-
valist concepts of sin and punishment.”363
One reason that the criminal justice system rejects disease the-
ory and maintains the belief that people have complete free will
is because of a fear of the contrary view.  One lawyer has claimed
that a rejection of the idea of free will in the law would have
“deleterious psychological consequences: to tell people that they
have no power over their actions tends to prevent or weaken ef-
forts to build inner controls.”364  If, as Judge Bazelon noted, we
were not morally justified in punishing anyone and therefore we
did not punish, then our streets would be overrun with crime.
However, one might adopt the view that crime is a disease and
nobody “deserves” punishment, but we still need to incarcerate
for utilitarian reasons to deter crime and protect society.  Yet,
under such a belief system where utilitarian justifications are the
only basis for punishment, the criminal justice system would lose
its moral authority.365  As Professor Sanford Kadish noted, if we
remove moral blameworthiness and claim to punish only out of
deterrence concerns, “People would continue to see state coer-
cion as punishment, notwithstanding official declarations that the
state’s only interest is the individual’s welfare and social protec-
At least one witness reported that the destroyed material “’would be rather large
news,’ the sort of stuff ‘people have never heard, are not expecting, and would be
shocked to find out.’” Id.
362 Roscoe Pound, Book Review , 3 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 281, 283-84 (1909) (re-
viewing MAURICE PARMELEE, THE PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOL-
OGY IN THEIR RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1908)).
363 Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths:  The Symbolism Mythology of In-
sanity Defense Jurisprudence , 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 730 (1989/1990).
364 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 49 (1980).
365 There are critics of using a utilitarian calculus for imposing punishment.  For
example,
Dostoevsky developed a passionate hatred for utilitarian thought in all its
forms—moral, social, and economic.  To excise our native retributive con-
science and to replace it with a mental felicfic calculator is, he believed, to
debase and demean human nature in the worst way . . . .  The utilitarian
conscience, in Dostoevsky’s judgment, sacrifices everything to externals,
counseling us to forfeit our freedom in the mistaken belief that justice can
be rationally calculated.
HENBERG, supra  note 356, at 175.
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tion.”366  Further, Professor Kadish argued that it is doubtful so-
ciety would want to accept such a change, “since blame and
punishment give expression to the concept of personal responsi-
bility which is a central feature of our moral culture.”367  So, we
proceed with the fiction that we have the moral authority to
punish.
Because humans cannot prove whether we have free will or
not, our beliefs are often based on a cost-benefit analysis, consid-
ering the costs of adopting either theory.  In our normal lives, as
a practical matter, we err on the side of choosing free will over
determinism because, even if we are wrong, we have better lives
if we believe in free will.368  If society were to embrace determin-
ism, there would be a loss of incentive to make the predeter-
mined world a better place.  However, in the area of capital
punishment and the death penalty, the costs shift.  If capital de-
fendants act without free will, then we are executing people who
are not morally blameworthy.369  If they do have free will and we
do not execute them because we believe they are not morally
blameworthy, the cost is arguable.370
Isaiah Berlin noted how difficult it would be for society to
change the way it acted and to embrace determinism over free
will: “[I]t is difficult, and perhaps beyond our normal powers, to
conceive what our picture of the world would be if we seriously
believed [in determinism.]”371  Further, one may ask whether re-
366 Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime , 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 265 (1987).
367 Id.
368 Kant argued that “[l]ife becomes meaningful for us as human beings when we
can believe that what we do is the result of free choice, and has, thereby, a moral
meaning.” FROST JR., supra  note 304, at 147.
369 This argument leads to a circular argument that if everything is predetermined,
so is our decision to execute murderers and we have not free will to act differently.
One might argue that if everything is predetermined, there is no reason to debate
the issue.
370 A free will advocate might argue that a failure to adopt a belief in anything
besides that we have absolute free will would have adverse consequences on human
behavior.  People may tend to be more anti-social if they believe they are not mor-
ally responsible for their actions.
371 ISAIAH BERLIN, Historical Inevitability , in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND,
119, 147 (Henry Hardy & Roger Havsheer eds., 1997).
If the belief in freedom—which rests on the assumption that human beings
do occasionally choose, and that their choices are not wholly accounted for
by the kind of causal explanations which are accepted in, say, physics or
biology—if this is a necessary illusion, it is so deep and so pervasive that it
is not felt as such.
Id.  at 147-48.
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cent studies tell us enough about the causes of crime to justify
changing our views.  Based on fears that studies might be used
for improper purposes, some argue that ignorance in this area
should be maintained and we should avoid scientific research on
the issue.372  Others might fear that a determinism view will re-
sult in arresting people before they commit crimes, as in The Mi-
nority Report ,373 or that there will be a loss of personal autonomy
and society will begin programming individuals as in A Clock-
work Orange374 or even programming embryos as in Brave New
World .375  Discoveries about the effects of genes and environ-
ment and a belief in predictive behavior do raise moral issues,376
372 Besides the general concerns about how such studies will affect our concepts
of personal responsibility, some have raised concerns that biological research on
crime might be used for racist purposes. RAINE, supra  note 273, at 314-17.  Profes-
sor Raine argued that while scientists and society have a responsibility regarding
how such studies are done and reported, such studies are important and the issue of
biological influences should be “scientifically confronted, not politically repressed.”
Id.  at 316.
373 PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report , in THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER
CLASSIC STORIES (2003).  Much of the theme of the book and the movie centers on
the free will versus determinism debate.  Detective John Anderson initially believed
in the deterministic predictions that allowed the police to make arrests before the
crimes were committed, until the “precogs” predicted that he would commit a crime
in the future.  One could argue that one of the major justifications for punishment
today is similar to the Minority Report  scenerio of punishing people for crimes not
yet committed.  Today, one of the main justifications for punishment is incapacita-
tion—or to prevent a criminal from committing future crimes. See  Robinson &
Darley, supra  note 51, at 464-68.  Thus, punishments like three-strikes laws with a
component of incarcerating criminals because they might commit crimes in the fu-
ture, arguably are not so far away from the future vision of Minority Report.
374 ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).  In A Clockwork Or-
ange , society experiments with reprogramming criminals by giving them a drug that
makes them violently ill and then forcing the criminals to watch scenes of violence.
While Minority Report  illustrates the extremes of the incapacitation justification for
criminal punishment, A Clockwork Orange  highlights the extremes of the rehabilita-
tion justification.
375 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).  In Brave New World , set in
the year 632 AF (After Ford), human embryos are conditioned and developed to fit
into society by a combination of drugs, nutrients, and oxygen.
376 RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 268-69.  A New Zealand study found that the com-
bination of a low active monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) and an abusive envi-
ronment resulted in a significant probability that the person would be antisocial. Id.
at 267-68.  Professor Ridley asks,
Imagine that you are a youngster rescued too late by social services from
an abusive family.  Just one diagnostic test, of the promoter length in this
one gene, will allow a physician to predict, with some confidence, whether
you are likely to be antisocial and probably criminal.  How will you, your
doctor, your social worker, and your elected representative handle this
knowledge?
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but we must still ask the questions.
If crime were seen as a disease, society would treat the crime
and the criminals in a different manner.  Doctors strive to cure
and prevent diseases, but current American society treats crimes
by locking up the perpetrators and by instituting longer
sentences.  If crime were seen as a disease, society would work
harder to cure the problem by looking to the causes.  University
of Southern California Psychology Professor Adrian Raine, who
has written about the causes of crime, has noted:
If we accept that repeated, serious crime is a disorder, the im-
plication is that such offenders should not be punished as se-
verely for their actions, that more freedoms should be restored
to incarcerated prisoners, that new, vigorous attempts should
be made to increase new research and clinical efforts to under-
stand and treat crime, and that the criminal justice system re-
quires revision in order to take into account the consequent
practical implications.377
The immediate changes to the criminal justice system do not
have to be drastic, but society should seek knowledge and under-
standing over maintaining ignorance.378  There is still much to be
done, but an important step was the consideration of mitigating
factors in capital cases.  These factors include brain damage, child
abuse, intoxication, drug abuse, poverty, and other mitigating
factors that courts and legislatures have determined as relevant.
It is time that these Disease Theory Factors, and the implications
from the decisions regarding their relevance in capital cases, be
considered beyond the individual cases and have broader signifi-
cance for the way the criminal justice system works.  As one phi-
losopher asked, “Is there not a necessity for deeply reflecting
upon an alteration of the system that breeds these crimes, instead
of glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of criminals to
make room only for the supply of new ones?”379
Id.  at 268-69.
377 RAINE, supra  note 273, at 320.
378 For example, some might argue that the adoption of disease theory should
apply to the sentencing stage but not to the guilt phase. See, e.g. , Thomas A. Green,
Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound:  An Essay on Criminal
Justice , 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1923 (1995) (noting that historically, determinist
facts had more influence at the sentencing stage than at the guilt stage of trials).
However, the new understanding of disease theory should also have effects on the
guilt phase.
379 Karl Marx, Capital Punishment , N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 18, 1853, quoted in
Jeffrey G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution , in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITA-
TION 74, 75 (2d ed. 1985).  Regarding free will, Marx asked, “Is it not a delusion to
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One may wonder what are the implications for crime if society
adopts a disease theory of criminal law.  If society saw crime as
something to be cured rather than something to be punished, it
would not necessarily result in a flood of criminals in our streets.
One might argue that the government would still be justified in
detaining people to protect society.380  If incapacitation is neces-
sary to protect society from certain criminals, then we may im-
prison them even if they are not morally deserving of the
punishment.  Then the debate may focus on whether society ben-
efits from the death penalty even if the defendants are not mor-
ally deserving of being executed.  Further, the new label would
be something of a deterrent, as there may be some romance to
being an “outlaw” but not to being “diseased.”
As an initial experiment, society could adopt a disease theory
instead of a punishment model for only certain types of crimes.
There are some crimes that seem to fit within the disease model
easier than others.381  Professor Raine has cited studies that indi-
cate that repeated serious crime is a disorder.382  Certainly, it
might be easier for society to accept repeated drug crimes as
crimes in need of treatment rather than incarceration.  There is
room for experimentation.  The use of mitigating factors in a
structured setting in capital cases is itself an experiment applying
the disease theory to the most severe crimes.  Society should use
that experiment as a way of going forward with alternative ways
to deal with our growing prison population in other areas.
Judge Bazelon noted that merely establishing the factors
substitute for the individual with his real motives, with multifarious social circum-
stances pressing upon him, the abstraction of ‘free will’—one among the many quali-
ties of man for man himself?” Id.  Of course, one might cite the failure of
Communism around the world as an example of the possible damage done to society
by believing in the ability to control human beings by their environment.
380 One commentator has noted that a gene defense is not very effective in indi-
vidual cases:
In trying to disprove his guilt, a criminal who admits to a natural inclination
to crime is hardly likely to win over the jury.  And when being sentenced, if
he claims it is in his nature to murder, he is unlikely to persuade the judge
to set him free to kill again.
RIDLEY, supra  note 133, at 271-72.
381 One author has noted certain crimes that do not easily fit within the disease
theory of crime, such as economic crimes for the purpose of monetary gain, system-
atic acts of violence by organized gangs, “tax dodging, espionage, reckless driving,
and corruption among civil servants.” BODENHEIMER, supra  note 315, at 36 (citing
JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 63-64 (1974)).
382 RAINE, supra  note 273, at 319-20.
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needed to understand the causes of crime “will not cure the dis-
ease.  Once we enlighten our understanding, we will still need to
decide whether the costs of grappling with the roots of crime are
more than we are willing to pay.”383  However, he added, “soci-
ety can never hope to achieve a just and lasting solution to crime
without first facing the facts that underlie it.”384  At the least, we
cannot ignore the questions raised by the development of miti-
gating factors in capital cases.
B. Proposals for Reform: Moral Principles Demand That Our
Criminal Justice System Change in at Least Four Ways
Considering that mitigating circumstances are carving a new
path for criminal justice theories, the remaining question is what
should be the next steps of reform.  Mitigating circumstances in
capital cases have developed with little discussion about what
they mean about our perceptions of humanity.  Further discus-
sion is needed.  This Article is not proposing that “every frantic
and idle humour” of a defendant should exempt that person from
punishment.385  It is important, however, that judges, defense
lawyers, prosecutors, academics, criminologists, sociologists,
mental health professionals, and others continue to push for fur-
ther education and reform in this area.
Below are some suggested reforms based on the moral consid-
eration of Disease Theory Factors, new scientific evidence, and
philosophical theories.  First, social science experts should make
use of the evidence being presented in capital cases.  Second, the
criminal justice system should continue to experiment with alter-
natives to incarceration where deterrence concerns can still be
satisfied.  Third, the criminal justice system should abandon con-
siderations of retribution and instead focus on deterrence, dis-
ease theory, and victims.  Finally, capital punishment should be
abolished or a moratorium imposed to further consider the mo-
rality of the death penalty.
383 BAZELON, supra  note 120, at 23.
384 Id.
385 DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMOURS:  THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 133 (1996).  At the trial of Edward Ar-
nold in 1724 in Great Britain, Justice Robert Tracy of the Court of Common-Pleas
instructed the jury that “it is not every frantic and idle humour of a man, that will
exempt him from justice.” Id .
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1. Make Use of Information the Courts Already Possess
First, we must continue to study the information we have.
Each well-investigated capital case contains mitigating evidence
that helps explain the crime.  In lawyers’ files and court offices
across the country are important records that give insight into the
causes of violent crime.  To ignore this information, and the les-
sons that it can teach us, is a great error.  As discussed earlier,
Judge Bazelon noted in United States v. Alexander  that further
consideration of the RSB defense could lead to discoveries about
the causes of violent behavior.386  Judge Bazelon later wrote that
“eliciting the information necessary to understand the forces that
drive people to crime is not a solution to the problem of prevent-
ing crime; it is only a prerequisite to solving the problem.”387
Through the law of mitigating circumstances in capital cases,
the legal system is accumulating knowledge about RSB and other
factors related to violent crime.  This knowledge needs to be used
beyond the individual cases so this information is not “lost in the
system,” as Professor Morse warned about information discov-
ered through the proposed RSB defense.388
2. Experiment with Alternatives to Incarceration
Second, participants in the system must continue to be open to
new explanations, defenses, and alternatives to the growing in-
carceration rate.389  If, learning from the lessons of mitigating cir-
cumstances, the criminal justice system begins to see at least
certain crimes under disease theory, then changes will take place
throughout the system and throughout society.  As Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas wrote, “The judiciary plays an important role in
386 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
387 BAZELON, supra  note 120, at 290.
388 Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:  A Final Word , 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (1976) (“Even if great amounts of evidence on social condi-
tions were admitted at trials, cases leading to conviction would probably not force
society at large  to face its complicity in causing criminal behavior.”). See  discussion
supra  Part II.A.
389 The growing national incarceration rate shows that the prison system is not
working. For example, a recent examination of the California Youth Authority,
which oversees the state’s ten juvenile prisons, found that it is a failure on several
levels. See  John M. Broder, Dismal California Prisons Hold Juvenile Offenders ,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at 18.  “The system’s mental health programs are in ‘com-
plete disarray,’ the experts found.” Id.
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educating the people as well as in deciding cases.”390  The lessons
of mitigating circumstances must not be isolated to individual
capital cases and forgotten.
Professor Moore argued that in the debate between causal the-
orists and those who argue for personal responsibility, our histor-
ical notions of “resentment, moral indignation, condemnation,
approval, guilt, remorse, shame, pride, and the like” should guide
us in the revelation that we are correct to hold individuals mor-
ally responsible for their actions.391  However, human beings are
often wrong.  Our incorrect historical notions of how the uni-
verse acts should encourage us to question our understandings of
how human beings act.  Our current views about retributive pun-
ishment and the realities of prisons as human storage facilities
have created institutions of violence and chronic abuse.392  Our
understandings are slowly changing; we need to use the available
evidence to examine our historical understandings of moral re-
sponsibility; and we need to use these new understandings to
consider reform to our criminal justice system.
There is no one solution, and a range of options should be con-
sidered.  Professor Angela Davis, who has criticized incarcera-
tion because of racial and class disparities, has argued that
“rather than try to imagine one single alternative to the existing
system of incarceration, we might envision an array of alterna-
tives that will require radical transformations of many aspects of
our society.”393
One current reform is therapeutic jurisprudence394 and the use
390 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 443 (1956), quoted in BAZELON,
supra  note 120, at 23.
391 Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses , 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1144
(1985).
392 See, e.g. , Jonathan Cohn, America’s Abu Ghraibs , THE NEW REPUBLIC, May
24, 2004, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?pt=afs%2F9kV2Z8RvsEQdk
EEP wR%3D%3D.  In addition to evidence of chronic abuse by prison guards, “[i]n
2001, Human Rights Watch released a report citing credible estimates that 20 per-
cent of all male prisoners in the United States have been raped.  Inadequate supervi-
sion by guards, the mixing of prisoner types, and sheer indifference by prison
authorities are often what allows the rapes to take place.” Id.
393 ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 108 (2003).  Professor Davis ex-
plained, “[a]n attempt to create a new conceptual terrain for imagining alternatives
to imprisonment involves the ideological work of questioning why ‘criminals’ have
been constituted as a class and, indeed, a class of human beings undeserving of the
civil and human rights accorded to others.” Id.  at 112.
394 See  Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts ,
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2003).
Legal rules and the way they are applied are social forces that produce
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of special courts, such as mental health courts.395  Using the
threat of jail, mental health courts keep minor offenders with
psychosis in treatment and on medication long enough for the
offenders to make rational decisions about future treatments.396
Recently, Congress passed the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment
and Crime Reduction Act, which authorizes fifty million dollars
per year for states to create mental health courts and other
mental health services for nonviolent offenders.397
Similarly, the United States has more than one thousand state
and local “drug courts” that offer court-supervised treatment
programs instead of prison.398  A recent study of six jurisdictions
by the Center for Court Innovation concluded that nonviolent
drug offenders who complete such treatment programs are much
less likely to be repeat offenders than similar offenders who
serve prison time.399
Commentators have noted the promise of specialized courts.400
inevitable, and sometimes negative, consequences for the psychological
well-being of those affected.  Therapeutic jurisprudence’s basic insight was
that scholars should study those consequences and reshape and redesign
law in order to accomplish two goals—to minimize antitherapeutic effects,
and when it is consistent with other legal goals, to increase law’s therapeu-
tic potential.
Id . at 1062-63; see also Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America , 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439,
444-49 (1999) (noting that therapeutic jurisprudence uses mental health information
and social science as tools to gain new perspective on legal issues).
395 See generally  Winick, supra  note 394.
396 Sally Satel, Out of the Asylum, Into the Cell , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at A15.
397 Congress Passes Bill to Support MH, Criminal Justice Collaboration , MENTAL
HEALTH WEEKLY, Nov. 1, 2004, at 1.
398 Paul von Zielbauer, Court Treatment System is Found to Help Drug Offenders
Stay Clean , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33.  Another benefit of the drug courts is
that they save the state money, as the report concluded that New York drug courts
have saved approximately $254 million in prison-related expenses. Id.
399 See id .; see MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., THE NEW YORK STATE ADULT DRUG
COURT EVALUATION:  POLICIES, PARTICIPANTS AND IMPACTS (October 2003)
(showing meaningful recidivism impacts across a large number of drug court loca-
tions), available at  http://courtinnovation.org/pdf/drug_court_eval.pdf.
400 See, e.g. , Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice
Through Community Courts , 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898 (2003)
(“[C]ommunity courts seek to fix problems in the courts by developing legal forums
that are unique.”); Hora et al., supra  note 394, at 535 (“By understanding that drug
addiction should be considered a treatable disease, judges sitting in [Drug Treatment
Courts] apply a more appropriate and effective solution for the problem—judicially
supervised drug treatment for a problem that is and  should be recognized as largely
medical in nature.”); Winick, supra  note 394, at 1090 (problem-solving courts and
therapeutic jurisprudence “can do much to transform law into an instrument of heal-
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Recently, the American Bar Association Justice Kennedy Com-
mission Report, in recommending alternatives to incarceration,
also noted the promise of specialized courts.401  As a specific ex-
ample, a restorative justice probation program in Deschutes
County, Oregon resulted in a twenty-seven percent drop in seri-
ous crime among juvenile offenders during the first two years of
the program.402  In Brooklyn, New York, the Red Hook Commu-
nity Justice Center, which was created in 2000 and acts as a court
and community center for social services, has had positive
results.403
Such innovations as the mental health courts and drug courts
are consistent with the recognition that a person’s propensity to-
ward crime may be more like a disease to be cured than just an
infraction to be punished.  Other innovations may come from
outside the U.S. legal system and from other countries and other
ing for both the individual and the community”); Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminal-
ization of the Mentally Ill:  The Challenging Role of the Defense Attorney in the
Mental Health Court System , 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 210 (2002) (“With the develop-
ment of the mental health court, the identified concerns of mentally ill offenders . . .
may be addressed in a much more appropriate and effective manner.”).
Some commentators, however, have noted that these specialized courts, which
often delve into what would otherwise be attorney-client confidences, can create
some problems for defense attorneys trying to competently represent their clients.
See  Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I On Anyway?  Musings of a Public Defender
About Drug Treatment Court Practice , 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37
(2001); see also  Wendy N. Davis, Special Problems for Specialty Courts , 89 A.B.A.
J., Feb. 2003, at 32.  Additionally, some cities, such as Portland, Oregon and Denver,
Colorado have cut back or eliminated community and drug courts because of cost.
See  Terry Carter, Red Hook Experiment , A.B.A. J., June 2004, at 37, 42.
401 ABA JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra  note 44, at 32-33.  The
ABA Commission recommended alternatives to incarceration:
We recommend that jurisdictions study and fund treatment alternatives to
incarceration for offenders who may benefit from treatment for substance
abuse and mental illness; adopt diversion or deferred adjudication pro-
grams that, in appropriate cases, provide an offender with an opportunity
to avoid a criminal conviction; and develop graduated sanctions for proba-
tion and parole violations that incarcerate only when a probation or parole
violator has committed a new crime or poses a danger to the community.
Id . at 24.
402 ROBIN CAMPBELL & ROBERT VICTOR WOLF, PROBLEM-SOLVING PROBATION:
AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COMMUNITY-BASED EXPERIMENTS, 14 (2001) (examin-
ing efforts to reform probation based upon community justice principles in Vermont,
Massachusetts, Arizona, and Oregon), available at  http://courtinnovation.org/pdf/
prob_sol_prob.pdf.
403 Carter, supra  note 400, at 38-39.  “The court is a first-of-its-kind, ambitious
attempt at solving a neighborhood’s problems by getting at their root causes.  All
misdemeanors and a couple of low-level felony categories that call for a maximum of
a year in jail come through here.” Id.  at 37-38.
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cultures.404  These experiments are just some ways that the crimi-
nal justice system can gradually adapt to the new understandings
about human behavior.
3. Eliminate the Role of Classical Retributive Principles in
Criminal Justice System
Third, because a complete free will model is inconsistent with
current knowledge, we should eliminate the role that classical re-
tributive principles play in our criminal justice system so that the
system focuses on disease theory and utilitarian principles.  In-
stead of retribution principles, the criminal justice system should
404 For example, in 1982 the Navajo Nation developed the Peacemaking Court
with a focus on restorative justice as an alternative to an adversary system for some
cases. See  Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacemaking:  Implications for Adjudication-
Based Systems of Justice , 1 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 123 (1998); James W. Zion, The
Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking , 14 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 58 (1998).  As an-
other example, there are lessons to be learned from South Africa and its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. See, e.g ., South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, at  http://www.doj. gov.za/trc/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).  Indeed, con-
sistent with the theme of this Article about the existence of causes of crime is the
African principle of ubuntu , which holds that each individual person is a reflection
of the community. See, e.g. , MICHAEL JESSE BATTLE, RECONCILIATION:  THE
UBUNTU THEOLOGY OF DESMOND TUTU 35 (1997) (quoting Archbishop Tutu as
stating, “We are made for a delicate network of interdependence“). Ubuntu  is a
doctrine of human connection that includes the knowledge, as Archbiship Tutu has
stated, “that you are bound up with [others] in the bundle of life.” ANTHONY SAMP-
SON, MANDELA:  THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 12 (1999).
Similarly, Melissa Clack wrote,
[i]n the United States a person tends to be perceived by self and others as
an individual actor whose identity and sense of self stand apart from the
community, while in Japan a person is perceived by self and others as a
contextual actor whose identity is, in substantial part, defined by social
relationships.
Melissa Clack, Caught Between Hope and Despair:  An Analysis of the Japanese
Criminal Justice System , 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 525, 528 (2003).  Hence, “the
primary aim of the Japanese criminal justice system is correction rather than strictly
punishment.   Japanese officials hope to rehabilitate their criminals and allow the
offenders to re-enter society and become a part of the ‘family’ once again.” Id.  at
529.
Finally, Finland is another example. See  Jim Holt, Decarcerate? , N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2004, at 20.  About thirty years ago, Finland had a severe penal system and
one of the highest incarceration rates in Europe. Id .  Then, the Finns changed their
approach to become more humane. Id .  “Finnish prisons became almost ridicu-
lously lenient by our standards.  Inmates—referred to as ‘clients or pupils,’ depend-
ing on their age—live in dormitory-style rooms, address guards by the first name
and get generous home leaves.” Id .  Today, Finland has a low crime rate and it
imprisons 52 prisoners per 100,000 people—the smallest fraction of its population of
any European country. Id .
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focus only on curing the offender, healing the victim, and pro-
tecting society.
In 1949, in Williams v. New York , the Supreme Court stated,
“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law.  Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals.”405  Since that case was decided, the Court has
retreated from that statement and there has been a “great philo-
sophical revival of retributivism,”406 but it is time for the courts
to again consider that direction in light of what we are learning
from mitigating factor law.  As Roscoe Pound noted, “[I]n order
to deal with crime in an intelligent and practical manner we must
give up the retributive theory.”407  This suggestion is not that
punishment be eliminated altogether, but that, while considering
concerns of victims, there be an understanding that the goals of
punishment should be utilitarian in regards to deterrence and re-
habilitation.408  Judge Bazelon made such a suggestion when he
proposed in Alexander  that one option is to allow the defendant
to use the RSB defense, but to still incarcerate the defendant to
protect society.409  By placing more emphasis on utilitarian justi-
fications, we might embrace Beccaria’s conclusion that “[i]t is
better to prevent crimes than to punish them.”410
The abandonment of a pure retributive theory should also re-
sult in more focus on the victims of crime.  Currently, our society
sees vengeance as benefiting society, so it is a utilitarian goal.
Too often the line between victims’ rights and retributive justice
405 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).  Similarly, in Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246,
251 (1952), the Court noted a “tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.”
406 WHITMAN, supra  note 62, at 23-24.  “[T]he most important Anglo-American
movement of the last forty years or so” is “the great philosophical revival of retribu-
tivism, led by figures such as Andrew von Hirsch, Jeffrie Murphy, and [Jean] Hamp-
ton.” Id.
407 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City – A Summary , in CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 559, 586-87 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds.,
1922).
408 For example, “[e]ven if [pedophilia] can be successfully treated in a family
context—and medical treatment, unlike criminal law, does not involve the place-
ment of blame—one wonders whether the elimination of accountability and punish-
ment serves the victim as well as it serves the offender.” JACOBY, supra  note 303, at
223.
409 471 F.2d 923, 961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
410 CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 112 (Jane Grigson trans.,
Marsilio Pub. 1996) (1764).
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is blurred, but classical retributive theory—which justifies pun-
ishing a person only because the person deserves it—has nothing
to do with the concerns of individual victims.  Changes in percep-
tions of moral blameworthiness may eventually alter the justice
that victims seek, but in the interim, there should be some ac-
knowledgement that punishment may serve the goal of healing
the victims.411
Thus, with the eventual elimination of blameworthiness, the
focus on punishment should ultimately be to serve utilitarian
goals.  Further, we should acknowledge that punishment serves
some goals of vengeance for the victim, not retribution on a mor-
ally blameworthy subject.  “Vengeance” is a bad word for some
people, but is a more honest term for our current understanding
of punishments.412  As noted above, Justice Scalia has embraced
the vengeance function of punishments,413 and some scholars ad-
411 Islamic law provides a large role for victims in the process of determining the
appropriate punishment for offenders:
In the administration of Islamic criminal justice, the lex talionis  provides
the basis for qisas , exact retaliation, or diyah , payment of blood money.
Which of these is imposed depends on the will of the victim (in the case of
physical injury) or of the appropriate blood relatives (in the case of death).
Accordingly, the Islamic law of homicide and physical injury remains inti-
mately concerned with satisfaction of the aggrieved feelings of the victim or
of the victim’s family.
HENBERG, supra  note 11, at 117.
The determination that there should be more of a focus on victims instead of on
pure retribution, however, does not mean that victims will make punishments more
severe.  For example, the emphasis on victims in Islamic law is not a development to
encourage more severe punishments:
At the same time, however, the promise of expiation for whomever abjures
exact retaliation provides scriptural basis for urging diyah  as opposed to
qisas  . . . .  Though it remains in principle the right of the victim and his kin
to demand qisas , Muslim tradition has developed such passages into strong
moral and institutional pressure on individuals to forego retaliation.  In-
deed, the treatment of retaliatory punishments in the Muslim hadith  bears
many similarities to the gutting of the lex talionis  in the Babylonian Tal-
mud, with Islamic jurisprudence tending to ameliorate the harshness of the
law as a literalist might frame it.
Id .
412 One of the reasons for maintaining some sort of vengeance theory until further
education can take place is that society is not ready to completely abandon both
retribution and vengeance at this point in history.  As Ernest van den Haag has
argued, “When legal retribution is not imposed for what is felt to be wrong, or when
retribution is felt to be less than deserved – when it is felt to be insufficient, not
inclusive, certain, or severe enough—public control falters, and the ‘passion for re-
venge’ tends to be gratified privately.” ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS 11 (1975).
413 See supra  note 352-53 and accompanying text.  In a sense, Justice Scalia is
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vocate the use of revenge as a justification for punishment.414
It will not be easy for American society to retreat from a re-
tributive model of punishment.  Professor James Q. Whitman, in
his book Harsh Justice , argued that one of the reasons that
Americans punish more severely than other countries like France
and Germany is “because the management of the punishment
system in the United States is more given over to democratic
politics—which is often to say demagogic politics.”415  Thus, poli-
ticians tend to use the “retributive temper” and tough-on-crime
proposals to gain popular support.  Despite this obstacle to limit-
ing the role of retribution in punishment and adopting a disease
correct in making the argument that mitigating circumstances are irrelevant. It is
probably true that all murderers have acted because of a heredity and environment
beyond their control, so it makes little sense to only excuse those ones with good or
lucky attorneys who find and present the evidence.  Because of hereditary and envi-
ronmental forces, it is wrong to say that one murderer is more morally blameworthy
than another.  Arguably, Justice Scalia’s position is consistent with disease theory,
but the blameworthiness—or lack of it—is not relevant to him because society de-
mands certain punishments for certain crimes.  The question, however, should not
be what an individual defendant deserves.  Instead, the issue is whether society de-
mands vengeance or deterrence despite the lack of moral culpability, or whether our
understanding of mitigation and causation will ultimately allow us to overcome our
normal human feelings for revenge.
414 See, e.g , JACOBY, supra  note 303.
In one sense, it is a curiosity of recent history that a taboo has been at-
tached to the subject of revenge in a century that has witnessed the fearful
union of mass vengeance with technology. . . .  [But d]ismissing the legiti-
mate aspects of the human need for retribution only makes us more vulner-
able to the illegitimate, murderous, wild impulses that always lie beneath
the surface of civilization—beneath, but never so deep that they can safely
be ignored.
Id . at 362; see also  Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred:  A Qualified Defense , in FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 88 (1998).  “Since I regard retributive hatred as in principle the natural,
fitting, and proper response to certain instances of wrongdoing, I do not regard the
passion itself as either immoral or irrational.” Id.  at 108.
Professor Robert Blecker has stressed the importance of hate and emotion as a
reason for maintaining the death penalty:
[T]oday, for many of us death penalty advocates:  Utilitarian rationality, a
future-oriented calculus of costs and benefits, is inadequate.  No strictly
rational death penalty law can be constructed and applied exhaustively to
achieve justice.  We need a richer language that includes non-rational, in-
formed emotion.  Moral desert can never be reduced strictly to reason, nor
measured adequately by rational criteria:  Forgiveness, love, anger, resent-
ment are part of justice.  The past counts.  Not rationally, but really.
Robert Blecker, Roots:  Resolving the Death Penalty:  Wisdom from the Ancients , in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:  REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 198 (James R. Acker et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
415 WHITMAN, supra  note 62, at 199.
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theory model, retribution should not be a part of the calculus in
our criminal justice system.
With the developments of science and mitigating factors along
with the rise of the victims rights movement, the theories of crim-
inal justice are shifting toward punishment with less focus on re-
tributive theory and more focus on victims416 and a consideration
of “excuses” for the perpetrator.417  Members of one side of the
political spectrum complain about the excuses being used by
criminal defendants, while some defense attorneys and criminal
justice theorists might be concerned about the emphasis on vic-
tims instead of society in cases where the government is a party.
However, both trends are on an enlightened but rocky path to-
ward a new disease theory of criminal justice.418
In short, the development of the law of mitigating circum-
stances is eliminating the blameworthiness of capital defendants,
and, by association, the moral blameworthiness of all criminal
defendants.  If the law allows that factors such as heredity, neu-
rology, environment, and psychology can explain the causes of a
crime, we can no longer morally blame the perpetrator.  Thus,
punishment cannot be justified on a retributive or moral blame-
worthiness rationale.419
4. Abolish the Death Penalty
Fourth, the death penalty should be abolished because our cur-
416 See, e.g. , Aileen Adams & David Osborne, Victims’ Rights and Services:  A
Historical Perspective and Goals for the Twenty-First Century , 33 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 673, 675 (2002) (noting among other trends that since 1965, every state has
adopted a crime victim compensation program, and that since 1972, more than
10,000 victim assistance programs have been created around the country).
417 See, e.g. , ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE, 18-19 (1994) (listing a
growing number of excuse defenses).  “At a time of ever-hardening attitudes toward
crime and punishment, it may seem anomalous that so many jurors—indeed, so
many Americans—appear to be sympathetic to the abuse excuse.” Id.  at 4.
418 One might argue that a disease theory, rather than a punishment theory of
criminal justice, could in some circumstances be less respectful of human beings by
trying to impose “cures” on those who might not want to be cured and allowing
“cures” to be imposed before one has committed a crime.  One case that arguably
embraced disease theory is Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (holding
that involuntary confinement under a Kansas statute that allowed civil commitment
of people who were likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence” was not
criminal in nature and did not violate the constitution).
419 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:  A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next , 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that retribution “merits recognition as the criminal law’s cen-
tral objective”).
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rent system is not empirically or morally justified.  One conse-
quence from eliminating blameworthiness from the justifications
for punishment would be the elimination of the requirement of
mitigating factors.  If we accept that all murderers are equally
blameworthy and the result of factors beyond their control, then
capital defendants should not be treated differently based on
whether or not their attorneys were able to discover the causes.
Ironically, the successful development of mitigating circum-
stances law in capital cases should ultimately eliminate the need
for mitigating circumstances.  Considering the scientific and phil-
osophical evidence, all defendants are equally culpable and it is
morally wrong to impose the death penalty on some and not
others.  If retribution principles cannot justify the death penalty,
then capital punishment should be eliminated.420
One might argue that the scientific evidence about causation
and the philosophical evidence about free will are too inconclu-
sive to justify eliminating the death penalty.  However, if we de-
mand that there be a higher moral justification for the
punishment of death, the current evidence raises enough of a
question about the morality of the punishment that the punish-
ment should be eliminated unless contrary evidence is
developed.
CONCLUSION
A consideration of the current capital punishment system, in
light of empirical evidence of the causes of human actions and in
light of philosophical justifications, reveals a criminal justice sys-
tem with no moral foundation.  Consistent with Judge Bazelon’s
RSB theories, complete free will is a questionable theory and
new scientific studies reveal causes of crime exterior to the de-
fendants.  Not only is the current capital punishment system
without an empirical or philosophical justification, but in practice
the condemned are chosen by jurors and judges who apply their
own beliefs about free will to incomplete and imperfect informa-
tion about the defendants.  Instead of executing the “worst of the
worst” we are executing the “unluckiest of the unlucky.”421
Even though some mitigating factors in capital cases illustrate
420 One might argue, in the alternative, that because all defendants are equally
blameworthy, they should all be executed.
421 Symposium, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves
Death? , 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 133 (2004).
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a legal system that, to some extent, embraces a deterministic
view of crime, the legal system should go further and adopt a
disease theory view of crime.  Four ways that the criminal justice
system can begin to improve are: (1) using the mitigation evi-
dence developed in the courts to give us a better understanding
of the causes of crime; (2) experimenting with alternatives to in-
carceration; (3) eliminating the role of classic retributive princi-
ples in the criminal justice system; and (4) abolishing the death
penalty.  Ultimately, as one professor noted,
[T]he critical question may be not so much whether crime is
indeed a disorder, but whether less than 200 years from now a
more advanced society will look back aghast at our current
conceptualization of criminal behavior, with its concomitant
incarceration and execution of prisoners, with the same incre-
dulity with which today we look back at earlier treatment of
mental patients.422
Society will hopefully continue to evolve, especially in its
changing treatment of the outcasts of society.  One way it will
change is in its treatment and understanding of those we now
label as criminals.
Our belief in moral culpability, manifested in the punishment
of criminals, is an assertion of faith in our own free will.  How-
ever, to embrace the objective lessons presented by mitigation in
capital cases requires a new perspective on criminal law and life.
The empirical and philosophical evidence shows that each human
being evolves from outside factors, and the courts’ consideration
of mitigating factors reinforces that conclusion.  This determinis-
tic view, even if true, may not be a belief that human beings want
to embrace.  Human beings do not want to believe the statement
made by Casy the preacher in John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of
Wrath  after Casy awoke one night: “There ain’t no sin and there
ain’t no virtue.  There’s just stuff people do.”423
Certainly, there are possible consequences to our world-view if
we scale back our visions of free will and personal responsibility.
The shock might be comparable to that experienced by Inspector
422 RAINE, supra  note 273, at 319.  Professor Raine predicts “that a future genera-
tion will  reconceptualize nontrivial recidivistic crime as a disorder.” Id.
423 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 28 (1939) (R.R. Donnelley and
Sons Co. 1982) (1939).  Casy continued:  “It’s all part of the same thing.  And some
of the things folks do is nice, and some ain’t nice, but that’s as far as any man got a
right to say.” Id .
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Javert in Les Miserables  upon discovering that the criminal he
pursued was not pure evil as he had believed:
His supreme anguish was the loss of certainty.  He felt that he
had been uprooted.  The code was now no longer anything
more than a stump in his hand.  He had to do with scruples of
an unknown species.  There had taken place within him a sen-
timental revelation entirely distinct from legal affirmation, his
only standard measurement hitherto.  To retain in his former
uprightness did not suffice.  A whole order of unexpected facts
had cropped up and subjugated him.  A whole new world was
dawning on his soul: kindness accepted and repaid, devotion,
mercy, indulgence, violence committed by pity on austerity,
respect for persons, no more definitive condemnation, no
more conviction, the possibility of a tear in the eye of the law,
no one knows what justice according to God, running in in-
verse sense to justice according to men.  He perceived amid
the shadows the terrible rising of an unknown moral sun; it
horrified and dazzled him.  An owl forced to the gaze of an
eagle.424
Mitigation in capital cases is a “tear in the eye of the law.”425
Causes of crime are generally left to the criminologists, sociolo-
gists, neurologists, psychologists, and others, while the criminal
justice legal system focuses on punishing and protecting society.
By digressing from the path of automatic death sentences and
specifically identifying mitigating circumstances, the law has cre-
ated a new view of criminals that is concerned not only with retri-
bution and deterrence but also with understanding humanity and
discovering the causes of crime.
Because of Supreme Court decisions in cases such as Gregg v.
Georgia426 and Lockett v. Ohio ,427 in courtrooms around the na-
tion lawyers are documenting the causes of violent crime.  Strug-
gling with our imperfect information about human behavior, the
judges, juries, and lawyers in each capital case try to determine
what caused a particular defendant to commit a specific murder
at a certain time.  A substantial amount of information is scat-
tered in court records throughout the country, but we need to
begin to look at this information as a whole and determine what
we can learn about crime, violence, and human beings.  Even if
424 Victor Hugo, Les Miserables , in VICTOR HUGO’S WORK 180 (1905) (describ-
ing when Inspector Javert confronts the humanity of Jean Valjean, the escaped pris-
oner he had been pursuing).
425 Id .
426 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
427 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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current society is incapable of digesting the true meaning of the
information, at some point in the future our descendants will see
crime the way we currently see diseases.  The result will be a
criminal justice system that no longer focuses on retribution but
instead focuses on disease theory, deterrence, and crime victims.
When society changes its views to see crime as a disease it will
alter the current goals of punishment to focus on the search for a
cure, in terms of preventing crime.  Such a change of view will
have a dramatic impact and create “an unknown moral sun,” but
it will be a day of a new perception of the fabric of humanity.428
If we see that the worst among us and the best among us share
common bonds, the new understanding will cause us to be more
charitable to our fellow creatures.  As one philosopher wrote
about the ability to understand the causes of crime, “It may pre-
vent us . . . from indulging in righteous indignation and commit-
ting the sin of spiritual pride.”429  Ultimately, then, the search for
a new theory of criminal justice will help answer the question
asked by the first murderer: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”430
428 Hugo, supra  note 424, at 180.
429 Hospers, supra  note 302, at 417.  Professor Hospers added,
And it will protect from our useless moralizings those who are least
equipped by nature for enduring them.  As with responsibility, so with
deserts.  Someone commits a crime and is punished by the state; ‘he de-
served it,’ we say self-righteously—as if we were moral and he immoral,
when in fact we are lucky and he is unlucky—forgetting that there, but for
the grace of God and a fortunate early environment, go we.
Id.
430 Genesis  4:9.
